TURNING POINTS IN INDIAN ŚĀSTRIC TRADITION

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RADHAVALLABH TRIPATHI

NILAKANTH DASH

Indian śāstric traditions have grown extensively through three milleniums. They have ever been receptive to changes in social structure and evolution of our culture. Also, they have been revitalising themselves by incorporating new thoughts and facing challenges. During the first millenium, different śāstras made their beginings through the typical stylistic genres like *sūtra, kārikā* and *saṅgraha.* These stylistic genres were invariably connected with the tradition of oral transmission of thought or living *śāstrārthas* or debates between ṛṣis or intellectuals and discussions between the gurus and the śiṣyas.

Standing on the thresholds of a new millenium, we are not only faced with the problem of preserving our śāstric traditions, we also owe the responsibility to discover their potentiality and to discover ourselves and our national identity through these traditions. It is with this sense of responsibility that the Department of Sanskrit, Dr. Hari singh Gaur University organised a National Seminar on ***Turning Points in Indian Śāstric Tradition.***

The proceedings of this seminar are being printed in this volume for a wider circulation of the learned discussions and deliberations of the seminar.

Rs. 300

$ 30

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(Proceedings of National Seminar)

COMPLEMENTORY
COPY

Edited by
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Pratibha Prakashan
Delhi

Published under the authority of
Dr. H.S. Gaur University, Sagar

Ist Edition in 1999

© The Author

ISBN : 81-85268-93-2

Rs. 300/-

Published by :
Pratibha Prakashan
(Oriental Publishers & Booksellers)
29/5, Shakti Nagar
Delhi-110007
Phone : 7451485

Composed at :
Naresh Saini
Department of Sanskrit
Dr. H.S. Gaur, University, Sagar

Printed at :
Tarun Offset Printers

Dedicated

To

Dr. Ram Karan Sharma

in appreciation for his invaluable

contributions to Sanskrit

Learning & Literature

Preface

Indian śāstric traditions have grown extensively through three milleniums. They have ever been receptive to changes in social structure and evolution of our culture. Also, they have been revitalising themselves by incorporating new thoughts and facing challenges. During the first millenium, different śāstras made their beginings through the typical stylistic genres like *sūtra, kārikā* and *saṅgraha.* These stylistic genres were invariably connected with the tradition of oral transmission of thought or living *śāstrārthas* or debates between ṛṣis or intellectuals and discussions between the gurus and the śiṣyas. The *ākara granthas* or primary texts like *Brahmasūtra* of Bādarāyaṇa, *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* of Jaimini *Sāṅkhyasūtra* of Kapila, *Nyāyasūtra* of Gautama, *Vaiśēṣikasūtra* of Kaṇāda or *Yōgasūtra* of Patañjali, *Nirukta* of Yāska, *Bhikṣusūtra* of Pārāśarya, *Naṭasūtra* of Śilālin, *Aṣṭādhyāyī* of Pāṇini, *Arthaśāstra* of Kauṭilya, *Kāmasūtra* of Vātsyāyana, *Nāṭyaśāstra* of Bharatamuni and a number of *Dharmasūtras*, *Gṛhyasūtras* and *Śulbasūtras* were composed during this period. In the era begning from Christ to IX-X centuries, these *śāstras* or *sūtra* texts were interpreted and expanded through *bhāṣyas. Bhaṣyas* were composed by different ācāryas on all the sūtra texts, leading to the systematization of various philosophical schools. Secondly, the debate between the Vedic and Buddhist logicians further enriched these systems. The advent of *Navyanyāya* around X century, made a revolutionery change in the scene. No system remained uneffected with *pariṣkāra* the style of expression which *Navyanyāya* had evolved for accurate analysis, and presentation of a theme in a language entirely free from ambiguity.

Till recently, these traditions have been posing or facing new questions, and during each millenium they have undergone various turning points. Traditional Sanskrit pundits like Mahāmahōpādhyāya Ramavatar Sharma or Pt. Badarinath Shukla came forward with entirely new theories or interpretations of Philosophical systems. In fact, the colonisation has created various misconcepts about our intellectual traditions, overlooking their continuous growth and vitality, and attributing the greatest achievements to India's past only.

Standing on the thresholds of a new millenium, we are not only faced with the problem of preserving our śāstric traditions, we also owe the responsibility to discover their potentiality and to discover ourselves and our national identity through these traditions. It is with this sense of responsibility that the Department of Sanskrit, Dr. Harisingh Gour University organised a National Seminar on ***Turning Points in Indian śāstric Traditions*** from 19.3.97 to 21.3.97. This seminar was organised under DRS-SAP scheme of the University Grants Commission. The proceedings of this seminar are being printed in this volume for a wider circulation of the learned discussions and deliberations of the seminar.

I am grateful to the scholars who contributed their papers for this seminar. I am also thankful to the authorities of the University Grants Commission, New Delhi for recognising our department under DRS-SAP scheme and to the authoriries of Dr. Hari Singh Gour University also for providing funds for the publication of this volume.

Radhavallabh Tripathi

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TURNING POINTS IN VEDĀNTA IN SECOND MILLENNIUM A.D.

Intellectual Ratiocination and Spiritual Discourse in *Advaita Vedānta.*

G. Mishra

INTRODUCTION

It has been accepted by the orthodox Indian Philosophical Tradition that *Vedānta* in its pristine form is the essence of the end portion of the *Vedas* which defy human authorship. In their advent as different schools based on the *Vedas* and affiliated with *Mīmāṃsā;* and distinct from the philosophy inherent in the earlier portion of the *Vedas* (*Pūrvamīmāṃsā*) it has been systematised as *Uttaramīmāṃsā* which has been reasoned out as *Vedānta* by the ancient seers. In arriving at a philosophy the tenets are based on reasoning corroborated by experientiality and scriptural foundation and this has been worked out with some rigour from time to time by different *Veda*ntic writers. Thus the whole hermeneutics of *Vedānta* as sourced out of *Upaniṣad*s have manifold facets and the whole tradition of *Vedānta* is sprung out in different streams. Śaṅkara, one of the earlier exponents of *Vedānta* has given a strong footing to the philosophy of *Advaita* by relying on the superior authority of the *Abhedaśruti* passages as against the authority of *bhedaśruti* texts.[1] His advent may be taken as a radical turning point in the history of vedantic philosophy in the first millennium A.D.

Śaṅkara's writings provide us with volumes of information about his acquaintance with other schools prevalent during his period. The philosophical tenets of schools like *Mīmāṃsā, Sāṅkhya, Vaiśeṣika,* Buddhism and many others have been referred to as prima facie schools and Śaṅkara spares no pains in reestablishing the preponderance of *Advaita* by the refutation of those schools. As is well known, Śaṅkara built up his system on the assimilation of Buddhistic insights in the line of Gauḍapāda, accepted to be his grand preceptor. Nāthamuni and Yāmuna (10th cent. A.D.) the famous predecessors of Rāmānuja, gave strong counter views of the *Advaita* and questioned the authenticity of non-dualism,[2] which resembled Buddhism, a heterodox tradition without Vedic sanction and theistic base. But in an age when Buddhism was ruling the roost, having mass following and universal appeal, Śaṅkara brought a type of revolution in propounding his non-dualism which was adopted and appreciated not only by the scholars but also by the common public of that age by providing a spirituality based on the Ancient Indian Tradition (*sampradāya*) nurtured by *Vedas*, the ancient Indian scriptures. Śaṅkara not only showed the relevance of the vedic texts on the lines of *sūtrakāra vyāsa* (*śāstrayonitvāt*)[3] but also proved the untenability of Nāgārjuna's logic and dialectics which according to Śaṅkara evades the questions of spirituality (*sarvathā anupapatteśca*).[4] In terms of ontology and epistemology, Śaṅkara tried to build up a radical schools of non-dualism which became the main centre of controversy in the second millennium A.D.

A Hermeneutical Turn- Vācaspati Miśra

Within the schools of *Advaita,* in the post-Śaṅkara period, there came up the problems of understanding the vital issues which needed clarification and explication. Vācaspati Miśra (900 A.D) came into the Indian Philosophical scenario in the first half of 10th century and tried to fill up the missing gaps which he felt was not addressed by his predecessors in many of the systems in Indian Philosophy. A verse in the epilogue of the

Bhāmatī puts the works in a particular order.[5] His career as a writer consists of three phases. First was marked by the *Mīmāṃsā* works. The second phase consists of his writings on *Nyāya, Sāṅkhya* and *Yoga darśana*s and the last phase was devoted to his magnum opus i.e., *Bhāmatī,* the celebrated commentary on Śaṅkara's *Bhāṣya* on the *Brahmasūtra*s. Vācaspati appeared in an age of learning when the rigorous systematisation took place in many of the orthodox schools. The onslaught of Buddhism made the orthodox scholars to consolidate their systems to face the challenges of the other schools. Thus we find not only in *Advaita* but also in many other schools there was a temporary renaissance which gave rise to the thinkers like Bhavavikta, Praśastapāda, Candramati, Uddyotakara, Trilocanaguru, Aviddhakarṇa, Viśvarūpa and many others in the *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* schools; Kumārula, Prabhākara, Maṇḍana, Umveka Bhaṭṭa, Śālikanātha, Murārī in *Mīmāṃsā*; and the thinkers like Bhavya, Dharmakīrtti, Kamalaśīla, Śāntarakṣita and a few others in Buddhism. One thing that is to be noted in this period is that the commentators enjoyed absolute liberty of expressing their views quite independently of the notions and conclusions of the authors on whose treatise they were commenting without showing a trace of disrespect ot the original thinker or the thinking.[6]

Vācaspati, an outstanding model of this age, has brought out his commentary in such a meticulous style. In spite of his high reverence to Śaṅkarācārya, he has written his *Bhāmatī-ṭīkā* as a very critical analysis of the *Bhāṣya*. *Bhāmatī* is called as the *Bhāṣya-vibhāga*[7] and stands as a brilliant land mark in the Indian Śāstric tradition. All the other writings of Vācaspati look like means, preparatory texts to achieve this great end i.e., authoring *Bhāmatī.* Vācaspati seems to have taken special interest in the persual of *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika darśana* as evident from his *Nyāya-vārttika-ttparya-ṭīkā.* It was also in keeping with the way the *Bhāṣyakāra,* Śaṅkara who resorts to logic to prove his own stand point (*anumārdhavigraha*). This helped him to have mastery on logicality of the system, made him to understand deeply the prima facies as put forth by Śaṅkara and mainly to know the divergent Buddhist views which are refuted in the *Nyāyavārttika* itself. To refute the *Sāṅkhya* and *Yoga* schools, he must have felt the need for his strong foundation on these schools and it resulted in his writing *Sāṅkhya-tattva-kaumudī* and *Tattvavaiśāradī* on the *YogasūtraBhāṣya.* The *Bhāmatī* was no doubt his masterpiece, in which he strictly follows the *ācārya* and at times reverentially gives a different explanation when he finds striking discrepancy between Śaṅkara's view and that of Śavarasvāmīn. Similarly, in interpreting the *Brahmasūtra* 2.4.17, (*ta indriyāṇi tadvyapadeśād anyatra śreṣṭhāt*), Vācaspati refers the interpretation of *vṛttikāra* who preceded Śaṅkara.

Vācaspati is taken as an *advaitin* who adhered and appreciated the views of Maṇḍana Miśra. His writings give us to understand that he was sympathetic towards the *mīmāṃsaka*s and he must have got acquainted with *Uttaramīmāṃsā* through *Pūrvamīmāṃsā.* That might be the reason why he has authored three texts on *Mīmāṃsā* viz., *Nyāyakaṇikā,* a commentary on the *Vidhiviveka* of Maṇḍana, *Tattvabindu, Tattvasamīkṣā.* All these go to explain the hermeneutical skill he has imbibed from the school of *Bhāṭṭamīmāṃsā* for penetrating into the heart of philosophical problems in engaging himself in the debate to arrive at his own conclusions. This perhaps is the reason for the off-quoted statement in the *Advaita* tradition- *vyavahāre bhaṭṭanayaḥ.* In his *Bhāmatī,* he draws heavily from the

Brahmasididhi of Maṇḍana and it looks as though he tries to synthesise the two traditions prevalent during his period. Like Gauḍapāda who tried to synthesise the views of Buddhism with that of *upaniṣad*s Vācaspati brought about an amalgamation of the Śaṅkara and Maṇḍana schools. The inherent idea of Vācaspati is that unlike the *Mīmāṃsā* school, which has two uncompromising streams, *Advaita* is a unique school, having a fixed core and extensive boundary.

The Holistic *prasthānisation -prakāśātman*

Prakāśātman, (1500 A.D.) the author of *Pañcapādikā-Vivaraṇa* criticised the views of Vācaspati Miśra. He was followed by *Anubhūtisvarūpa,* the author of *Prakaṭārthavivaraṇa* who refuted the views of the *Bhāmatī* and went to the extent of branding Vācaspati as an errand boy of Maṇḍana. (*Maṇḍanapṛṣṭhasevi*)[8]. Rāmānuja in his *Śrībhāṣya,* criticises the views of Vācaspati and *Prakāśātman* and hence we may infer that both of these *ṭīkā*s were famous during the time of Rāmānuja. As we have pointed out, the difference of opinion is with regard to the peripheral details of both the schools which marked the growth of *Advaitavedānta* and gave rise to the enormous literature in the second millennium A.D. The contention of difference lies in a few points which have vital concern for the *advaitin* and on the issues which have not been explicated by Śaṅkara in his commentary. Vācaspati holds the view that *brahman* is not the locus of ignorance, it is the self. It is because ignorance is experienced by the *jīva*s, not by *brahman*. Prakāśātman favours the view that *brahman* is the locus of *avidyā*. It is because in the state of deep sleep, there is the experience of ignorance in the absence of the notion of the self, in the form of 'I'. Since the mind which is the limiting factor of the self has merged in *avidyā,* it can not be said that the self is the locus of *avidyā*. Hence the pure consciousness may be spoken of as the locus of *avidyā*. This view is objected as if the self as the content of `I' is not experienced in the state of deep sleep, then how are we to account for the rise of the recollection in the form `I slept' which involves reference to the self which is the content of the cognition `I'. Since the recollection in the waking state involves reference to the self as `I', it is clear that it must have been experienced as such in the state of deep sleep. Since the self as `I' is present in the state of deep sleep, *avidyā* could very well be located there.

For this the answer is proposed by saying that in the state of deep sleep, pure consciousness and *avidyā* alone are present; and the soul is not present therein. That is the reason why it is said that soul can not be the locus of *avidyā*. The question that is posed is how to account for the reference to the soul as `I' in the recollection of the form "I did not know anything when I was asleep". it is answered that the pure consciousness which is experienced along with *avidyā* in the state of deep sleep becomes associated with mind which is its revealing medium at the beginning of the waking state. The nature of revealing medium is to reveal an object as if it is present in itself. And since the blend of pure consciousness and mind is the self, that is, the content of the cognition `I', there is reference to the element of `I' that is self in the recollection "I did not know anything when I was asleep."

It must be admitted here that the *advaitin* does not admit the state of recollection in so far as the element of `I' in the cognition "I did not know anything when I was asleep" is concerned. It is because in the state of deep sleep there is the experience of the bliss element identical with the consciousness element, of deep sleep and of *avidyā*. This experience is only the mode of *avidyā* -the mode which is inspired by the reflection of the consciousness in it at the moment when one comes back to the waking state. It leaves latent impression which leads to recollection of the bliss element identical with the consciousness element which is recollected and is conditioned by mind at the time of waking state resulting in the cognition `I'. Hence the cognition in the `I slept happily' is of the nature of recollection in respect of the bliss element with the consciousness element, the state of deep sleep and *avidyā.* There is recollection in respect of the consciousness element and experience in respect of mind element. Hence the consciousness element is related to the mind at the time of waking state, there arises the cognition of the form "I did not know when I was asleep" involving the self.

This is a sample of *śāstric* dialectics given here to show how in the school of *Advaita* there are streams of explanations for the concept of ignorance and its locus. There are a number of such concepts that are taken up by the two schools and are dealt with. My purpose here is to propose that the freedom of thought was given importance in a limited boundary of a system which has been already systematised as we find in the *prasthānic* tradition in the school. It was also questioned by the opponent schools like Rāmānuja and Mādhva and many others who did not find the required hermeneutic tool in the school to accommodate their feelings of spirituality. And that gave rise to a different kind of question which gave a high `U' turn to the vedantic thinking in India. Be that as it may, the way the westerners view that there is no scope for growth in the Indian thought can not be accepted when looked from this stand point.

Tradition of Logicalisation- Śrīharṣa

The second millennium also marked the advent of a great dialectician Śrīharṣa (1150 A.D.) whose *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍa-*

khādya (KKK) brought about · a stormy debate in the philosophical landscape in India. Śrīharṣa's main contention was to argue against the other schools without proposing a solution in favour of his own view. By the employment of abstruse logic and penetrative dialectics he tried to show the loopholes in the thinking processes of the schools which are antagonistic to the non-dualistic thinking. In other words, Śrīharṣa was one of the most brilliant idealistic thinkers who started a whole lot of motivation to think in a different way than had been going on earlier. For more than one millennium the ongoing realist-idealist debate was there and Śrīharṣa introduced a different type of methodology popularly known as '*vitaṇḍā*' which is different in the sense that it does not give a clear solution and argument in favour of its own view.[9] Some of the views and positions Śrīharṣa would hold are peculiarly unique. My submission here is that *vitaṇḍā* being what it is, and taking KKK as a *vitaṇḍā* text, we cannot say that Śrīharṣa does not have a view or he did not try to favour his own view. If we see in between the lines we may find Śrīharṣa's unquestionable adherence to the school of *Advaita* which is very much pronounced in the whole text. The methodology is imbibed with the tools of a realistic school i.e. *Nyāya* and the *Navya-Nyāya* (NN) school which was worked out in the century following, had its inheritance from the writings of Śrīharṣa who gave the initial foundation for the school. Even though the tradition does not accept Śrīharṣa as the founder of the NN school, as he spoke from an idealistic platform, he, nevertheless, stood as an unmoving pillar of philosophising logical tradition in India.[10] Śrīharṣa is motivated by religious considerations and most possibly by his personal predilection towards the *Advaita* reality i.e., *brahman*. In order to provide a dialectic base for the *brahman* centred world view, Śrīharṣa attacks the dualistic presuppositions of the *Nyāya* school up to Udayana. Logic, or *Nyāya* enjoys enormous proliferation in the late classical age, and the school assumes a different application in the post-Śrīharṣa age shows the impact of KKK. Gaṅgeśa's mention of Śrīharṣa shows his indebtedness to this type of *vitaṇḍā* thinking. In later years of second millennium the tools of NN were adopted to establish the *Advaita* school as pointed out by Citsukha, Madhusūdana, Brahmānanda and many others.

Logic and Spirituality

More often than not, it is believed that advaitic spirituality has nothing to do with the world and the word. Śrīharṣa makes a peculiar combination of the both and declares that reality which is spiritual has to be logical and needs to be worked out. In his *Naiṣadhīyacarita* and KKK we find him claiming to have had the Mystic experience of the *brahman*. In KKK, we find:

> This text came to an end, which was produced for the delight of the learned by the Śrīharṣa, who from Lord of *Kānyakubja* receives a seat of honour and a pair of betel leaves, who knows immediately in highest meditation the Supreme *brahman*, the ocean of bliss, whole poetry, is the shower of sweetness, and whose pronouncement on reasoning have brought opponents to ruin.[11]

This is supported by another statement in the KKK where he says:

> Therefore, the doctrine of *Advaita* into which you are being led by these arguments that are in accord with the definitions of arguments established in your own school- have faith in it. After you have faith just through that faith in the teachings of the *upaniṣad*s, you will have *jijñāsā* to know the

supreme Reality. That will pave way for witnessing in yourself the reality of illumination and happiness.[12]

By predilection and practice, Śrīharṣa was an *advaitin.* Traditionally, *Advaita* has been designed as a philosophical programme based on the positive determination of *brahman* as against the Nāgārjuna's *śūnyavāda.* So it would be doing enormous injustice to Śrīharṣa if we say that he did not have any positive programme in writing a text which is vaitandic in character.

In and through the text, Śrīharṣa defends an absolute non-sublatedness as the hallmark of philosophising as against the *Naiyāyika*s theory of realistic universe. Elsewhere, he subscribes to the theory of *svataḥprāmāṇyavāda,* which stands as basic to the Advaitic epistemology, and ontology. For him the self-illumination means the self certification which is grounded on awareness and the primary concern of Śrīharṣa is certification for self-awareness not justification for the worldly content for an awareness like that of a pot or a cloth. He says that if the *Nyāya* view of *parataḥprāmāṇyavāda* is accepted, then an object, say, pot cannot be veridically known, if "being veridically known" is to establish a position in a debate or terminate an inquiry. Hence he concludes that there would be no epistemologically relevant sight of objects if perception were not self certifying. Thus, his contention is all awareness may be *primafacie* self certifying, but the self awareness is *ultimafacie* self certifying and this is because all content other than self awareness is sublatable.

Textual Exegesis- The pointing dictum

Śrīharṣa clearly points out that the *upaniṣad*s are the sources of knowledge for the *Advaita* position of knowledge and for identifying the knowledge with the ultimate reality. Like

Śaṅkara, he views that for the knowledge of the Supreme Self, *pramāṇa*s are sublated along with the external appearances. In other words, the belief in the reliability of scripture is conditioned by spiritual ignorance as in any experience. Hence, scripture only intellectualises the reality and the knowledge comes automatically thereafter. The views of Śrīharṣa were taken up later and worked out elaborately by *citsukha* (1295 A.D.). He engages in the same debate on the concept of *svaprakāśa* and provides greater elaboration and defensive arguments in substantiating the *advaitin*'s view. Hence, I would like to conclude this section by pointing out the fact based on the discussion that Śrīharṣa has a specific agenda in his KKK and his polemic is directed to show that *Advaita* has the inner strength of defending itself from other *primafacies* to prove that knowledge perse is intrinsically veridical.

Concessions in the Concept of Liberation- Madhusūdana Sarasvatī

The last turning point that I would like to incorporate in this paper is that of the contribution of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī (1600 A.D) who felt the necessity of clarifying the position of *Advaitavedānta* as the *dvaita* proponents suggested certain difficulties in the logical framework of the *Advaita* philosophy. Like many of his illustrious predecessors, Madhusūdana tried to show the continuity and connection, argument and counter-argument in the making of different systems of Indian Philosophy. Here, I have not taken the arguments Madhusūdana puts forth to defend his view against the background of *vyāsatīrtha* as found in his *Advaitasiddhi*. My concern is to show how he has accommodated the concept of *bhakti* with in the framework of Advaitic liberation giving a definite place for emotionalism and human feeling without compromising the fact that knowledge *perse* is the only means to liberation.

One of the outstanding contribution of Madhusūdana is his innovating a middle way which can satisfy both non-dualism and devotion. His is a unique concept of *bhakti* doctrine where the concept of *bimba-pratibimba-vāda* and the theory of *bhakti* as a sentiment (*rasa*) have been harmonised in the philosophy of *Advaita Vedānta.*[13] The idea is to present the concept of *Advaita* in a way the devotee enjoys the ecstasy of boundless love for the Lord. In his exposition of *bhakti,* Madhusūdana adopts the definition of *bhakti* in the *Bhāgavata.*[14] Madhusūdana brings in an interesting analogy to explain the process of the *manonāśa,* melting of the mind which serves as the condition for the rise of *bhaktivṛtti.* Comparing the mind with lac, he says that lac is solid by nature but it becomes liquid when it comes in contact with fire. He says that *bhakti* has such power to transform the indifferent mind to a mind where there is *bhakti vṛtti.* In *Bhaktirasāyana,* while trying to amalgamate both, Madhusūdana unconsciously lands into spiritual region where *bhakti* becomes *bhagavat* Himself and not a mere *cittavṛtti.* As a consequence, he implicitly discarded the mental mode as *bhakti,* because being creation of *māyā* the mental mode could not be conceived to be all-blissful. Madhusūdana recognises the *bhaktivṛtti* to be a type of knowledge. He takes *bhakti* to mean the reflection of consciousness on the mental mode. Out of the two theories of knowledge accepted in *Advaita,* i.e., mental mode as *jñāna* and reflection of the consciousness on the mental mode as *jñāna,* Madhusūdana adopts the latter view to substantiate his conception of *Advaita bhaktī.* His idea is to equate this *bhaktivṛtti* with *akhaṇḍākāracittavṛtti* as *brahman* realisation. He strikes a new note on the basis of *bimba-pratibimiba* when he identifies the reflection of *bhagavat* with the reflected *bhagavat*. He explains the genesis of *bhagavatprakāra* -the reflection of *bhagavat* on the mental mode with a famous *Advaita* example of rope and snake. The erroneous knowledge -this is a snake, and the true knowledge that it is a rope establish the fact that both the knowledge reveal the rope. While the false knowledge perceives the rope as `this' the true knowledge grasps it as rope. Knowledge of rope as `this' is therefore not opposed to the superimposition of snake on the rope. Taking this clue, Madhusūdana says the second type of knowledge (rope is rope) is the true one. In ordinary cognition, the pot exists is a false knowledge as it comprehends the pot which is the false reality. In both kinds of knowledge, -the pot exists and *bhakti,* consciousness is revealed, as rope is revealed both in erroneous and veridical perceptions.[15] For Madhusūdana, *brahman* is the state of absolute existence where knowledge and bliss are undifferentiated. Thus according to him, the revelation of *bhagavat* in *bhakti* corresponds to the revelation of rope and discards the superimposition of external objects on consciousness. For him, *bhakti* is as effective as the direct means like *śravaṇa* etc. In his commentary of *gītā,* called *gūḍhārthadīpikā,* he says that *jīvanmukta*s being purified by knowledge, develop a love for *bhagavat*. [16]

Thus we see that Madhusūdana tries to accommodate the *jñāna* with *bhakti* in the line of theistic schools without compromising with the concept of non-duality and the concept of liberation. It must have been an outcome of the influence that the *vaiṣṇava* religion which has its impact in that period and the loving devotion that Madhusūdana entertained in himself for *Kṛṣṇa.*[17] As a liberated man is free from prescriptions and prohibitions, to have loving devotion cannot be considered as binding to the world. Any ethical commitment would again bind him to the *saṃsāra,* though essentially he would definitely be ethical having trans-ethical perceptions. In that way alone we should view the philosophy of devotion so strongly put forward as the means and as the end by Madhusūdana.

Evaluation

The impact of Śāstric *Vedānta* was felt in the neo-*Vedānta,* when in Nineteenth and Twentieth centuries the persons like Vivekananda, Rammohan and Aurobindo tried to see the practical relevance of ancient Indian tradition in the context of modem predicaments faced by the mankind. For *Vivekānanda* the principal message of the *Advaita Vedānta* is that the world of plurality is transient, though it is not unreal, it cannot be taken as true. The individual consciousness is caught in a conflict of transcendental outlook and the common sense and the way to resolve this conflict is to evolve an inner discipline, a type of reawakening and resurrection of consciousness. This looks to be an extension of Madhusūdana's adherence to *bhakti,* as it gives importance to the means of spirituality as a mode of or panacea to human survival or the problems involved in it.

Thus we have seen in the foregoing pages the way the Śāstric tradition has taken turns in the Indian tradition leaving enough scope for so called growth and development. The action and counter reaction has strengthened its base and perfected its role in giving several paths for self actualization.

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3. *Brahmasūtras* of Bādarāyaṇa 1.1,4
4. *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* of Śaṅkara on *sūtra* 2.2.32.
5. *yannyāyakaṇikātattvasamīkṣā-tattvabindubhiḥ*
yannyāyaSāṅkhyayogānām vedāntānām nibandhanaiḥ
samacaisaṃ mahatpuṇyaṃ tatphalaṃ puṣkalaṃ mayā
samarpitam athaitena priyatamaṃ parameśvaram
6. *viśuddhavijñānaṃ śaṅkaraṃ karuṇākaram*
Introductory verse no-6 in *Bhāmatī.*
7. *bhāṣyaṃ prasannagambhīraṃ tatpraṇitaṃ*
vibhajyate-- *Bhāmatī.* Introductory verse.
8. *daśastu pṛṣṭhasevi syāt pṛṣṭhakanduti mocakaḥ*
9. *vitaṇḍā* is a type of debate different from *vāda* and *jalpa.*
The definition of the debates are given as
tattvabubhutsu kathā vādaḥ
ubhayavijigīṣu kathā jalpaḥ
svapakṣa sthāpanahīna parapakṣadūṣaṇamātra
paryavasāna kathā vitaṇḍā.
Advaitasididhi, commentary by Balabhadra Ed. by Anantakrishna Sastri p. 14.
10. *Nyāyavaiśeṣika* by B. K. Matilal, 1977, p. 101.
11. *tāmbuladvayamāsanaṃ ca labhate yaḥ kānyakubjeśvarāt yaḥ sākṣād kurute samādhiṣu parabrahmapramo- dārṇavam* etc. KKK. p.754.
12. Ibid. p. 125.
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14. *Bhaktirasāmṛtam.* p.24.
15. Op.cit p. 207.
16. *Gūḍhārthadīpikā* p.374.
17. *kṛṣṇātparaṃ kimapi tattvamahaṃ na jāne.*
Advaitasiddhi Introductory verse.

TURNING POINT IN THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA SYSTEM

Prof. V.N. Jha

0.0 In this paper an attempt is made to highlight some of the turning points in the history and development of the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* system of Indian Philosophy Logic.

1.0 It is very likely that the system of *Vaiśeṣika* preceded that of *Nyāya*, if not in language but in content. This system presents categorisation of the universe of our experience into six categories namely, *dravya* (substance), *guṇa* (quality), *karman* (action), *sāmānya* (universal), *viśeṣa* (particular) and *samavāya* (inherence). This is the reason that this system has another name: *ṣaṭ-padārthī*. Kaṇāda, the author of the *Vaiśeṣika sūtra*s, did not accept *abhāva* as a distinct category. He did not bring God too into his philosophical frame-work. The things coming under his six categories of entities were his *prameya*. He accepted only two ways of knowing (*pramāṇa*) namely, *pratyakṣa* (perception) and *anumāna* (Inference) like the Buddhists and did not give the status of *pramāṇa* to *śabda* and *upamāna*.

2.0 But the things must have started changing after Gautama presented his philosophical frame-work of *Nyāya*. There must have been a strong realisation of the exchange of ideas between the two systems of thought and we can see very positive response at each step. We find Vātsyāyana mentioning the six categories of Kaṇāda in his commentary on the *Gautamasūtra* 1.1.9. He says -

asti anyadapi dravyaguṇakarmasāmānyaviśeṣaṇasamavāyāḥ prameyam.

Likewise we find Praśastapāda implying the reality of *abhāva*. He has also assigned definite role to God. God is depicted as the creator of the Universe.

As Vātsyāyana realised that the six *padārtha*s of the *Vaiśeṣika* system are the outcome of the categorisation of the world of our experience and cannot be compared with the sixteen *padārtha*s of Gautama, in the same way Praśastapāda must have realised that the entities like God, absence etc. are absolutely necessary to explain the reality of the world of our experience. The process of give and take must have been so close that we find Jayantabhaṭṭa claiming in his *Nyāyamañjarī* that the *Vaiśeṣika* System is the follower of the *Nyāya* system. He says -

Vaiśeṣikāḥ punaḥ asmadanuyāyina eva (p.9)

I consider these events as the turning points in the early history and development of these two systems of thought. The impacts of these turning points have been so far-reaching that in course of time by the time of Udayanācārya (10th Century AD) the systems of *Vaiśeṣika* and *Nyāya* have merged into a single system of *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* philosophy.

3.0 There is another aspect which is inherent in the tradition of the *Nyāya Vaiśeṣika* system of thought and that is the supremacy of rationality over emotionality. No person or a school of thought is greater than logic. Therefore, no one hesitates in rejecting the view of any school, be it the view of his own school, if the view does not stand the test of logical scrutiny. Thus, we find Jayanta criticising the followers of Jaimini for not understanding the mind of Jaimini with regard to the general definition of *pramāṇa*. He observes that *agṛhīta-grāhi-pramāṇam* was not intended by Jaimini as the general definition of *pramāṇa* as generally understood and explained by the followers of Jaimini. Rather *agṛhīta-grāhi-pramāṇam*, was intended to be the definition of *śabdapramāṇa* only because it is the *śabdapramāṇa* i.e. the *Vedas* which reveal something which is not revealed by any other means of knowing. One instantly, therefore, remembers :

pratyakṣeṇānumityā vā yastūpāyo na vidyate .
etaṃ vidanti vedena tasmād vedasya vedatā ..

Thus, Jayanta concludes :

śabdasyānupalabdhe'rthe prāmāṇyaṃ cāha jaiminiḥ .
sarvapramāṇaviṣayaṃ bhavadbhirvarṇyate katham?
(*Nyāyamañjarī* p. 61)

As Jayanta points out defects in others's understanding he also points out defects in the understanding of Vātsyāyana. While explaining the *anumāna-sūtra* of Gautama 1.1.5 which runs as follows :

tat trividham anumānam pūrvavat śeṣavat sāmānyatodṛṣṭaṃ ca.

Vātsyāyana provides the following example to illustrate the *sāmānyatodṛṣṭānumāna- sāmānyatodṛṣṭam--vrajyāpūrvakam anyatra dṛṣṭasya anyatra darśanam iti tathā ca ādityasya.*

But Jayanta objects and says *yat punaḥ bhāṣyakāreṇa bhāskarasya deśāntara prāptyā gatyanumānamudāhṛtam* *tadayuktam. Deśāntaraprāpteḥ gatikāryatvāt kāryeṇa kāraṇānumānam śeṣavadeva idam syāt. (Nyāyamañjarī*.p. 344).

This is sufficient to illustrate that Jayanta had no other consideration than rationality either to accept of reject a position. In fact this is the life of this tradition and this attitude keeps on contributing to the turning points on any scientific discipline.

Another case may be cited of the same category is the opinion of Bhāsarvajña who held that the state of *apavarga* may be a positive entity i.e. *nitya-sukha* or *nitya-ānanda* and not a negative entity like *ātyantika-duḥkha-nivṛtti* as advocated by Gautama in his *sūtra.*

tadatyantavimokṣo'pavargaḥ. (1. 1. 22)

The same trend of critically examining the positions of the tradition· continues to the mediaeval period · too. Raghunāthaśiromaṇi asked to reconsider the traditional number of categories of entities which constitute the world of own experience. He was of the opinion that the number cannot be restricted to seven only. The categorisation must be kept with an open set because the entities like *viṣayatā* etc. cannot be included in the given seven categories of entities.

4.0 With this trend of open-minded-ness, the development in the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* Philosophy and logic may be divided into two phases:

1. The development upto 1000 AD which is normally called *Prācinanyāya* and
2. The development after 1000 AD which is known by the term *Navya Nyāya*.

In the first phase, the development is issue-based (*prameya-pradhāna*). Various issues were taken up in the dialogue with Buddhist logicians such as the existence of God, existence of soul, reality of the world, the reality of relations, the question of the number of *pramāṇa*, the question of cross-application of the *pramāṇa*s (*pramāṇasamplava*) and a host of other questions and they were discussed and conclusions were drawn. One would remember in this connection that Udayanācārya wrote two books on two very prominent issues :

1. The *Nyāyakusumāñjali* in order to establish God and,
2. The *Ātmatattvaviveka* (also called *Bauddha-dhikkāra*) in order to establish soul. This period of 1000 years way be called a golden period in the history and development of Indian philosophy in general and *Prācīna Nyāya* in particular.

5.0 The second phase of development is the turning point of the 1st phase of development. As pointed out, the development of the *Prācīna Nyāya* took metaphysical, ontological, and epistemological issues to their logical ends. But while doing this exercise they discovered that for a dialogue there is a necessity of developing a precise language of discourse. This need necessitated the emergence of *Navya Nyāya* which concentrated on *pramāṇa* and developed a precise language of communication. It is well known that after this language was developed, almost all the scientific, analytic and philosophical disciplines adopted this very *Navya Nyāya* language for discussion and for arriving at a conclusion, this was indeed a very important turning point.

The impact of this development was far-reaching. It not only provided a medium of precise communication, but gave room for scientific development comparable to the development of symbolic logic in the west. The *Navya Nyāya* logicians seem to be very much familiar with prominent set-theories like the laws of equivalence and what is called De Morgan's law. These laws were known to the *Navya Naiyāyika*s centuries before the western logicians. One can experience this while reading and analysing *Viṣayatāvāda* of Harirāma Tarkavāgīśa and Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya and the formulation of the definition of *pakṣatā* by Gaṅgeśa and his followers.

This language of analytic discourse and precise communication seems to have been developed by the following method :

a. By distinguishing an inherent property (mostly a *jāti*) from an acquired property (*upādhi*).
b. By introducing the notion of *avacchedya-avacchedaka-bhāva.*

This method provided a very effective tool to analyse and verbalizable cognition (*savikalpaka-jñāna*) and this is the reason that all other systems adopted the language of *Navya Nyāya* for communication. This language enjoyed the same position of Mathematics in modern physical science.

It is not possible to highlight all the turning points of the *Nyāya Vaiśeṣika* system and hence. I have pointed out only a few of them.

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SENSE-OBJECT CONTACT, NORMAL > SUPERNORMAL: A TURNING POINT

Nilakantha Dash

Analysis of human behaviour is the pivotal point leading the philosophers to form various concepts about the world. The means for cognition (*pramāṇas*) fall in this category of such concepts. First and foremost among the *pramāṇa*s is perception (*pratyakṣa*), accepted by all the schools of Indian Philosophy.

When our sense organs come in contact with some object we acquire the perceptual knowledge of that object. Gautama, the author of *Nyāyasūtra* defines *pratyakṣa* in the following way- *"indriyārthasannikarṣotpannam jñānam"* means `the perceptual knowledge arises due to the contact between sense organ and the object'. So the contact of the sense-organ with the object is the cause of perceptual knowledge.

Vātsyāyana, the author of *Bhāṣya* on the *Nyāyasūtra*, goes a step further in the analysis of *pratyakṣa*. According to him, it is not only the contact of the sense-organ with the object, but also the contact of one's soul with the mind, the mind with the sense organ, which are responsible for perception. He also divides perception into two types viz., external and internal. Perception of the world outside is external perception. In case of internal perception, one perceives the objects of the inner world, like *sukha, duḥkha, icchā, dveṣa* etc. Here mind serves as the sense-organ and gets connected with the internal objects.

While perceiving some object, we also perceive its generic properties like colour, quality etc.. For the comprehension of these, the sense-object contacts also should be different. Taking these into consideration, Udyotakara in his *Nyāyavārttika* on *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.4. made six divisions of contacts and illustrated them. They are:-

(i) Contact (*Saṃyoga*)

(ii) inherence in that which has contact (*Saṃyukta-samavāya*)

(iii) inherence in that which inhers in that which is connected by contact (*Saṃyukta-samaveta samavāya*).

(iv) inherence (*samavāya*)

(v) inherence in that which inhers (*samaveta-samavāya*)

(vi) the relation of qualificand and qualified (*Viśeṣya-viśeṣaṇa-bhāva*)

When certain object, a jar for instance is perceived, the particular jar is the `object' and the eye is the sense-organ. The relation between them, which produces perceptual cognition is contact (*Saṃyoga*).

In case of the colour of a jar, we perceive the colour due to the relation between the eye and the colour. Colour is not a substance, but a quality . Here, the relation between the eye and the colour is named as *Saṃyukta-samavāya*, because the colour is inherent in the jar which is in contact with our eyes (sense-organ).

In the perception of class of colour i.e., colourness (*rūpatva*), the contact is in the form of `inherence in that which inhers in that which is connected by contact'. Here colourness is a property of colour and inhers in the colour, which is inherent in the jar. So the contact is *saṃyukta-samaveta-samavāya*.

In case of perception of sound the contact is in the form of inherence (*samavāya*). Sound is perceived through ear. According to *Naiyāyika*s, ear is sky or *gagana* in essence. *Gagana* or *ākāśa* is accepted as a substance (*dravya*) where, the property `sound' inhers. We hear a sound as the sound comes near the ear and inhers in the sky portion of the ear. So, here the sense-object contact is inherence *samavāya*.

We hear sound on different occasions, e.g., when somebody beats a drum, when some object say, metal, falls on the ground, when somebody tears a paper , when somebody pulls wood or bamboo into two parts etc.. These are the various sources, producing sound in the first instance. Analysing these sources, Udyotakara divides sound into two parts, viz., the sound which has its source in conjunction and the sound which has its source in disjunction.[1]

To perceive soundness of sound, the contact required is *samaveta-samavāya*. because soundness inhers in sound, which is perceived by the relation of inherence.

Last one in the list of contacts is *viśeṣya-viśeṣaṇa-bhāva*. This contact is needed for the perception of inherence and absence. To perceive the absence of a jar on the floor, the contact viz., *saṃyoga* cannot serve the purpose because absence cannot have the relation of conjunction with the eyes. *Saṃyukta-samavāya* will also not do because, we cannot say that the absence inhers in the floor which is in contact with the eyes.

All these are not possible simply because `absence' is an adjunct to the floor. Rather we can name the relation as *saṃyukta-viśeṣaṇatā*. So the adjuncts or adjectives are to be perceived through this particular relation of *viśeṣaṇatā*. In this way, *viśeṣya-viśeṣaṇa-bhāva* serves the purpose in case of the perception of absence.

These six types of contacts are explained in later commentaries in a more exhaustive way. But after 10th century A.D., with the emergence of a new school called *Navya Nyāya*, the presentation of the theory of perception took a new mode. The basic definition of perception underwent changes in the important texts like *Tattvacintāmaṇi* of Gaṅgeśa. Along with these, the definition and the concept of division of contacts responsible for perception also changed and their numbers increased. *Sannikarṣa*s are said to be broadly of two types viz., normal (*laukika*) and supernormal (*alaukika*). Those six types of contacts discussed above are kept under the head of normal contacts (*laukika sannikarṣa*). Supernormal contacts (*alaukika sannikarṣa*s) are three in number resulting supernormal perception (*alaukika pratyakṣa*).

These contacts are (i) *sāmānyalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa*,
(ii)*Jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa*,
and (iii)*Yogajasannikarṣa*.

Much later, the basic texts written for the beginners of this *Nyāya* study, like *Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī* and others, included these supernormal contacts, while explaining the theory of perception in a systematic way.

The text of *Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī* goes like:-

Evam pratyakṣam alaukikālaukikabhedena dvividham. tatra laukikapratyakṣe ṣoḍhā sannikarṣo varṇitaḥ. alaukikasannikarṣastvidānimucyate--

alaukikastu vyāpārastrividhaḥ parikīrtitaḥ
sāmānyalakṣaṇo jñānalakṣaṇo yogajastathā..and so on.

The justification of accepting *sāmānyalakṣaṇā-pratyāsatti* (SLP) is explained in various ways. The main purpose of *sāmānyalakṣaṇāpratyāsatti* is with regard to the apprehension of invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*). Though the method of ascertaining *vyāpti* has long been a matter of dispute, Gaṅgeśa is of the view that invariable concomitance between two things say, smoke and fire is apprehended through the perception of their co-existence in a particular instance. Gaṅgeśa, who devotes a full chapter of his *Anumānacintāmaṇi* for the discussion of *sāmānyalakṣaṇā*, begins as follows-

Vyāptigrahaśca sāmānyalakṣaṇāpratyāsattyā sakaladhūmādiviṣayakaḥ, kathamanyathā parvatīyadhūme vyāptyagrahe tasmādanumitiḥ:- means (The knowledge of invariable concomitance has all smokes as its object, through the contact called *sāmānyalakṣaṇā*, i.e., through the relation of the form of universal. If this is not accepted, how can there be inference without the knowledge of invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) in the smoke, on the mountain?

Through our normal sense-perception, all cases of smoke and fire and their co-existence cannot be covered. We know that the relation of invariable concomitance is the relation between all cases of smoke and fire. The supporters of *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* claim that when we perceive a particular smoke and a particular fire and their co-existence, their corresponding universal viz., smokeness and fireness inherent in them are simultaneously perceived. The next moment, through the perception of fireness and smokeness, all the particular smokes and fires belonging to all times past, present and future come into the range of our perception. Thus the universal relation between smoke and fire is grasped without fail. Of course, this is not a normal way of perception. Here the knowledge of universal like smokeness and fireness serve as the supernormal points of contact between the sense-organ and all the particulars of a class, which are normally beyond the scope of perception. By normal perception through normal contacts like *saṃyoga* and *saṃyuktasamavāya* etc., we get the perception of a particular object and its universal respectively. So normal perception ends here. But supernormal contact called SLP further extends this grasp to all the particulars under the class.

Many of the well-established theories regarding inference are liable to criticism. So are the theories of *Naiyāyika*s, *Mīmāṃsaka*s or Buddhists. There are schools who accept and practice the one theory and schools refuting it. In case of *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* also opponents are there. Gaṅgeśa faces the remark of various schools of opponents and refutes them. He divides the opponents into two categories. One accepts *parāmarśa* as the immediate cause of inference and the other rejects it as irrelevant. *Parāmarśa*, more explicitly called *tṛtīyaliṅga-parāmarśa*, is the complex synthetic judgement combining the major premise and the minor premise; and this is the immediate antecedent to the inferential conclusion. Such is the *Nyāya* position. But the pre-Gaṅgeśa *Nyāya* school does not accept the necessity of SLP, though it admits the relevance of *parāmarśa*. Gaṅgeśa might have kept this school in his mind, when he says `others do not accept this' (SLP) [*tadapare na manyante*].[2]

The text of *Nyāyaratna* by Maṇikaṇṭha Miśra which distinguished pre-Gaṅgeśa logicians of the new school may be referred here. Maṇikaṇṭha rejects the necessity of SLP. Gaṅgeśa has fairly brought out the meaning of the opponents' objection. A person after the observation of the colocatedness of smoke and fire for the first time in the kitchen, gets the knowledge that smoke goes with fire, provided he has never seen smoke in the absence of fire anywhere. Here, in such a situation, he can have such a knowledge that there is some general character of smoke (i.e. smokeness) which does not allow it to present there where fire is not present.

So when the same person observes in few cases that fire is related to smoke and does not see any contradictory case, he can easily assume that the general character of smoke (smokeness) determines its (*dhūma*'s) non-existence without fire and determines smoke's presence in a locus where fire cannot be absent. In this way, smoke (*dhūma*) remains in our understanding along with its general character i.s., *dhūmatva* as related to fire and thus constituting the knowledge of *vyāpti*. So when we see smoke on the mountain, at once we identify it as having the same determinant general character (smokeness) because that smokeness is one and present in all individual smokes.[3]

Then Gaṅgeśa deals with the other opponents i.e., *Mīmāṃsaka*s who do not feel the need of SLP for *vyāpti* and also do not accept the step of confirmatory cognition (*parāmarśa*). This view is traditionally ascribed to Murāri Miśra, a distinguished exponent of *Mīmāṃsā* philosophy. This view also is as old as Kumarila Bhatta, as it has been shown by Pārthasārathī Miśra in the chapter on *Vyāptivāda* in his *Nyāyaratnamālā*. Their process of inference consists of three steps. They are` the knowledge of invariable concomitance', `its remembrance', and `the knowledge of the presence (of smoke) in the subject'. All are having the same qualifier i.e., smokeness. So there is a symmetry in all these three steps, which causes inferential cognition.[4] So they do not agree to the fact that for the knowledge of invariable concomitance one should know the presence of concomitance in all possible co-instances and the absence of concomitance in all possible counter-instances in this world. As per them, two or three instances of concomitance are enough for generalisation along with the absence of any contradictory instance. They do not recognise the utility of such a generalisation encompassing all times and places. For them, generalisation holds only to the extent of instances that have been observed.

Gaṅgeśa tries to establish SLP by the argument from some other angle. First of all he says, that without SLP one cannot have any doubt regarding *vyāpti*.[5] As per *Mīmāṃsaka*s, there is no need of SLP for the emergence of the knowledge of *vyāpti*. As *dhūmatva* is one and the same in all *dhūma* individuals and *vahnitva* is one and the same in all *vahni* individuals; so also the *vyāpti* between vahni and *dhūma* is one and the same in all cases of smoke and fire. So the knowledge of *vyāpti* is possible after perceiving the co-existence of smoke and fire in a few instances. So let us say, one has perceived the co-existence of fire and smoke in five or six places. But even then he may have a doubt in the form of `let there be smoke but not fire' (`*dhūmaḥ astu vahnirmāstu*'). In the structure of this doubt, the smoke, about which *vahni-vyāpyatā* is doubted, must have some perceptual presence any how. Doubt is also a form of perception[6]. Perception cannot take place without sense-object contact. One has the knowledge of those smokes, which he has seen in five or six places in some particular time. To doubt about *vahni-vyāpyatā* in *dhūma*, one must know all smokes belonging to past, present and future and of a distant place also. It is impossible to know all these smokes by normal contacts.

Here one may argue that there is no need of doubt, when one has the knowledge of smoke and fire in a few instances. But doubt arises, it is a fact. Then how to explain the emergence of doubt? Here comes the need of SLP, which can serve as a contact to present the knowledge of all smokes including those of other places and times. This will be a proof of the existence of *kālāntarīya* and *deśāntarīya dhūma*, with regard to which there is possibility of doubt.[7]

Moreover, when doubt arises, we eradicate it with the help of some *anukūla tarka* or suitable logic. If doubt does not arise, the concept of *anukūla tarka* will become redundant.

Thus the establishment of the theory of SLP brought a new turn in the philosophical tradition and philosophers have tried to solve some other problems also with the help of this. So *Naiyāyika*s uphold SLP resulting a real perception on the following grounds:-

Without it we cannot explain the knowledge of invariable concomitance, which is a prerequisite to inferential cognition. For the apprehension of *vyāpti* (*vyāptijñāna*) between smoke and fire, one has to know that all smokes are related to fire. One cannot know this if his perception is limited to particular smokes, for any number of particulars will not make the universal.

Hence we must admit that while perceiving one smoke, as related to fire, we perceive all smokes through the universal, smokeness as so related. It cannot be said that it is unnecessary to assume that we perceive all smokes as related to fire, because we cannot even doubt, if all smokes are related to fire or not unless all smokes are somehow presented to us, when we do perceive one as related to fire.

Again without *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* one cannot explain negative judgements like `this cloth is not a pot' ot `this is not a cow' etc. To say that `this is not a cow' is to know the class of cows. This is possible if by perceiving one cow, we perceive all other cows through the universal `cowness' as perceived in the present and perceived cow.

Further, we cannot explain voluntary effort to attain a pleasure without the help of *sāmānyalakṣaṇā*. To strive for a pleasure is somehow to know it as something to be, but not yet experienced. But how can we know a pleasure, which we have not experienced? This is possible, if when experiencing one pleasure, we know all pleasures through the universal `pleasureness' as belonging to the experienced pleasure. Therefore, after the knowledge of all individual pleasures as possessing pleasureness, it is possible, that one can leave those which are accomplished and can have desire of the unaccomplished ones.[8]

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2. *Sāmānyalakṣaṇāprakaraṇa*-p.114

3. *tathāhi dhūmatvāvacchinnā vyāptiḥ sannikṛṣṭadhūmaviṣaye dhūmatvena pratyakṣeṇa jñāyate tataḥ smṛtā sā tṛtīyaliṅga parāmarśe pakṣaniṣṭhadhūmavṛttitayā jñāyate tato'numitiḥ.* Ibid.114-5.

4. *sannikṛṣṭadhūma viṣaye dhūmatvena dhūmo vahnivyāpya ityanubhavastathaiva vyāptismaraṇaṃ. tato dhūmavānayamiti vyāptismṛtiprakāreṇa dhūmatvena pakṣavṛttidhūmajñānādanumitiḥ vyāptyanubhava-tatsmaraṇa- pakṣadharmatājñānānāmekaprakārakatvenānumitihetutvāt* Ibid. 115-6

5. *ucyate yadi sāmānyalakṣaṇā nāsti tadānukūlatarkādikaṃ vinā dhūmādau vyabhicārasaṃśayo na syāt.* Ibid. p. 141-2.

6. *sandehasya pratyakṣarūpatayā dharmīndriyasannikarṣam vinā tadviṣayakatva'sambhavāditi bhāvaḥ.* Ibid(*Jāgadiśī*)p.142.

7. *prasiddhadhūme vahnisambandhāvagamāt. kālāntarīyadeśāntarīyadhūmasya mānābhāvenājñānāt. sāmānyena tu . sakaladhūmopasthitau dhūmāntare viśeṣādarśanena saṃśayo yujyate.* Ibid. p. 142-3.

8. *siddhe icchāvirahāt asiddhasyājñānāt tasmāt sukhatvādinā jñāteṣu sarveṣu sididhaṃ vihāyāsiddhe icchā bhavatītyabhyupeyam.* Ibid.305-7

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TURNING POINTS IN MĪMĀṂSĀ EPISTEMOLOGY

Dr. Ujjwala Panse

In the tradition of *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* thought many points of divergent opinions can be traced that may be named as the turning points in *Mīmāṃsā* epistemology.

Mainly, when we have two prominent schools of *Pūrvamīmāṃsā*, we find two independent traditions of thought that held altogether different views so far as the area of epistemology is concerned, along with other issues.

One such turning point could be non-acceptance of *abhāva* or *anupalabdhi* as a separate means of knowing by Prabhākara. He maintained, unlike the *Bhāṭṭa*s and *Naiyāyika*s that a negative experience such as there is no pot on the ground (*bhūtale ghaṭaḥ na*) does not point to any negative entity like *abhāva* but it consists of a single positive entity. He divided positive entities into two classes : A positive entity connected with another positive entity and a single or only positive entity. So there is a pot on the ground is an expression of the first type of positive entity and there is no pot on the ground is the expression of the second type of positive entity. So there is no negative entity as such which should be given the status of a separate category of entities. And hence no necessity of accepting *anupalabdhi* as *pramāṇa*.

Still another point also goes to the credit of Prabhākara and that is : No knowledge is false. When he said this a new theory of error namely *a-khyātivāda* came into being. To touch it upon briefly, Prabhākara held that knowledge as knowledge is always true - there can be no knowledge that is false. What is false is remembrance. He did not accept the validity of *smṛti* or remembrance. He said directly.

anubhūtiḥ pramāṇam, sā smṛteranyā na sā smṛtiḥ.
apramāṇam smṛtiḥ pūrvapratipattivyapekṣaṇāt..

so, the criterion to deny the validity to *smṛti* was that it required previous experience i.e. it expected something else for its own production. Such is not the case of knowledge. Knowledge is produced without expecting any previous knowledge and therefore i.e. because it independently produces an awareness about the object - it is valid.

But if this is true, what about the knowledge like, 'this is silver' which arises after looking at a piece of conch shell ? Because this is a direct experience produced from the eye - Conch-shell contact so it does not fall under the domain of *smṛti* then how come it is not true ? It is unequivocal that this is a direct experience and also that it is not true.

Prabhākara explains : not only this but all such cases of error do not comprise of only one knowledge but they are all necessarily combinations of knowledge and remembrance. And so far as the knowledge part is concerned it is true but the remembrance part - only is false.

To explain it more clearly : The expression *idam rajatam*, this is silver- should be divided into two parts namely *idam*, this and *rajatam* silver. Between these two, *idam* is the experience part and *rajatam* is remembered because of the similarity of dazzlingness in the piece of conch-shell. And remembrance is never true, never valid.

Thus, whatever cases of false knowledge are there, are in reality the combinations of experience and remembrance. And it is the remembrance part that is false and never the knowledge part. But the difference between these two constituents is not understood and that itself results into frustrated behaviour (*aphala-pravṛtti*), Thus, this theory is known as *a-khyāti* not understanding the difference between knowledge or experience and remembrance.

Hence Prabhākara contributed to the theory of error in our tradition which may be taken as a turning point in *Mīmāṃsā* epistemology.

One more important issue in Indian Epistemology is the issue of validity of knowledge.

There are various opinions or we may say as many philosophies so many opinions on this issue are there.

There are two basic differences depending on the two possibilities. To explain, knowledge can be valid either intrinsically or extrinsically. In other words, knowledge possesses validity that is either internal or external i.e. it possesses either *svataḥ-prāmāṇya* or *parataḥ prāmāṇya*. It is the *Naiyāyika*s who uphold the theory *parataḥ prāmāṇya* of *jñāna* and the *Mīmāṃsaka*s are well known for their theory of *svataḥ prāmāṇya* of *jñāna* .

The important question regarding the validity of knowledge is how is it known whether certain knowledge is valid or not. In other words how the validity or otherwise in that particular knowledge is known.

To answer this question one must be aware of how that particular knowledge itself is revealed.

Suppose it is revealed by one knowledge. Then there is a further question, namely, whether the validity of the first knowledge is known by the same knowledge that revealed that knowledge i.e. is it known by yet another knowledge?

If an answer to this question is in affirmative then it amounts to accepting self-validity of knowledge and if the answer is in negative then the result is acceptance of extrinsic validity of knowledge . It is the *Mīmāṃsaka*s who answer the question in affirmative and *Naiyāyika*s answer this question in negative.

An example would make it clear : Suppose, X has perceptual cognition of pot : This is a pot, (*ayam ghaṭaḥ*). This is produced by eyes and pot contact. And this verbalised determinate cognition of pot is called *vyavasāya*. After this knowledge arises, it is revealed by another knowledge namely, *anuvyavasāya, ghaṭamaham jānāmi*. This is the stand of the *Nyāya* system. The second knowledge is the awareness of the first one. In other words, *anuvyavasāya* is direct knowledge of *vyavasāya*. So for the *Naiyāyika*s knowledge is an object of perception. But this perception does not reveal the validity existing in the same knowledge. It is an altogether different matter which depends upon the fruitful behaviour of the knower. If the knower obtains the same thing that he perceived then his knowledge is valid and vice versa. Thus, validity of knowledge is inferred on the basis of fruitful behaviour. The form of inference is : *idam jñānam pramā, saphalapravṛttijanakatvāt*; *idam jñānam apramā, viphalapravṛttijanakatvāt.*

Thus, according to *Nyāya* system, thought knowledge is an object of perception validity of knowledge is not so but is an object of inference which is a separate means of knowing. And therefore, *jñāna* is *parataḥ pramāṇa*, i.e.- validity of knowledge is extrinsic.

Contrary to this : The *Mīmāṃsakas* hold that validity of knowledge is known by the same knowledge that reveals the knowledge itself.

According to the *Bhāṭṭa* School of *Pūrvamīmāṃsā*, knowledge is beyond the reach of sense organs (*atīndriya*). So it is not perceivable but it is inferred on the basis of knownness produced in the object when it is known.

The form of inference in case of knowledge of a pot would be : *ghaṭaḥ ghaṭatvaprakārakaghaṭatvavad-viśeṣyaka -jñānaviṣayaḥ, ghaṭatvaprakārakajñātatāvattvāt*. The same knowledge i.e. inferential cognition reveals the validity in the knowledge thus inferred - and therefore, knowledge according to *Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā* is self-valid (*svataḥ pramāṇa*)

This view was contested by Prabhākara who held that knowledge is not inferred on the basis of the knownness in the object but it is revealed by the same knowledge. This peculiar view of Prabhākara was again a turning point which was known by the same *tripuṭipratyakṣavāda*. As per this theory when a perception arises it not only reveals its object but it also reveals the knower and the knowledge also with the object. Thus, the expression of perception of *vyavasāya* according to Prabhākaras is not 'this is a pot' but 'I know the Pot'. [*idamahaṃ gṛhṇāmīti... tritayamevāvabhāsate. meyamātrāvabhāsarūpā saṃvidekā. na tu tasyāṃ saṃvidantaraṃ cakāsti. na ca sā nāvabhāti. tadanavabhāse sarvānavabhāsaprasaṅgāt.* vide *Prakaraṇapañcikā* p. 171] The metaphor of lamp makes the intention of Prabhākara very clear. As a lamp revels the object as well as itself so knowledge reveals the object as well as itself. Thus here also, as the same knowledge reveals itself and also validity in itself, knowledge is self-valid for the Prabhākaras.

These two views were held by these two schools for quite a long period of time.

But somewhere in the 12th century A.D. there flourished a *Mīmāṃsaka* who did not agree to accept either of the two well established schools of *Mīmāṃsā*. He held an altogether different view on the issue of validity of knowledge. He neither accepted that knowledge has to be inferred nor did he accept that the same knowledge reveals validity in itself. He is Murāri Miśra who is given the status of the exponent of the third school of *Pūrvamīmāṃsā*.

He went near the Prabhākara view when he accepted knowledge to be perceptible and he went closer to the *Nyāya* system when he accepted *anuvyavasāya* or awareness of the first knowledge namely *vyavasāya*. We may call it a turning point in *Mīmāṃsā* epistemology as it was a different position form the established two schools of *Mīmāṃsā* but we have to accept with a pinch of salt that this view was not acceptable to an philosopher who flourished after Murāri. Nevertheless, this was such a significant view that it was taken up by many *Nyāya* texts and some *Mīmāṃsā* texts after Murāri and was refuted. So, Murāri except in his own work appeared as a *Pūrvapakṣin* in all other works.

He held the view that validity of *vyavasāya* is known by *anuvyavasāya*. As *anuvyavasāya* reveals *vyavasāya*, it also reveals validity existing in the same and thus knowledge is self-valid.

Thus, interestingly, so for as the self validity of knowledge i.e. the state of being an object of cognition which reveals the cognition itself is concerned all the three schools of *Mīmāṃsā* agree to it but they differ in stating what cognition is the revealer of validity. [*miśramate tu anuvyavasāyagrāhyo vyavasāyaḥ. anuvyavasāyaśca vyavasāyapratyakṣam. tajjanikā sāmagrī manaḥsaṃyuktasamavāyādighaṭitā. tadgrāhyameva vyavasāyaniṣṭhaprāmāṇyamiti miśrāḥ.* vide *Rāmarudrīyam* on *Tarkadīpikā* p. 360]

All contributions of the founders of both the Schools of *Mīmāṃsā* may be taken as turning points in *Mīmāṃsā* epistemology which may or may not be accepted by other schools but were meticulously followed by the followers of the two schools respectively.

To mention a few among the issues, the *jāti-śakti vāda* of the *Mīmāṃsā* system which is acceptable to both the schools.

Prabhākara's stand of *anubhūtiḥ pramāṇam*] all experience is valid his theory of verbal understanding namely *anvitābhidhānavāda* Kumārila's theory of verbal understanding namely *abhihitānvayavāda* ; Kumārila's refutation of yogic perception; Prabhākaras non- acceptance of *abhāva* or *anupalabdhi*. as a separate means of knowing and so on.

All these theories had their impact on the *Mīmāṃsā* system on one hand and they also influenced other systems of Indian philosophy on the other.

When the two streams of thought, namely the Bhaṭṭa and Prabhākara were flowing through parallel ways, establishment of the third school became a prominent turning point in the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* epistemology.

On various issues Murāri Miśra's opinions could be taken as new divergent opinions i.e. turning points. One such example we saw of his view on validity of knowledge which is taken note of by many a prominent philosopher after him - be it for the sake of refutation.

There are various philosophical or logical concepts that he defined peculiarly differing from the two established currents. Some important ones among them are those of *viśeṣa*na and *upalakṣaṇa*, *kārya* and *siddha*, *tantra* and *avāpa* etc.

He really interpreted and defined these concepts in a new perspective to suit the contexts in which they were discussed. Though not believed by any followers, their significance cannot be reduced.

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LOST DIMENSIONS & TURNING POINTS IN SĀMĀNĀDHIKARAṆYAM*

Achyutanand Dash

The potentialities, the values and the universal applicabilities of Indian *śāstra*s are beyond any doubt. They have their well-defined goals. They follow a well-structured methodology in presenting their doctrines like that of *uddeśa-lakṣaṇa-parīkṣā* etc. The theories of the *śāstra*s are well-knit, compact and comprehensive. The integrity and uniformity of the concepts are maintained throughout the *śāstra*s with all sincerity. The *śāstrakāra*s take all possible care so that no loophole is left anywhere that could give the opponents a chance of *nigrahasthāna*. Inspite of this, there are many instances of interesting speculations that have lead to lively dialogues and debates. almost on all issues which have helped to develop each and every theory in their multiple facets and dimensions. If the history of the Indian *śāstric* Traditions in general or that of any concept in particular is monitored closely then it will be very clear that there are many interesting turning points in the tradition which bear the testimony of high-order Indian intellectual tradition.

We would like to study here the turning points vis a vis lost dimensions of *sāmānādhikaraṇya* which have greatly helped in the development of many issues, and have been significant in the areas of Linguistics, Logic and Epistemology. The historicity of the concept of *sāmānādhikaraṇya* is very interesting. It has many facets and each of them plays a role in the *śāstric* exposition. An exhaustive study on this issue is however, on this issue is not possible here. *Sāmānādhikaraṇya* and its allied notions play a role in defining the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) and the marker (*upalakṣaṇa*). The debates are interesting, stimulating and at the same time there are seeds of filmsy arguments found in the *śāstra*s, that one will be stunned to see them. In our view, such issues are to be studied more carefully, seriously and factfully as well, so that, that can help us to find a concrete direction for further development in the *śāstric* tradition.

Sāmānādhikaraṇya: Meaning and Etymology:

The term *sāmānādhikaraṇya* seems to have a long history. Pāṇini has used it at least in 8 *sūtra*s in his *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, both in the reference to adjective as well as noun. Katre[1] defines the term in noun as: `grammatical agreement in case with' and in adjective as : `being in the same case relation with'. Grammarians explain the term as denotative of the identical sense/meaning under the circumstance of absence of different case-endings[2]. This explanation signifies two aspects:

(1) being in the same case-relation
and
(2) denoting `identity' as meaning of the noun and adjective.

The standard example is given as:

[eg.1] *nīlo ghaṭaḥ* (A blue pot.)

Here the word `*nīlaḥ*' does not mean just `dark colour' (esp. `dark green' or `dark blue'), but it means `the substance/thing coloured with dark green or dark blue. It seems that the exponents of Indian semantics advocate an extended meaning of an adjectival term like *nīlaḥ* etc., so that the expressions like [e.g.1] may represent an integrated whole of meanings being related by the relation called *abheda* or *tādātmya* i.e., identity.

Before we go into details on the issue, it will be worth examining the etymological meaning of the term *samānādhikaraṇa* here. The term *samānādhikaraṇa* is a compound word being derived from the analytic phrase (*laukika-vigrahavākya*) as: *samānam adhikaraṇam yasya/yayoḥ/yeṣām vā tat samānādhikaraṇam tasya bhāvaḥ sāmānādhikaraṇya*. Here the term *adhikaraṇa* is explained in the school of Pāṇinian grammar as: relation viz. `identity' of word-meanings in a sentential cognition which is generated by a sentence that has a structure involving adjective and substantive or subject and predicate, or as two substantives in opposition. It has also other meanings like government, location and the sense of locative case[3]. However, here the term *sāmānādhikaraṇya* would precisely mean `being in a common/same government/case relation'. Philosophically it also means `having same predicament/category, common substratum, relating to same object'.

Commentators on Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī* explain the word *adhikaraṇa* as *abhidheya*[4] (`denoted sense of a word' or `word meaning'). Possibly it came to mean so on account of the *pravṛttinimitta*[5] of the word. We may contemplate the *vyutpatti* (etymology) of the term *adhikaraṇa* as: *amuka artham nimititikṛtya/adhikṛtya pravarttate'yam śabdaḥ iti adhikaraṇam abhidheya ity ucyate*. Explaining *samānādhikaraṇena* Kāśikākāra states that `*bhinna-pravṛttinimittasya śabdasyaikasminnarthe vṛttiḥ sāmānādhikaraṇyam*[6]. Here the author has taken *pravṛttinimitta* into account for justifying the term *adhikaraṇa* as meaning *abhidheya*. Nāgeśa also says: *samānārthatvam sāmānādhikaraṇyam tacca paryāyaśabdānām sutarām astīti bhāvaḥ*[7].

Sāmānādhikaraṇya in Sanskrit Lexicons:

Even though we have sufficient evidence to prove that the term *adhikaraṇa* means *abhidheya* (`denoted sense of a word' or word meaning; still we find it strange that no (popular) Sanskrit Lexicon gives this meaning. It is the only Sanskrit Dictionary, i.e., ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF SANSKRIT ON HISTORICAL PRINCIPLE (for the sake of abbreviation we shall call it DCD= Deccan College Dictionary) being edited at the Deccan College Postgraduate Research Institute, Poona (India) has given this meaning of the term *adhikaraṇa*[8]. The DCD gives the meaning as:

1E. `the basis of a word (i.e., its meaning or referent) (to explain the word *sāmānādhikaraṇya*)'.

This justifies our explanation of the term in the sense of `denoted sense of a word or word-meaning'. The etymology given above is supported by many citations from a wide range of *śāstric* literature given in attestation of the usage in the same sense in DCD. We may cite a few of them here:

(1) *sāmānādhikaraṇyam iti samānam vācyam ity arthaḥ* (Tantra Vā.968.5 on iii.4.13)

(2) *utpalaśabdasya tadevādhikaraṇam nīlaśabdasyāpi* (Ṭup.Ṭ. 102.5 on vi.151)

(3) *samānam abhinnam ekam adhikaraṇam vācyam yeṣām padānām tāni samānādhikaraṇāni padāni* (Nyās. I.181.21 on P.i.2.42)

(4) *adhikriyata ity adhikaraṇaṃ padārthas tasya yugapad vācyatāyām ekena padena padārthadvayasyaikadopasthānam tasmin dvando bhavatity arthaḥ* (Yuktisneha. 155.23 on i.1.7)

(5) *bhava-sarveśāna-paśupati-rudrogra-bhīma-*

mahādevābhidhānāṣṭakasyādhikaraṇam vācyam param brahma (Brahma. Sū. Bh. (Śrī) i.125.3 on i.I.2)

(6) *adhikaraṇam dravyam abhidheyam iti yāvat* (Mayu. Māli. 605.14 on vi.6.2)

(7) *yam artham adhikṛtyocyate tad adhikaraṇam* (Artha. Śā. iii.241.9 (15.1))

As it is evident from these citations that the schools of *Mīmāṃsā*, *Vyākaraṇa*, *Vedānta* and even *Arthaśāstra* use the term *adhikaraṇa* in the sense of 'word-meaning'. Since the word *adhikaraṇa* is the main constituent of the term *sāmānādhikaraṇyam*, its meaning plays the vital role in defining the term. Therefore, this justifies the term *sāmānādhikaraṇyam* as meaning '*abhedena ekārthabodhakatvam*'. But to justify that syntax cannot be ignored. Hence, the adjectival sense of 'being in the same case-relation with' is also taken into account. Therefore, finally *sāmānādhikaraṇya* means: *vibhinna-vibhaktirāhitye sati abhedena ekārthabodhakatvam* (i.e., denotative of unified meaning through the relation 'identity' under the (syntactic) environment of being in the absence of different case-ending). This definition of *sāmānādhikaraṇyam* fulfils two aspects of the concept viz. semantics in the sense *abhedena ekārthabodhakatvam* and syntactic in the sense of *vibhinnavibhakti-rāhityam*.

Udayanācārya on *Sāmānādhikaraṇyam*:

Udayanācārya[9] in his *Kiraṇāvalī* refers to these two aspects of *sāmānādhikaraṇyam*. He says: *dvividham hi sāmānyādhikaraṇyam śābdam ārtham ca*(i.e., *sāmānyādhikaraṇam* is two-fold, with reference to 'words' and their 'meanings'). Broadly speaking the *śābda-sāmānādhikaraṇyam* is defined taking the sentence structure into account that involve the subject and predicate, or adjective and substantive or two substantive in appositions, where the grammatical agreement is seen under the environment of being in the same case-relation with, whereas the *ārtha-sāmānādhikaraṇya* takes only the ontology or world reality into account. Thus according to Udayanācārya, both these aspects of *sāmānādhikaraṇyam* together yield a good result when in operation but not one without the other. Only *vāstava-sāmānādhikaraṇya* (ontological co-substrata) may result in misrepresentation of sentential cognition, thinks Udayanācārya[10]. He finds defects in usages that is based on only on *śābda-sāmānādhikaraṇyam* like :

[eg.2] *mātā me bandhyā*

or only on *ārtha sāmānādhikaraṇyam* like :

[eg.3] *gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ* (A village of cowherds on (the bank) of Ganges).

Or

[eg.4] *go sadṛśo gavayaḥ* (A *gavaya* is like a cow).

These usages are interesting in this context because [eg.3] is a stock example for *lakṣaṇā* in almost all the *śāstric* literature including *Kāvyaśāstra*; so also [eg.4] is the stock example for *upamāna pramāṇa* (analogy as the means of valid cognition) in most of Indian Schools of philosophy. However, it is amazing to note that almost all the *śāstrakāra*s have ignored the syntactic aspect of these sentences, which Udayana takes into account. The sentence [eg.4] is a subject-predicate type construction based on *sāmānādhikaraṇyam*. The subject is *gavaya* and the predicate is *go-sādṛśya* that qualifies the *gavaya*. Udayana considers *go-sādṛśya* as an *upalakṣaṇa* (contingent property) on the ground of similarity that belongs to world reality rather than the syntax of the sentence. Udayana's concept of *upalakṣaṇa* here may appear strange, but to my mind, he is dealing with the fundamentals of the concept that we shall discuss latter on. Another interesting feature that Udayana brings here is the example [eg.3] in addition to [eg.4] as another example of *upalakṣaṇa*. Here [eg.3] according to Udayana, means *gaṅgā-upalakṣita-ghoṣaḥ*. This is an example given in support of pure *ārtha-sāmānādhikaraṇyam* only on mundane reality will make little sense in the context of discourse analysis without the consideration of its syntax. This is no doubt, an example of *lakṣaṇā* even for Udayana and thus its *upalakṣaṇa* status cannot be justified satisfactorily except in a metaphorical sense where sometime we use the term.

What is *upalakṣaṇa*?

The concept of *upalakṣaṇa* is again a very vast field of research. We shall, however, concentrate only upon *sāmānādhikaraṇya* and its role in defining *upalakṣaṇa* and its allied notions here. *upalakṣaṇa* is generally translated by many as `indicator', however following Mohanty[11], I would like to render it as `contingent property' (*upalakṣaṇa*). Monier William defines *upalakṣ-* (the compound verbal base) as: `to distinguish, mark; to distinguish by a secondary or unessential mark, to imply in addition, designate implicity'. Accordingly `that distinguishes by a secondary or unessential mark, a marker, that implies in addition, that designates implicitly' is called an *upalakṣaṇa*. Now it should be pointed out that *upalakṣaṇa* cannot be defined without looking into the definitions of *viśeṣaṇa,* which is an ally to it. Udayanācārya, defines *viśeṣaṇa* as:*samānādhikaraṇam avacchedakam viśeṣaṇam*[12], (the qualifier is that, which distinguishes (from others) and which is in the same case-ending (as that of qualified, i.e., *viśeṣya*)).

Udayana gives the example:

[eg.5] *nīlam utpalam,* (A blue lotus).

In this sentence, it is clear that there is a syntactic agreement between `*nīla*' and `*utpala*' being in the same case-ending that is referred to in the definition by the term *samānādhikaraṇa*. *avacchedaka* here means *vyāvarttaka* i.e., distinguishing feature by its essential or primary marker. This generates a complex cognition viz.,*viśiṣṭa-pratyaya*. Both, *viśeṣaṇa* and *upalakṣaṇa* give rise to *viśiṣṭa-pratyaya*, by functioning as its un-essential or secondary marker. Therefore, to define *upalakṣaṇa,* Udayana says: *avacchedakatvāviśeṣe'pi vyadhikaraṇam upalakṣaṇam*[13], i.e., the distinguishing property being common to (both) *upalakṣaṇa* is that which is not in the same case-ending. Here, *vyadhikaraṇa* is glossed as *asamāna-vibhaktikatvam* or *asamāna-vibhaktyanta-pada-vācyatvam*, i.e., `not construed with the same case-ending'. Udayana, as we have seen, gives the example [eg.3] where *gaṅgā* is an instance of *upalakṣaṇa*; only because it is in different case-ending than that of *ghoṣa,* where the earlier is seen with the locative case-ending and the latter in nominative case-ending. This obvioulsy is not a good example of *upalakṣaṇa* according to Udayanācārya, since it is based only on *śābda-sāmānādhikaraṇyam.* What he thinks is that both *śābda* and *ārtha sāmānādhikaraṇya* together hold good and that is found in examples like [eg.1] and [eg.5] the reason being syntactic and semantic continuity achieved by that alone which is very important in sentential cognition. Coming to the case of *upalakṣaṇa,* the tradition gives the wellknown example of:

[eg.6] *jaṭābhis tāpasaḥ*.

(A hermit by matted hair)

Here *jaṭā* is no doubt an unessential or secondary marker or a contingent property of a *tāpasa* that distinguishes him from all other *tāpasa*s and *atāpasa*s.

Śrī Śivāditya Miśra the author of Saptapadārthī, translates the view of Udayanācārya. He defines *viśeṣaṇa* and *upalakṣaṇa* in the following manner :

samānādhikaraṇam vyāvarttakam viśeṣaṇam
and
vyadhikaraṇam sat vyāvarttakam upalakṣaṇam[14]

As we have stated above that the term *vyadhikaraṇam* is just an explanatory term of *avacchedakam* that is used by Udayanācārya. Śivāditya explicitly defines *samānādhikaraṇam* and *vyadhikaraṇam* as follows:

ekavibhaktyanta-padavācyatvam samānādhikaraṇatvam (i.e., *samānādhikaraṇa* is that statement having words in same case-endings)
and

bhinnavibhaktyanta-padavācyatvam vaiyadhikaraṇyam (i.e., *vaiyadhikaraṇya* is that statement having words in different case-endings)[15].

Therefore, it is certain that there was no confusion so far on the nature of *samānādhikaraṇa* and *vyadhikaraṇa* until the period of Śivāditya Miśra. Then comes a *turning point* in the concept of *samānādhikaraṇa* and its allied notion that created a lot of confusion amongst the *śāstrakāra*s and that presents the ontology based on fantastic speculation and facetious arguments were presented in support of that. What follows, we shall give a small account of this.

Gaṅgeśopādhyāya on *viśeṣaṇa* and *upalakṣaṇa* :

Gaṅgeśopādhyāya in his magnum opus *TATTVACINTĀMAṆI* (TC) has exhaustively dealt with the nature and definition of *viśeṣaṇa* and *upalakṣaṇa*. He has given as many as 22 definitions of each of them and a thorough discussion thereon. {We have given a brief "*Survey of the definitions of viśeṣaṇa and upalakṣaṇa*" in the APPENDIX, which may be referred to for the following discussion}

It is well-known that Gaṅgeśopādhyāya greatly indebted to Udayanācārya and he refers to him with high regard, that is to say, with the honorific nominative plurals like "*yad āhur ācāryāḥ*". In this context also he does not forget to do so, even though he strongly advocates a revision of the proposals of Udayanācārya. That shows the rapid developments in the conceptual frame-work in the system of *Nyāya* philosophy.

Udayanācārya, as we have seen, has given "*gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ*" as an example of *upalakṣaṇa* (of course as an instance of *ārtha sāmānādhikaraṇya*) however, Gaṅgeśa strongly refutes it. According to Gaṅgeśa, if *lakṣaṇā* is considered as *upalakṣaṇa per se*, only because, the latter is also denotative of secondary sense like the former one, that it will be the case that the *lakṣaṇā* has to be eliminated (*lakṣaṇocchedaḥ*)[16]. No doubt *lakṣaṇā* plays a greater role in semantics which is accepted in almost all the schools of Indian Philosophy and linguistics and we can not do away with it. Therefore, *lakṣaṇā* should not be confused with *upalakṣaṇa*. It seems that at the time of Udayanācārya *lakṣaṇā*, *upalakṣaṇa*, (Pāṇini's) *itthambhūta-lakṣaṇa*, and *upamāna* were over-lapping concepts without any/much distinct demarcation amongst them. But, Gaṅgeśopādhyāya presents these concepts very clearly and finds nothing to get confused with. The over-lapping situation in the conceptual framework owes a great deal to the concept of *sāmānādhikaraṇya* and its allied notions. But Gaṅgeśopādhyāya restricts *sāmānādhikaraṇya* to mean only *ekādhikaraṇa-vṛtti,* and due to this alone the over-lapping situation amongst the concepts like *lakṣaṇā, upalakṣaṇa, itthambhūta-lakṣaṇa,* and *upamāna* disappears. Etymologically, *sāmānādhikaraṇya* can be explained to mean *'ekādhikaraṇa-vṛtti'* (residing in common locus) and the *laukika vigrahavākya* of that will be, *samānam=ekam / tulyam adhikaraṇam yasya / yayoḥ / yeṣām vā tat samānādhikaraṇam, tasya bhāvaḥ sāmānādhikaraṇyam.* Here *adhikaraṇa* means *ādhāraḥ* i.e., locus/substratum. We know its wide and spectacular use in the concept of *vyāpti* in the context of *anumāna-pramāṇa* (means of inferential cognition). The form of *vyāpti* is presented as: *yatra yatra dhūmaḥ tatra tatra vahniḥ* (where ever smoke there is fire-- the invariable concomitance is called *vyāpti*) which is caused by the regular perception of *vahni dhūmayoḥ sāmānādhikaraṇya* i.e., the common substratum of fire and smoke. This is fine and in the dognitive enterprise we do not rule out the role of *sāmānādhikaraṇya* in the sense of *ekādhikaraṇavṛtti.* But where linguistic issues are involved, neither can its syntactico-semantic nature be ignored nor can it be interpreted/restricted just to mean "state of being co-substrata". A survey of the definitions of *viśeṣaṇa* and *upalakṣaṇa* in T.C. (see APPENDIX) reveals that almost fifty percent of the definitions are based on or related to the syntactico-semantic nature of the concept. Let us examine the usages that are taken for consideration by Gaṅgeśopādhyāya while defining the *viśeṣaṇa* and *upalakṣaṇa.*

VIŚEṢAṆA	*UPALAKṢAṆA*
(a) *daṇḍī puruṣaḥ*	(a) *karuṇā kṣetram*
(b) *subhago'yam daṇḍī mahābāhuḥ*	(b) *kākavad devadatta-gṛham*
(c) *nīlam utpalam*	(c) *jaṭābhis tāpasaḥ*
(d) *lohitaḥ sphaṭikaḥ*	(d) *gaur anityaḥ*
(e) *daṇḍinam ānaya*	(e) *rūpavāṃs calati*
	(f) *rūpavati rasaḥ*
	(g) *kākena devadatta-gṛham*

Gaṅgeśopādhyāya tries to give only a semantic justification of these usages and completely ignores the syntax. In other words, he tries to sketch the world reality cognized from these sentences and thereby he defines *viśeṣaṇa* and *upalakṣaṇa*. It seems that *vyāvarttakatva* (distinguishing features) and *viśiṣṭadhīviṣayatva* (state of being the object of qualified cognition) are two common characteristics of *viśeṣaṇa* and *upalakṣaṇa*. However, *viśeṣaṇa* is further defined in accordance with the physical existence of the distinguishing feature(s) in/on the *viśeṣya* (the qualificandum): This idea has been variously presented using terms like : *vidyamāna, sad, viśeṣyavṛtti, adhikaraṇa, samānādhikaraṇa* etc. (cf. VI, 2,3,4,8,9,11,12,13,14,15; in the Survey of Definitions). In contrast to this, we find that *upalakṣaṇa* is defined in accordance with the denial of physical existence of the distinguishing features in/on the *viśeṣya* (qualificandum). This idea is again presented by terms like: *avidyamāna, asad, viśeṣyāvṛtti, anadhikaraṇa, vyadhikaraṇa* etc. (cf. the definition of *upalakṣaṇa* in contrast to that of the *viśeṣaṇa* given above.)

It seems, these definitions did not work well to describe the mundane reality represented by above usage. For instance in *lohita sphaṭikaḥ,* the reddish colour, though not an inherent colour of *sphaṭika* still it has been considered as a *viśeṣaṇa*. Needless to say *lauhitya* (reddish colour) is just a reflection on *sphaṭika*. Therefore, physical existence cannot be taken to be a criterion for defining *upalakṣaṇa*. In the same manner, we can closely examine the other sentences and will not be surprised to find that *vidyamānatā* and *avidyamānatā* etc., are not *asādhāraṇa-dharma* for defining *viśeṣaṇa* and *upalakṣaṇa*.

Therefore, it seems, Gaṅgeśa thought of applying the *anvaya / sambandha* aspect of the above concepts to justify the ontology represented by above usage. But, while applying the reformulated definition based on the *anvaya / sambandha* aspects (cf. V7,10, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22) he again overlooked the syntactic aspect of the sentences. Thus, he had to face similar problems, because *anvaya / sambandha* were interpreted to mean *sākṣāt-sambandha* (direct relation) in contrast to *paramparā sambandha* (indirect relation) in the sense of `contact' or `absence of contact'. This, of course, means physical existence or non-existence of *jaṭā* etc., in the cases like (eg.6) *jaṭābhis tāpasaḥ* etc.

Jaṭābhis tāpasaḥ: A Knotty Point:

Vardhamānopādhyāya, son and pupil of Gaṅgeśopādhyāya, in his *Kiraṇāvalī*-Prakāśa, explains *jaṭābhis tāpasaḥ* with reference to its status as *upalakṣaṇa* very interestingly, let us see what he says.

"*ata eva jaṭāsattvāsattvābhyām jaṭāvāṃs tāpasaḥ jaṭābhis tāpasaḥ iti prayogaḥ* | *kālabhedena jaṭā viśeṣaṇatvāt upalakṣaṇatvāc ca. anyathā tṛtīyāniyamo na syāt* | *ata eva vyavacchittipratyayasamaye viśeṣye sattvāsattvābhyām tad eva viśeṣaṇam upalakṣaṇam. na tu yad upalakṣaṇam na tad viśeṣaṇam iti*[17]"|

According to Vardhamāna, there can not be any hard and fast category as such like *viśeṣaṇa* and *upalakṣaṇa*. That will depend upon their ontological reality. Moreover, the time factor must be considered for distinguishing how the *viśeṣaṇa* and *upalakṣaṇa* present the *viśiṣṭa-jñāna*. The ontology will refer to the existence and /or non-existence of the qualifier or the marker, as the case may be, on the substance. It is possible to find interchangeability between *viśeṣaṇa* and *upalakṣaṇa* depending upon usage. Vardhamāna says in no uncertain terms that *jaṭā* can be treated as *upalakṣaṇa* if the ascetic has no *jaṭā* at present, provided that he had it earlier. What does this *jaṭā-asattvakāla* mean? I fail to understand whether Vardhamāna wants to address a *muṇḍi sannyāsi* by the sentence "*jaṭābhis tāpasaḥ*". Moreover, Vardhamāna tries to justify Pāṇini's aphorism: *itthambhūtalakṣaṇe tṛtīyā* (P.2.3.21) accordingly. His intention, perhaps is more explicitly articulated by Mathurānātha in the following lines: *itthambhūta ity anena atītārthaka-kta-pratyayena· asattvasya bodhanād ityarthaḥ*[18]. Mathurānātha has explained the term *itthambhūta* etymologically, saying the suffix *kta* is used here in the sense of past (by P.1.1.26 and 3.2.102), which obviously refers to 'non-existence'. But grammarians, in this case, say that the suffix *kta* is used in the sense of *kartṛ* (agency) by P.3.4.72, added to *bhū-dhātu* of the 10th class (*curādigaṇa*) but not to the one belongs to the 1st class (*bhvādigaṇa*)[19]. It seems that here lies the fundamental misinterpretation of the form grammatically which led to the conceptual mis-representation of the whole situation.

Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya, the author of Vyutpattivāda has rejected the views of Vardhamānopādyāya as well as that of Mathurānātha. He thinks their interpretation of Pāṇinian aphorism is neither correct nor suitable to the context. According to him, the existing *jaṭā* only can be considered as *upalakṣaṇa* of an ascetic but never the non-existing *jaṭā* nor the earlier *jaṭā*[20]. The question should never be raised that since the above views were propounded by authorities like Gaṅgeśa, Vardhamāna or Mathurānātha and therefore, that should be accepted and defended by all means. in a different context Gadādhara, who is also one of the prolific writers and an authority in *Navya-Nyāya*, says :*na hi kasyacid granthakṛtoviparīta-lekhanam yuktivalād vastusiddhau bādhakam*[21], i.e., a vague statement of any author should not come on the way of establishing the nature of an entity by true logic. *Nyāya* always teaches us to think precisely and objectively and in that process the so called `personality cult' should not be given much importance. *Navya-Nyāya*, no doubt shows a healthy tradition of discourse analysis.

The important question that may be raised here is: While discussing on the issues like *viśeṣaṇa* and *upalakṣaṇa* etc., which has greater relevance with discourse analysis, should we not take the linguistic aspects like `syntax and semantics' into consideration? Only on the basis of `world reality' or `referent' we will not be able to interpret the linguistic categories properly and there always will be a fear of misrepresenting the world reality in addition to spoiling the beauty of language. To my mind, we should not compare and contrast the *viśeṣaṇa* with *upalakṣaṇa* since they fall under different realm of our knowledge spectrum. *viśaṃṣaṇa,* no doubt, is a linguistic category[22] whereas *upalakṣaṇa* is a *sinn*, of course, not exactly in Fregean sense. One of the reasons, that I think, intensifies the problem is our confusion of *guṇa* (the second category in *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* school of thought)or *dharma* (*ādheya* i.e., *dravya, guṇa, jāti* or *upādhi* etc., or whatsoever thing that exists in another thing) with *viśeṣaṇa*. This confusion leads us to the misrepresentation of world reality. We should see the sentence construction first and then go for the sentential analysis.

Sāmānādhikaraṇya in *Advaita Vedānta* :

The concept of *sāmānādhikaraṇya* no doubt have a greater potentiality to handle all these issues related to syntax and semantics without giving any room for semantic misrepresentation. For instance, it plays an important role in designing the conceptual frame-work of *Advaita-Vedānta*. *vedāntin*s quote the Upanisadic statement: *satyam jñānam anantam brahma*[23] i.e., `Brahman [is] Truth, Knowledge, Infinite', to exemplify the *svarūpa lakṣaṇa* (essential nature) of *Brahman*. The words *satya* etc. are applicable to one and the same thing and they are meaningful only on account of their *pravṛttinimitta* (the reason of their application). Otherwise, if all these words are taken to mean one and the same thing, then they are being synonymous, the statement would be trivial, repetitious and a string of names for one and same thing[24]. Thus, it has to be accepted that they are not synonymous and they have their different meanings. In that case, how can they all refer to a self-identical and purely undifferentiated entity? To that *vedāntin*s say that `identity' (*abheda*) means `identity-in-difference' (*bheda-ghaṭita-abhedas-tādātmyam*). This has been explained with the help of a mundane identity statement such as: *so'yam devadattaḥ* (This is the same Devadatta as that) (Comparable to Frege's `the morning star=the evening star'). Here, `*saḥ*' refers to Devadatta who was seen earlier at a different place and `*ayam*' refers to the same Devadatta who is seen now at this place. This means, Devadatta is the same person and there is a pure identity of Devadatta with himself. The only thing that differs is the `spatio-temporal reference' in the statement expressed by *saḥ* (he, who is seen `then' and `there' at a different time and space) and *ayam* (this man, who is seen `now' and `here'). Only when, the spetio-temporal reference is given up, then only pure self-identity will be established and the statement becomes meaningful. This `giving up' of part of the meaning that is understood from the statement is called *bhāgatyāga-lakṣaṇā* or *jahadajahal-lakṣaṇā*[25] in *śāstras*. Therefore, *vedāntins* explain *abheda* to mean *bheda-ghaṭita-abheda* (identity-in-difference), where the *bheda* part is given up for pure identity. This identity is conveyed by the *samānādhikaraṇa* statement that has a greater bearing in *Vedānta*. The same is also applied to explain the *mahāvākya* `TAT TVAMASI' for pure self-identity of *jīvātman* with the *paramātman*, which is the fundamental doctrine of *Advaita Vedānta*.

Gadādhara's New Approach:

However, *Naiyāyikas* do not accept *abheda* to mean `identity-in-difference'. They accept something `complete identity'. Gadādhara says: *abhedas tādātmyam*[26]. He takes up this issue in the beginning of his celebrated work Vyutpattivāda. According to Gadādhara, *abheda* is represented by *saṃsargamaryādā,* i.e., the principle of relation based on (Syntactico-semantic) expectancy which is the governing principle of *śābdabodha.* He classifies *śābdabodha* into two as `*abhedānvayabodha*' and `*bhedānvayabodha*'. In the *abhedānvayabodha* section he studies on the syntax of the adjectival clause involving `subject and predicate'. `adjective and substantive' and `two substantives in appostion'. He emphasises a new linguistic principle: *viśeṣaṇavibhakter abhedārthakatvam*[27], i.e., `identity is the meaning of the case-ending added to an adjectival clause' which is again controlled by '*svasamānavibhaktikatvam*', i.e., having same case-ending. This, as we have seen, is the meaning of *samānādhikaraṇa* in the old school of *Nyāya* and *Vyākaraṇa*, that is glossed in Sanskrit as: *abhedena ekārthabodhakatvam* under the circumstance of '*vibhinna-vibhakti-rāhityam*'. Needless to say that the seemingly new principle introduced by Gadādhara is nothing but restatement of the same idea which prevailed in the concept of *sāmānādhikaraṇyam*. The only thing we can point out here is that Gadādhara does not give any indication to the fact that the new principle '*viśeṣaṇavibhakter abhedārthakatvam*' has any link with earlier concept of *sāmānādhikaraṇyam*. However, in this context, his approach seems to be completely new and certainly laudable. Gadādhara's method of sentential understanding (*śābdabodha*) in general and the *abhedānvayabodha* Section, in Vyutpattivāda, in particular is praiseworthy. But, I am sceptical about its comprehensive nature. It seems, he has not looked into the discussions on *viśeṣaṇa-vibhaktyartha* and its related issues in the Vṛttisamuddeśa of Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīya.

Finally Bhartṛhari :

Bhartṛhari deals with these issues quite exhaustively. It is interesting to note that *sāmānādhikaraṇya* is the underlying concept of his expositions, having all its syntactico-semantic flavour. I think, a thorough study on these issues is needed with a view to identify different dimensions and facets of *viśeṣaṇavibhakti*, its meaning and its syntactic role in sentence analysis. We cannot go into a detailed discussion here on Bhartṛhari's exposition and certainly that is beyond the scope of this paper. It needs an independent exploration incorporating Gadādhara's treatment. It would, however, be worth noting various aspects of *sāmānādhikaraṇya* as have been introduced by Bhartṛhari here just to suggest a beginning of this research. Let us see the following *kārikā*s:

sāmānādhikaraṇyam ca śabdayoḥ kaiścid iṣyate |
viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyatvam saṃjñāsaṃjñitvam eva vā ||
keṣāmcij jātiguṇayor ekārthasamavetayoḥ |
vṛttiḥ kṛṣṇatileṣviṣṭā śabde dravyābhidhāyini [28]||

Translation:
"According to some, the appositional relation is between words and so is that of the qualifier and the qualificand and that of the name and the named.

According to some who hold that the word conveys substance (individual), the universal and quality, inhering in the same thing, are found in an integrated manner in the sesame seed"[29]

So also Bhartṛhari says in a different context
jātisamkhyāsamāhārair yathaiva sahacāriṇi |
dravye kriyā pravarttanta ekātmatve'py apekṣyate ||
mūrtibhyo mūrttidharmāṇām tathā bhedasya darśanāt |
sāmānādhikaraṇyam ca kriyāYogaś ca kalpyate [30]||

Translation:
"Just as, through the universal, number and collection, actions are performed on the substance which is associated with them, even though their identity is understood.

In the same way, as one sees from things their identity with their attributes, the relation of supposition and connection with the verb become explicable"[31].

CONCLUSION:

If we closely observe the different aspects of *sāmānādhikaraṇya,* we can certainly see the *Turning points vis a vis* its lost dimensions which have helped in the development of the intellectual (*śāstric*) tradition in India to a greater extent. With this background we can envisage the different characteristics of *turning points* with reference to the *śāstric* studies underlining following three consequences:

(i) it may solve some existing problems (like the over-lapping situation of *lakṣaṇā, upalakṣaṇa, itthambhūta-lakṣaṇa, upamāna* etc.)

(ii) it may create some new problems (like the misrepresentation of *jaṭābhis tāpasaḥ,* etc.)

(iii) it may give scope to postulate a new set of principles (like *viśeṣaṇa-vibhakter abhedārthakatvam* in Gadādhara's Vyutpattivāda.)

Therefore, we must look into the historiography of the conceptual framework of different theories along with their turning points at the same time we should think on further development of *śāstric* studies.

NOTES AND REFERENCES:

1. Katre, S.M., 1968-1969, Dictionary of Pāṇini, Deccan College Building Centenary and Silver Jubilate Series, Nos. 53,62,63; Vol. 1-3, Deccan College Postgraduate Research Institute, Poona.

2. cf. *vibhinnavibhakti-rāhitye sati abhedena ekārthabodhakatvam,* see Nyāya Kosa, (Reprint of IV Edn.) by M.M. Bhīmācārya Jhalakikar, Bhandarkar Oriental Institute, Poona, India, 1996, p. 968.

3. See *ādhāro'dhikaraṇam* P.1.4.45, and *saptamy adhikaraṇe ca;* P.2.3.36.

4. Cf. *adhikaraṇa-śabdo'bhidheyavāci,* Vṛtti on P.1.2.42. See also Vṛtti on P.1.4.105.

5. The term *pravṛttinimitta* is translated by Mohanty, J.N., (1992, p.65) as `the reason for the application of a word to an object' or just `reason of behaviour'. Matilal, B.K., (1990, p.31) translates it `the basis for the application (of a term or a word)' or `occasioning ground or basis' (p.33). Nyāya Koṣa defines it as :*padaśakyatāvacchedakam,* i.e., the delimiting factor of the denotative potency of a word; it is otherwise defined as:*vācyatve sati vācyavṛttitve sati vācyopasthitiprakāratvam,* i.e., `that which is the denoted sense of a word at the same time that which resides in the denoted sense of the word being related to the same as a qualifier'. The term *pravṛttinimitta* can also be explained as `the essential meaning of a word, for which it stands/introduced initially'.

6. Kāśikā Vṛtti on P.1.4.105.

7. Uddyota on Pradīpa on P.2.1.49.

8. Encyclopaedic Dictionary of Sanskrit on Historical Principle, Vol.III. pt.1, General Editor, A.M. Ghatge, Deccan College Postgraduate Research Institute, Poona, 1982, p. 1550.

9. *Kiraṇāvalī* by Udayanācārya, Bibliothica Indic, (A Collection of Oriental Work), ed. By N.C. Vedāntatīrtha, The Asiatic Society, Calcutta, (Work No. 200, Fascicules 4, Issue No. 1572,) Sept. 1956, p.589.

10. Cf. *"etat tu mūhurtamātram avadhīyatām | dvividham hi sāmānādhikaraṇyam śābdam ārtham ca | tatra na tāvac chābdasāmānādhikaraṇyamātreṇānvayopapattiḥ | `mātā me bandhyā' ity ādiṣv api prasaṅgāt | nāpi kriyā-kārakayoḥ parasparam ādhārādheyapratītāv anvayaprasaṅgāt| ārtham*

tu sāmānādhikaraṇyam yathā ghoṣa padārtha-paryālocanāyām iha durlabham tathā `go-sadṛśo gavayaḥ' ity atrāpi durlabham eva| go-sādṛśyam gavaya-padapravṛttinimittam na bhavaty āyuṣmataiva niṣṭaṅkitam| upalakṣaṇamātreṇacodāhṛtena go-sādṛśyena yad upalakṣaṇīyam gavayatvam tena saha yady anvayaḥ tadānīm gaṅgāpadenāpi upalakṣaṇīyatīrapadenaiva saha ghoṣasyānvayopapattau katham anvayavaidhūryam? tasmād vāstava-sāmānādhikaraṇya-virahād aparyavasannam vākyam evamvidhām pramām karoti"|| *Kiraṇāvalī* by Udayanācārya, ibid. p.589.

11. Mohanty, J.N., 1992, Reason and Tradition in Indian Thought, An Essay on the nature of Indian Philosophical Thinking, Clarendon Press, Oxford, p.66.

12. *Kiraṇāvalī* by Udayanācārya, op cit., 453-455.

13. Ibid. p. 455.

14. Saptapadārthī by Śivāditya Miśra, (with three comm.) ed. by Amarendra Mohan Tarkatirtha and Narendra Candra *Vedānta*tirtha, Pub, Mtropolitan Printing and Publishing House, Calcutta, 1934, p.92.

15. Ibid. p.92.

16. Df. `*na hi gaṅgāyām ghoṣa ity atra pravāho'pi tīrāvacchedakatayā bhāsate kintu tīratvena tīraviśeṣa eva, anyathā ajahatsvārthāsāmyāt | na caivam upalakṣaṇapadasya lākṣaṇikatvam aśakyasya samsthānāder upasāthāpanād iti vācyam | upalakṣaṇa budhyupasthāpitakāraṇāntarajanya-samsthānopasthityā tadanvaye tātparyād iti, maivam| tathāvyutpatter asiddheḥ, na hyupalakṣaṇapadātiriktam upalakṣopasthāpakam astīty upalakṣaṇapadam svārtham upasthāpya upalakṣam upasthāpayatīti lakṣaṇaiva syāt, anyathā lakṣaṇocchedaḥ' |*
Tattvacintāmaṇi by Gaṅgeśopādhyāya, Vol.1, (*pratyakṣa*

khaṇḍa) with Comm. *rahasya* by Mathurānātha ed. by Kāmākṣānātha Tarkavāgīśa, Motilal Banarsidass, Reprint, Delhi, 1974. pp. 826-827.

17. *Kiraṇāvalī-Prakāśa* by Vardhamānopādhyāya, Bibliotheca Indica, The Asiati Society, Calcutta, 1956, p.454.

18. See *Rahasya* on TC by Mathurānātha Tarkavāgīśa, op cit., p. 825.

19. Cf. *ayam prakāraḥ ittham, tam bhūtaḥ itthambhūtaḥ `bhū prāptau' iti caurādikāt ādhṛṣād vā iti ṇij abhāve `gatyarthākarmaka' ity ādinā `kartari ktaḥ' | lakṣaṇam jñāpakam .......lakṣalakṣaṇabhāvas tṛtīyārthaḥ tad āha `jaṭājñā-pya' iti | na ca jñāne karaṇatvād eva tṛtīyā siddhā iti vācyam, karaṇatvāvivakṣāyām lakṣya-lakṣaṇa-bhāvamātra-vivakṣāyām tṛtīyārthatvāt* || *Bālamanoramā* on *Siddhānta Kaumudī*, ed. by C. Sankararama Sastri, Pub. by Sri Balamanorama Press, Mylapore, Madras, 1929, p.288.

20. Gadādhara briefly translates the view of Gaṅgeśopādhyāya and at the end he gives his own views on this issue. he says `*kvacic ca vidyamānam apy atadvyāvṛttinyūnādhikavṛttitayā tatra na viśeṣaṇam ity ucyate, kim tūpalakṣaṇam, yathā vidyamānāpi jaṭā tāpasa upalakṣaṇam, na tūpalakṣatāvacchedakaśamadamādivad viśeṣaṇam ity alam*'| See *Vyutpattivāda* by Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya, ed. by Dharmādhikārī Ḍhuṇḍirāja Śāstrī, Pub. Medical Hall Publishing, Kasi, Samvat 1942, pp.92-93.

21. *Vyutpattivāda*, by Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya, with *Śāstrārthakalā*, comm. By Pt. Venimadhava Sastri, Pub. JayaKrishna Das Haridas Gupta. The Caukhamba Sanskrit Series, Benaras City, 1935, p.101.

22. *viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyatvam padayor upajāyate* |
na prātipadikārthaś ca tatraivam vyatiricyate || V.P. III.14.6
Translation:

‘The relation of qualifier and qualificand arises between the meanings or fully formed words. The meaning of the stem is not thereby affected'.
See Iyer, K.A.S., The *Vākyapadīya* of Bhartṛhari, Kanda III. pt.ii. *(Vṛttisamuddeśa)*, Eng. Translation, Exegetical Notes, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1st Edn., 1974, p. 124.

23. *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*, ii.1.1.
24. See detail discussion on "Identity Sentences (*sāmānādhikaraṇya Vākya*)" in Mohanty, J.N., 1992, op cit. p.95-97.
25. *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* by Dharmarājādhvarīndra, ed. with English translation by S.S. Suryanarayana Sastri, the Adyar Library, Adyar, 1942, pp. 73-74.
26. *Vyutpattivāda* by Gadādhara, with *Śāstrārthakalā,* op.cit., p.87.

27. cf. ‘*Abheda eva vā viśeṣaṇavibhakter arthaḥ*', *Vyutpattivāda*, op.cit. p.4; See also ‘*abhedaś ca prātipadikārthe svasamānavibhaktikena svāvyavahitapūrva-varttinā ca padenopasthāpitasyaiva saṃsarga-maryādayā bhāsate, yathā nīlo ghaṭaḥ nīlaghaṭam ānayetyādau nīlādeḥ na tu viruddhavibhaktimatpadārthasya*'|| *Vyutpattivāda*, op.cit., p.1.
28. *Vākyapadīya* of Bhartṛhari (VP.III.14.21-22) with *Prakīrṇaprakāśa* of Helaraja, Kanda III Pt.ii, Critically edited by K. A. Subrahmania Iyer, Deccan College Postgraduate Research Institute, Poona, 1973, pp. 158-159.
29. Translation quoted from K.A.S. Iyer, ibid, p.132.
30. VP.III.14.180-181; op cit. p.240.
31. Translation quoted from K.A.S. Iyer.

APPENDIX:

A SURVEY OF DEFINITIONS OF *VIŚEṢAṆA* AND *UPALAKṢAṆA* IN GAṄGEŚA'S *TATTVACINTĀMAṆI*

VIŚEṢAṆA	*UPALAKṢAṆA*
V1. *Vyāvarttakatve sati sadviśeṣaṇam* (eg. 1) *daṇḍī puruṣaḥ*	U1. *Vyāvarttakatve sati asad upalakṣaṇam* (eg.2) *karuṇā kṣetram* (eg.3) *kākavad Devadattagṛham* (eg.4) *jaṭābhis tāpasaḥ*
V2. *Vyāvṛttibodhakāle vyāvarttakam sad viśeṣaṇam*	U2. *vyāvṛttibodhakāle vyāvarttakam asad upalakṣaṇam*
V3. (*nāpi*) *viśeṣyavṛttitve sati pratyayavyāvṛtti-samānādhikaraṇatve sati vyāvarttakam viśeṣaṇam*	U3. *viśeṣyāvṛttitve sati pratyāyya vyāvṛttivyadhikaraṇatve sati vyāvarttakam upalakṣaṇam*
V4. (*yad vā*) *yatra viśeṣyatāvacchedena vyāvṛttyā vā yatsamānādhikaraṇatvena pratīyate tatra tad viśeṣaṇam*	U4. (*yatraviśeṣyatānavacchedena vyāvṛttyā vā yatvyadhikaraṇatvena pratīyate tatra tad upalakṣaṇam**)
V5. (*nāpi*) *viśeṣyasamānavibhaktikatvam viśeṣaṇatvam*	U5. (*viśeṣyavibhaktibhinnavibhaktikatvam upalakṣaṇam*
V6. (*atha*) *vyāvarttakatve sati viśiṣṭadhīviṣayatvam viśeṣaṇatvam*	U6. (*vyāvarttakatve sati viśiṣṭadhīviṣayatvam upalakṣaṇam**)
V7. (*nāpi*) *vyāvarttakatve sati kriyānvayi viśeṣaṇam* (eg.5)*subhago'yam daṇḍī mahābāhuḥ*	U7. *anyad upalakṣaṇam* (*vyāvarttakatve sati kriyānanvayi upalakṣaṇam**)
V8. (*tathā ca*) *viśiṣṭadhīkāraṇajñānaviṣayatve sati pratyāyyavyāvṛtti samānādhikaraṇam viśeṣaṇam* (eg. 6) *nīlam utpalam*	U8. (*viśiṣṭadhīkāraṇajñānaviṣa-yatve sati pratyāyyavyāvṛttivyadhikaraṇam upalakṣaṇam**)
V9. *vyāvarttanīyam adhitiṣṭhati yat sākṣāt tad viśeṣaṇam* (eg. 7) *daṇḍī pumān* (eg. 8) *lohitaḥ sphaṭikaḥ*	U9. *ato viparīt am anyat* (*yat paramparayā vyāvarttanīyam adhitiṣṭhati tad upalakṣaṇam* (eg..9) *gaur anityaḥ*

V10. *(anvayapratiyogyupasthāpakatayā*) sākṣād anvitam viśeṣaṇam*	U10. *(atha) anvayapratiyogyupasthāpakatayā (paramparayā) anvitam upalakṣaṇam.* (eg.10) *rūpavāmś calati* (eg.11) *rūpavati rasaḥ*
V11. *(atha) vyāvṛttibuddhisamaye viśeṣyasambaddham vyāvarttakam viśeṣaṇam*	U11.*tadānīm(vyāvṛttibuddhisamaye) viśeṣyāsambaddham vyāvarttakam upalakṣaṇam*
V12. *(etena) yatra yad viśeṣyāvacchedakadharmeṇa vyāvṛttyā vā samānādhikaraṇatvena pratīyate tatra tad viśeṣaṇam (ity api prayuktam)*	U12. *yatra yad viśeṣyānavacchedakadharmeṇa vyāvṛttyā vā vyadhikaraṇatvena pratīyate tatra tad upalakṣaṇam*
V13. *(evam ca) pratyāyyavyāvṛttyadhikaraṇatāvacchedakatve sati vyāvarttakam viśeṣaṇam*	U13. *tad anyavyāvarttakam upalakṣaṇam (pratyāyyavyāvṛttyadhikaraṇatānavacchedakatve sati vyāvarttakam upalakṣaṇam*)*
V14. *samānādhikaraṇam sad vyavacchedakam viśeṣaṇam*	U14. *vyadhikaraṇam asad vyavacchedakam upalakṣaṇam*
V15. (a) *svādhikaraṇamātravṛtti vyāvṛttibodhakatvam* (b) *svāvacchinnādhikaraṇatākavyāvṛttibodhakatvam* (c) *svānadhikaraṇavyāvṛttyabodhakatve sati vyāvṛttibodhakatvam vā viśeṣaṇatvam*	U15 *upalakṣaṇam tu svānadhikaraṇe'pi vyāvṛttim bodhayati*
V16 *(athavā) vivakṣitānvayapratiyogitāvacchedakam viśeṣaṇam* (eg.13) *daṇḍinam ānaya*	U16 *tadanavacchedam upalakṣaṇa (vivakṣitānvayapratiyogitānavacchedakam upalakṣaṇam*)* (eg.14)*kākena devadattasya gṛham*
V17 *(yad vā) yadanvitatayā jñāta eva viśeṣye tātparyaviṣayetarānvayadhīs tad vyavacchedakam viśeṣaṇam*	U17 *anevambhūtam upalakṣaṇam (yad ananvitatayā jñāta eva viśeṣye tātparyaviṣayetarānvayadhīs tad vyavacchedakam upalakṣaṇam*)*
V18 *(ayam eva) kāryānvayi viśeṣaṇam*	U18 *tadananvayyupalakṣaṇam (kāryānanvayyupalakṣaṇam*)*

V19 (*tātparyaviṣayībhūtaviśeṣyānvayabodhaviṣayatvam viśiṣṭajñāna-viṣayatvam vā viśeṣaṇatvam**)	U19 (*na tu*) *tātparyaviṣayībhūtaviśeṣyānvayabodhaviṣayatvam viśiṣṭajñānaviṣayatvam vā upalakṣaṇam*
V20 (*yad vā*) *viśeṣyānvayinā yasyāvaśyam anvayas tadavacchedakam viśeṣaṇam*	U20 *tadanyad upalakṣaṇam* (*viśeṣyānvayināyasyāvaśyam anvayas tadanavacchedakam upalakṣaṇam**)
V21 *yad vyāvarttakam viśeṣyānvayinānvīyate tad viśeṣaṇam*	U21*tadanyad upalakṣaṇam* (*yad vyāvarttakam viśeṣyānvayinānvīyate tad upalakṣamam* *)
V22 (*yad vā*) (a) *tātparyaviṣayānvayapratiyogi* (b) *uddeśyānvayapratiyogi vā dharmo viśeṣaṇam*	U22 *tadanyad upalakṣaṇam* ((a) *tātparya- viṣayānvayāpratiyogi* (b) *uddeśyānvayāpra tiyogi vā dharma upalakṣaṇam* *)

ity alam vistareṇa |

N.B. :(1) All definitions inside the parenthesis with an asterisk '(.....*)' are reconstrued definitions of *viśeṣaṇa* and/ or *upalakṣaṇa* in comparison/ contrast to the other.

(2) eg.=exempli gratia as they are given by *gaṅgeśopādhyāya* and they are serially numbered.

* I am thankful to Dr. Jim Benson, University of Oxford and Mrs. Chandra Gerialyi, Visiting Fellow, University of Oxford for going through this paper and suggesting substantial changes which has helped me to improve it upon considerably.

TURNING POINTS IN THE *MAHĀYĀNA* BUDDHIST TRADITION

Karunesh Shukla

I

The pristine spiritual and esoteric[1] Indian thought-ferment that has its original lineage in the hymns of the *Ṛgveda Saṃhitā*, had a four-way development in the *Nigama* (Vedic), the *Āgama*, the *Śramaṇa* and the *Nāstika* folds. Of these the *Śramaṇa* fold[2] incorporates in itself the *Jaina*s, the *Ājīvaka*s as well as the Buddhists. The antiquity of the *Śramaṇa* fold goes back to the Vedic times, references to which are found in the Vedic texts [3]. The *Śramaṇa* fold has been a turning-point in the Indian tradition[4]. Like the Vedic and the Agamic folds it does not regard any divinity as a source of the manifold wordly texture and force behind all activity and effort to achieve the state of Bliss better known as *mokṣa*, *kaivalya* or *nirvāṇa*.

It relies on the analysis of the present, the visible world as well as the human mind and its states. The fruits of our actions are at the root of all happiness or suffering. Knowledge, good conduct and vision of truth[5] or conduct, concentration and contemplation as well as gnosis[6] are regarded the way to emancipation.

Both Jainism and Buddhism are a matrix of systems, sub-systems and traditions of cultural and spirituo-intellectual refinement. Both have several philosophical systems-both phenomenologists and the Absolutists and have developed in the Classical Sanskrit and ended with a note of popular linguistic expression and Tantric esotericism or folk-elements [7].

But Buddhism differs in a some what peculiar way. While Jainism advocates the *ātmavāda* doctrine of permanence and the seven-angled dictum (*sapta-bhaṅgī naya*) of describing any object or view-point, Buddhism propounds the evanescence of phenomena, negates any permanent entity whotsoever and propounds that egoity or I-ness is at the root of all evil. The ontological themes as also the dialectics and logic developed in the two systems are differently shaped, but in their absolutist view-points, the two systems again seem to echo each other [8].

II

In the Buddhist tradition three turning points, i.e., the swinging of the law (*dharmacakrapravarttana*) occurred. These relate respectively to the first sermons of Lord Buddha at *Ṛṣipattana* (Sarnath), the second swinging of the law at the Vulture Peak (*Gṛdhrakūṭa*) in Rajagrha and the third one is said to have occurred at *Śrīparvata* in *Dhānyakaṭaka*. Various traditions differ on the subject - matter, the timing and the actual preaching of the law at the three events [9]. While the first *dharmacakrapravarttana* relates to the four Aryan truths (*cattāri ariya saccāni*) as the true spirit of the *dharma* [10], the second swinging of the law related to the altruistic *Mahāyāna* teachings and is said to have occurred, according to one tradition in the first year of the *sambodhi*, and according to the other, in the sixteenth year of the *sambodhi* [11]. A third tradition records that the second *dharmacakrapravarttana* occurred shortly before *parinirvāṇa* of the Master [12]. However, the Buddha's preachings were based on equality of beings (*sattvasamatā*), compassion (*karuṇā*) and eradication of the suffering of humanity at large. The *Mahāyāna* doctrines are essentially rooted in the teachings of the Buddha [13], hence his association, with the second swinging and the promulgation of the *Mahāyāna* doctrines cannot the ruled out.

The Sino-Tibetan and the Indian traditions relate that a third *dharmacakrapravarttana* was also held[14]. The *Sekoddeśaṭīkā* relates that this occurred at *Dhānyakaṭaka* and related to the esoteric Tantric doctrines [15]. Tson-kha-pa and other sources have it that this swinging of the law related to the system that preached the three-fold reality of the *parikalpitalakṣaṇa*, the *paratantra-lakṣaṇa* and the *pariniṣpanna-lakṣaṇa* while the second swinging of the law related to the two-fold reality as elucidated by the *Mādhyamika* School [16].

Even if it is so occurred, it points to the development of the Tantric doctrines from the *Mahāyāna* tenets points to the fact as indicated by *Naḍapāda* (*Nāropā*) in the *Sekoddeśaṭīkā* on the *Kālacratantra*.

Thus, the Chinese, the Tibetan and the Sanskrit sources refer to the three turning points in the history and tradition of Buddhism which indicate to the developing phases of the Buddhist doctrines, namely, the original teachings of the Buddha, the *Mahāyāna* doctrine of compassion and the Tantric esotericism based on Universal Compassion [17]. Nāgārjuna along with Āryadeva severally points out that the Master preached his law according to the capacity and the capability of the disciples to grasp it [18].

Mahāyāna is the most significant development in the history of Buddhism in India. This is the turning point of Indian Buddhism. The altruistic and universal outlook of the *Mahāyāna*, its doctrines of *Pāramitā*, *mahākaruṇā*, *bodhisattva* and *buddhatva*, as well as its further development in the field of metaphysics, epistemology and esoteric practices lead to the conclusion that the superior-most development in the history of Buddhism was shaped in the various off-shoots of the *pāramitā-naya* and the *mantra-naya*[19].

The entire Buddhist tradition is based on the teachings of Lord Buddha which began in the *Mṛgadāva*-grove of Sarnath near Varanasi [20]. While the first words of the Buddha are said to have related to the discovery of the origin of the phenomenal *dharma*s through *pratītyasamutpāda* [21] and/or the *gahakāraka* (Sanskrit-*gṛhakāraka*)-the house-builder, *tṛṣṇā*, responsible for the cycle of the migration and transmigration, his teachings centre round and his first sermon relates to the four noble truths[22]. The Buddha analysed the evanescent present and concluded that all that we perceive, experience and feel is full of suffering; it is of the nature of evil (*dukkha*), is transient (*aniccā*) and non-intrinsic and devoid of any self or entity (*anattā*) [24]. His emphasis was on the present, on the conduct of the person which is entirely responsible for all good or evil fruition resulting in future births and lives. Nescience (*avidyā*) is at the root of all existence, which is further and generally caused by craving. Thus, all evil is rooted in craving [25]. The human personality is constituted by the five aggregates which have on account of their mutable nature, been equated to phantom, banana-tree and mirage [26]. The true nature of the truth, or the dhammata is, therefore, lofty, indescribable in worldly terms of predictions, is unfathomable and beyond the compass of logical predications [27].

Thought the Buddha did not teach any metaphysical gospel[28] his ultimate aim was to eschew evil and blow the flame of all worldliness and thus attain the state of *nirvāṇa* [29].

His teachings were presented, analysed and interpreted in the eighteen schools called '*nikāyas*' - sects that ultimately developed into *theravāda* leading to *Hīnayāna* with an ideal of arhat and the *Mahāsaṅghikas* leading to the *Mahāyāna* with the ultimate goal of attaining buddhahood (*Buddhatva*).

Philosophically, the Buddha's teachings were analysed and interpreted in various philosophical schools mainly the twofold *abhidharma* - the *Vaibhāṣika* and the *Sautrāntika* and the *Yogācāra* and the *Mādhyamika* schools which further paved a way to the rise of the esoteric Tantricism [30].

Abhidhamma is an admixture of religion and philosophy and centres round the analysis of the phenomenal - both physical and mental existents (*dhammas*) as well as the states of the human mind. The Pali texts, such as *dhammasaṅgaṇi* and later expositions and tracts present a minute analysis of the various *dhammas* under the title *Vibhajjavāda* [32].

The Sanskrit *Abhidharma*[33] is mainly based on *dharma-pravicaya* and the analysis of the conditioned (*saṃskṛta*), unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*), the mental or ideational (*caitasika*), the non-mental (*citita-viprayukta*) *dharmas*, in addition to a subtle and minute analysis and indepth study of worldly spheres (*loka*), acts (*karmans*), atoms (*paramāṇu*), *nirvāṇa* and other categories. This analysis is based on the *Hīnayāna* theories with the ideal of *Arhat*. This view-point developed in the *Vaibhāṣika* and the *Sautrāntika* schools [34].

IV

The *Mahāyāna* is the development and culmination of the Buddha's original teachings with an altruistic outlook and analysis of *pratītya-samutpāda* as the doctrine propounding the non-intrinsic character of the visible *dharma*s. On the basis of being non-intrinsic in character, the worldly *dharma*s were characterised as *śūnya*- (*śūnyāḥ sarvadharma niḥsvabhāvayogena*)[35].

Here, the ideal of helping the suffering human beings achieve salvation was evolved and every human being was regarded a potential '*Buddha*'. The ideal of *bodhisattva* was conceived with a view to help the suffering humanity[36]. One of the *bodhisattva*s, namely, *Amitābha* is said to have not entered the *nirvāṇabhūmi* till even a single being does not achieve salvation[37]. *Śāntideva* speaks of arousing *bodhicitta* with a view to remove the suffering of the human beings and their manifold evil[38]. While the *Theravāda* idealised arhathood as the last goal, the *Mahāyāna* symbolised the ideal of *bodhisattva* and Buddhahood and claimed that every human being was a potential '*Buddha*'.

Practice of the six virtues of perfection (*pāramitā*) - namely *dāna, śīla, kṣānti, vīrya, dhyāna* and *prajñā*, was regarded as a way leading to the purification of the conduct and of the mind[39]. Realisation of gnosis - the *Prajñāpāramitā*, perfection of wisdom was a pre-requisite of the realisation of the non-intrinsic character of the phenomenal existents (*dharma*s) and thereby of *śūnyatā* and *nirvāṇa*[40].

The philosophical stand-point of the *Mahāyāna* developed into the perfection of the *advaya*-doctrine based on the interpretation of the metaphysical delineations of the *Mahāyāna* texts.

The *Prajñāpāramitā* texts and the *Mahāyāna sūtra*s declare all phenomena as non-intrinsic (*niḥsvabhāva*) in character and as phantom. That which lacks its own inherent nature cannot be described in terms of ens (*bhāva*), non-ens (*abhāva*), both (*bhāva-abhāva*) or neither (*anubhāva*). Nature (*svabhāva*), Nāgārjuna says, is innate and co-genetic (*sahaja*) with the object and hence, if the nature of the object is assumed to be true and intrinsic, all kinds of manifestations and generation in the form of manifold objects would ultimately cease [41]. All activity, generation, decay, degeneration and cessation of phenomenal existents would be inexplicable in as much as their nature would not change. Hence the non-intrinsicness of phenomenal objects has to be accepted, which is in accordance with the worldly process of production (*utpāda*), decay (*vikāra*), degeneration (*vipariṇāma*) and cessation (*nirodha*) [42]. This is what the dectrine of dependent origination (*pratītya-samutpāda*) actually denotes. All worldly existence and activity is relative and dependent on the causes (*hetu*) and conditioning factors (*pratyaya*). That which is relatively produced is virtually non-insintric and its independent generation cannot be either explained or explicably accepted [43]. It is *niḥsvabhāva* and ultimately void (*śūnya*)[44].

All empirical existence (*saṃvṛtisatya*) is non-intrinsic and is of false and deceitful character (*mṛṣā moṣa dharmā*). It belongs to the realm of intellect (*buddhi*) and is described in terms of dependent origination. The absolute (*paramārtha*) is beyond the range of intellect and cannot be described in words[45]. It is indescribable, unfathomable, difficult to be visualised and subtle (*sūkṣma*) [46]. The import of the Master's teachings is twofold-tentative or explicit (*neyārtha*) and final or implicit (*nītārtha*) [47]. While the *saṃvṛti* is the tentative import or (*nītārtha*) of the *Buddha*'s teachings, the final import is the absolute truth which is akin to voidity (*śūnyatā*) [48].

Needless to say that *Mahāyāna* and its philosophical schools - the *Mādhyamika* and *Yogācāra* systems accepted in totality the *Buddha*'s view-point that the notion of me (*ahaṃkāra*) and mine (*mamakāra*) is at the root of all evil [49] and hence the same is to be discarded [50].

In fact, the central theme of the entire Buddhist tradition has been the suppression of the notion of me and mine, which is at the root of all evil. This may be gleaned from the texts of the *Theravāda* and *Abhidharma*, the *Prajñāpāramitā* texts, the *Mādhyamika* and the *Yogācāra* as also the vast Tantric and the *Siddha* literature. Purification of mind and its states has been regarded as a pre-requisite to the removal of afflictions and thereby attainment of *nirvāṇa*.

The absolute (*paramārtha*) is devoid of all predictions and explicable alternatives. It is non-dual, devoid of dogmatic views whatsoever, a matter of self-realisation and to be known neither only (*anekārtha*) or severally (*ananārtha*) [51]. Salvation is achieved by the elimination (*kṣaya*) of actions and afflictions, which arise from conceptual ideations (*vakalpa*). Ideations, in their turn come forth from the manifold worldly texture (*prapañca*), which ceases by the contemplation of voidity [52]. Voidity (*śūnyatā*) is nothing but the true nature of *dharma*s realised through contemplation. It is not a concept based on logical reasoning [53] but a way of life derived from practical meditational experience through spiritual potency. The *Mādhyamika* does not present a pursuit of knowledge on intellectual plane, but it is a way of life with *śamatha* or concentration of mind, it is also *vipaśyanā* or a vision of the true nature of *dharmatā* which is neither produced nor vanished [54]. When the object of the mind vanishes, objects of the world also wither away, as the true nature of the *dharma*s is neither produced nor vanished [55].

The *Mādhyamika* presents the *paramārtha* on the basis of a philosophical and dialectical reasoning which explains the ontology of *paramārtha* as free from the all contradictions.

The *Mādhyamika*, says Nāgārjuna [56], has no view-point to project. He, therefore, presents the view-points of other systems, such as the *Ābhidharmika*s, the *Sāmmitīya*s, the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* as well as the *Jaina*s and other sects and systems and confutes them on the basis that they present aspects of truth in partial and lop-sided manner and keeps them in the category of ens (*asti*) and non-ens (*nāsti*). His view-point is above all predictions and descriptions in terms of *asti* and *nāsti* (*astināstivyatikramam*) [57].

For this purpose a four-cornered and precise dialectical reasoning is put forth to project the logical impotency and contradiction in the view-point of the opponent. The *Mādhyamika*, as pointed out by Āryadeva [58], regards the absolute as devoid of the four categories (*koṭi*s) and in like manner, all objects of the world are examined in terms of four-cornered dialectical reasoning which ultimately concludes that all *pramāṇa*s are untenable, so are all predictions about the *prameya*s. In the *Vigrahavyārattanī*[59] and *pramāṇaviheṭhana* alias *Vaidalya Prakaraṇa*,[60] Nāgārjuna, argues the non-intrinsic character of means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*s) and argues that they are valid neither intrinsically (*svataḥ*), nor extrinsically (*arataḥ*), both or neither. They are like fire and hence to be discarded for the purpose of the delineation of the philosophical postulates of the *Mādhyamika* [61]. He says : *Mādhyamika* has no dictum to prove (*pakṣa*), so no contradictions in the *Mādhyamika* view-point can be pointed out [62].

All logical and ontological predications are subject to contradiction in terms of is (*bhāva*), is not (*abhāva*), both (*bhāvābhāva*) and neither (*anubhaya*) which in the end leads to *reductio ad absurdum*. So, *nirvāṇa*, the body of Tathāgata and all categories in the philosophical reasoning and ontological presentations are subject to this contradiction. Thus, this four-cornered dialectics is employed by Nāgārjuna [63] to point out contradiction in and untenability of the various ontological categories, such as motion and rest (*gatāgata*), existence and non-existence (*astitva-nāstitva*), inherent nature (*svabhāva*), time (*kāla*), actions (*karma*), *ātmā* and the *skandha*s, *Buddha*, *ārya-satya*s, *nirvāṇa*, *pratītya-samutpāda* and *dṛṣṭi*, the dogmatic views with the conclusion that the *Buddha* aimed at discarding all views which aim to present the truth partially and dogmatically [64]. Hence, these views (*dṛṣṭi*s) are to be discarded[65].

In the *Mādhyamika* view, 'wise intuition is the fruit of long philosophic cultivation of critical insight, developed in sustained contemplation of the profound nature of things, until reason transforms instinct and habit and what one knows rationally to be the case is intuitively to be the case. This is a position that balances complexity and integrates both realities without collapsing them to one side or another, to the habitual simplicity of just this or just that [66].

Nāgārjuna declares in clear terms that *nirvāṇa* too cannot be delineated in terms of ens, non-ens, both or neither. Thesis (*pakṣa*) gives rise to anti-thesis (*pratipakṣa*), ontologically both are not consistent and tenable. Therefore, *nirvāṇa* may be described as a state where in the states of *bhāva* and *abhāva* decline [67].

For Nāgārjuna, in the state of *nirvāṇa* a sublimation of *saṃsāra* occurs. There is no distinction at all of *nirvāṇa* and *saṃsāra* or vice-versa [67]. '*Nirvāṇa* is not an intrinsically real intrinsic reality that mysteriously violates its nature and projects unilaterally absolute meaningfulness into the world. *nirvāṇa* cannot be distinguished from *saṃsāra*. It is just here now, and the full experiential acceptance of that is liberation, which is not a going elsewhere' [67a]. It is virtually the state of the untying the knot of the mind and hence, *nirvāṇa* has been equated to *anirvāṇa*, a realisation of one's true nature, where the notion of egoity lastingly disappears and the feeling of attachment and afflictions vanishes [68]. Nothing new is achieved, but the true nature of *saṃsāra* as non-intrinsic is realised. This is what the *Buddha* taught by his being silent. *Nirvāṇa*, thus, is the state of non-prediction (*nirabhilāpya*) of the true state of *dharmatā* as the silence is the true word of the absolute.

This centrist view-point of Nāgārjuna found further elucidation in the works of his disciple Āryadeva, commentators Bhāvaviveka, Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti and followers Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla and others, whose principal works have either come down to us in their original form or are preserved in their Sino-Tibetan versions or have since been reconstructed into Sanskrit.

These authors presented the *Mādhyamika* position regarding the Absolute (*paramārtha*) and confuted the view-points and categories of other systems (Āryadeva), either following the non-predictive reasoning of Nāgārjuna's dialectical methodology (Buddhapālita) and Candrakīrti or employed independent argumentation (Bhāvaviveka).

Śāntarakṣita [70] and Kamalaśīla [71] on the one hand presented a very mature and comprehensive elucidation of the *Mādhyamika* view-point and confuted the traditional *Mīmāṃsaka*, *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, *Cārvāka*, *Vedāntic* and *Jaina* views regarding truth and reality; on the other, they evolved a perfect dialectical style of presenting the *Mādhyamika* arguments in a mature logical garb.

Kamalaśīla also wrote a text entitled *Bhāvanākrama* [72] (the stages of contemplation) in three parts, which related to the contemplation of *śūnyatā* and concentration of mind through the ten stages as elucidated in the *Daśabhūmaka sūtra* [73]. A concentration of *śīla* leads to the contemplation of *samādhi*, a vision of *samādhi* enables one to attain *prajñā* again giving rise to pure knowledge, the base of *śīla sampat*. This is the way to achieve the *yuganaddhamārga* of *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā* and leads to the attainment of the *Buddha*-stage[74]. *Śūnyatā* is not other than compassion. Its realisation leads to the ideal of equality of beings (*sattvasamatā*). This is *mahākaruṇā*. If the *bodhicitta* is accompanied by practice, even greater are its benefits; it is in fact a seed of all the properties of the *Buddha*, '*Buddhadharma*' [75]. Without practice of the twofold *bodhicitta* enlightenment cannot dawn. The practice consists of gnosis (*prajñā*) and appropriate means (*upāya*. i.e. compassion). The two are to be practised unitedly and not separately. The six perfections are to be practised in ten stages. The three-fold *prajñā* (i.e., *śrutamayī, cintāmayī* and *bhāvanāmayī*) should be practised and united with *upāya* leading to the attainment of Buddhahood by following the *Mahāyāna sūtras*. All false imaginations should be removed by the sharper edge of gnosis. The duo of *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā* is, therefore, to be contemplated in the ten stages, [76] ultimately leading to the realisation of voidity and universal compassion (*mahākaruṇā*). This is what Nāgārjuna intends when he says that endowed with compassion, the *Buddha* taught the noble way (*dharma*) for the elimination of all dogmatic views (through *śūnyatā*) [77]. For this purpose one has to contemplate on the sixteen or twenty kinds of *śūnyatā*.

The *Yogācāra* advocates the *cittamātra* or *vijñaptimātrā*-doctrine and denies the entity of the external objects, elucidates the three - fold reality of the *parikalpita*, *paratantra* and the *pariniṣpannalakṣaṇa satya*. For the *Yogācāra*, the *vijñāna* or the *vijñaptimātrā* does not require any other base or source for its cognition, it is self - cognised (*sva-saṃvedita*) and the entire gamut of the outer objects in the form of the *grāhya-grāhaka* category is caused by *vāsanā* and is unreal. All *vijñāna* emanates from the store-consciousness (*ālaya*-vijñāna). The realisation of *nirvāṇa* as the vimal *vijñānadhātu* is the ultimate aim of the system which argues that the *ahaṅkāra* or I-ness is at the root of all evil.

In the *Yogācāra* tradition of the *Mahāyāna* a pure logical system was evolved with *pramāṇa* as the theme of all religio-philosophical quest. Following Asaṅga, who, for the first time elucidated the *hetu-vidyā*, Vasuvandhu, Diṅnāga, Dharmakīrti, Prajñākara, Ratnakīrti, Jñānaśrīmitra and a host of many other *Nyāya* masters championed the cause of presenting *Mahāyāna* view-point in an entirely logical garb. Dharmakīrti regarded *pramāṇa* as the aim of all philosophical quest and shifted the thrust from *prameya*s to the *pramāṇa*s.

These authors attracted and were in a continued interaction with logicians in the Brahmanic fold, namely, Vātsyāyana, Udyotakara, Vācaspati, Udayana and others. This has been a major contribution of *Mahāyāna Buddhism* to Indian tradition.

Alongwith the *Mādhyamika*, the *Yogācāra* advocating the doctrine of *cittamātratā, vijñaptimātratā, citrādvaitavāda* and the epistemological developments in the same tradition gave a perfect shape to Buddhism in the middle and the later half of the first and the first half of the second millenium of the Christian era. The *Mādhyamika* and the *Yogācāra* distinctly contributed towards the systemitisation of Buddhist *Advayavāda* in *Mahāyāna* tradition. A blending of the central themes of the two systems and their analysis led to the formulation of the *Vajrayāna* tenets which paved a way to the development of the *Kālacakrayāna* and the *Sahajayāna*. But the greatest event in the history of Buddhist or the *Mahāyāna* tradition was the advent of the *Mādhyamika* thinking which brought a veritable revolution in Buddhist thought. It not only gave a perfect interpretation to the *Buddha*'s insight with the Mahāyānic base of universal compassion (*mahākaruṇā*) and *Prajñāpāramitā*, but also evolved a logical method of non-predictive four-cornered dialectic based on spiritual auto-experience which influenced the galaxy of philosophers and theoreticians of posterity both in the brahmana and the *Śramaṇa* folds.

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5. *Samyagdarśanajñāna cāritrāṇi mokṣamārgaḥ. Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra*, I-1.
6. Cf. *Saṃyutta Nikāya*, Nalanda Ed. (S.N.), IV. 360-62.
7. *Laghukālacakratantrarājaṭīkā Vimalaprabhā*, Folio 30A (Asiatic Society manuscript) : *Saṃskṛtabhāṣāyā pāramitānayaṃ, mantranayaṃ tantra tantrātaraṃ saṃskṛtabhāṣayā prākṛtabhāṣayā apabhraṃśabhāṣayā ca saṃskṛta śarbarādimlecchabhāṣayā.*
8. For example, Kundakunda and Nāgārjuna, almost contemporary, seem to share the same absolutist view-point.
9. See for details, Joshi, L.M., *Studies in the Buddhist Culture of India*, Delhi, 1977, p. 240sq.;see also,Rahula Samkrityayana, *Purātattvanibandhāvalī*, p. 113, fn. 3., Joshi, (ibid, p. 240-41 says that the tradition of the

second and the third *dharmacakrapravarttanas* is a later fabrication; see also, Goyal ibid, pp-111, 221,246 sq.; Pande, Studies, pp-383 sq.; on the three phases of Buddhist philosphy vide Th. Stcherbastky, Budhist Logic, I. 3-14.

10. Cf. S.N., IV - 360 sq.

11. See, Joshi, ibid, p. 240; cf. Blue Annals, II. 754 Bu-ston, II. 52-54 quoted by Murti, T.R.V., *Central Philosophy of Buddhism*, London, 1955, p. 4. fn.2.

12. This is according to Tibetan tradition, see, Rahula Samkrityayan, ibid, loc-cit.

13. See, Dutt, Nalinaksna, *Mahāyāna*, Delhi, 1977. pp. 73-81, 143-44 and elsewhere, Goyal, ibid, 211 sq.

14. Vide, Thurman, *The Speech of Gold*, Delhi, 1983, p. 32 etc.; Joshi, ibid, p. 240 sq.; Goyal, ibid, p. 241 sq.

15. *Sekoddeśaṭīkā* of Nada-Pāda, (GOS ed.), p. 2 sq. *Śrī Dhānye Niyatamantranayadeśanāsthāne.....*; Naropa quotes: *Gṛdhrakūṭe yathā śāstuḥ prajñāpāramitānaye. tathā mantranaye proktā śrī dhānye dharmadeśanā.. Gṛdhrakūṭe mahāśaile prajñāpāramitānayam. Sandeśya bodhisattvānāṃ mahāyānaṃ niruttaram..* (*Mūlatantra*); cf. *Cakraparivarta prāvartitā tena tuṣṇībhutāḥ..*, *Lalitavistara*, XXVI. 50; see VS1-75.

16. Vide, Thurman, ibid, p. 122 sq. also, pp. 118-19 sq; Murti, ibid, p.4, Butson, *History of Buddhism*, quoted by Murti, ibid, p. 4 fn. 2; Cf. Taranath also records that most of the *Mahāyāna sūtras* and *tantras* appeared simultaniously, vide see *History of Buddhism in India*, by Chattopadhyay, Alka, Simla, 1970, p. 347; also Stcherbatsky, ibid, I.11-14.

17. See, Thurman, ibid, pp. 116-21.

18. Cf. *Bodhicittavivaraṇa*, quoted in *Bhāmatī* and *Brahma sūtra*, II. 2-18 and Sarvadarśana Saṅgraha, p. 18.

Deśānāṃ lokanāthānāṃ sattvāśayavaśānugā.
bhidyate vahudhā loka upāyairbahubhiḥ punaḥ..
gambhīrottāna bhedena kvaciccobhayalakṣaṇā.
bhinnā'pi deśanābhinnā śūnyatādvayalakṣaṇā..
Cf. aslo MK, XVIII. 7, with MKV; *Ratnāvalī* quoted in MKV, p. 59-60; see also, Āryadeva, *Catuḥśataka*, VIII. 15, Cf. MKV, p. 370.

19. Cf. *Advayavajrasaṅgraha*, p. 21:
Mahāyānaṃ ca dvividhaṃ pāramitāyānaṃ mantrayānaṃ ceti (Tattvaratnāvalī).

20. S.N. loc-cit; cf. also *Mahāvagga*.

21. *Khuddaka Nikāya*, (K.N.), I. 63, 64 65, for references of various traditions, vide, Pande, ibid, pp. 383-84.
Yadā have pātubhavanti dhammā, ātāpino jhāyino brāhmaṇassa.
Athassa kaṅkhā vapayanti sabbā, yatopajānāti sahetu dhammaṃ.

22. *Dhammapada*, Vs. 153-54.
aneka jāti saṃsāraṃ sandhāvissaṃ anibbisaṃ.
gahakāraṃ gavesanto dukkhā jāti punappunaṃ ..
gahakāraka diṭhṭosi, puna gehaṃ na kāhasi .
sabbā te phāsakā bhaggā gahakūṭaṃ visaṅkhataṃ.
visaṅkhāragataṃ citta taṇhānaṃ khayagajjhagā..

23. See, Supra, fn. 6.

24. *Dhammapada*, XI, Vs. 277-279.

25. Ibid, XXIV, Vs. 334-59.

26. Ibid, Gatha, 44, *Saṃyutta Nikāya* (PTS), III, 148.

27. *Digha Nikāya*, I, (*Brahmajāla Sutta*), See, *Lalita Vistara*, XXVI, 1-75, pp. 294-315.

28. On this point, Vide, Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, I. Ch. on the *Buddha*.

29. *Mahāparinibbāṇa Sutta*, Digha, II. 120 *Pajjotasseva Nibbānaṃ Vimokkho Cetaso Ahu.*; :Cf. *Udāna*, KN, I. 162-63; D.N. II 94.

30. Cf. *artho jñānasamanvito matimatā vaibhāsikeṇocyate*

pratyakṣo na hi bāhyavastu viṣayaḥ sautrāntikairāśritaḥ.
yogācāramatānugairanugatā sākārabuddhiḥ parā.
manyante bata madhyamāḥ kṛtadhiyaḥ svasthāṃ parāṃ samvidam..

quoted by Sogen, Yamakami, *Systems of Buddhist Thought*, Calcutta, 1912, pp. 102; cf. also, *Mānameyodaya*, ed. Kunhan Raja, C., Adyar, 1928, p. 300.

31. Vide, Chips from a Buddhist Workshop, by Mm. Pt. Hara Prasad Shastri, in B.C. Law (ed.) *Buddhist Studies*, Vol.I.
32. For a learned exposition of the *Pāli Vibhajjavāda*, vide, Sharma, Brahmadeva Narayana, *Vibhajyavāda*, Varanasi, 1988; Kashyap, Bhikkhu, J. , *Abhidhamma* Philosophy (2 Vols.)
33. See, *Abhidharmadīpa*, ed., Jaini, P.S., Patna, 1959, Introduction; *Abhidharmakoṣabhāṣya*, ed. Pradhana, P., Patna, 1967; *Abhidharmāmṛta* of Ghoṣaka, reconstructed by Shastri, Shanti Bhikshu, Vishwabharati, 1953;

    Jñānaprasthānaśāstra of Kātyāyanīputra, reconstructed, ed. by Shastri Shanti Bhikshu, Vishwabharati, 1955.

    Abhidharma koṣa bhāṣya vyākhyā (Sphuṭārthā) ed, Law. N.N., Calcutta, 1959.
34. Vide, Jaini, ibid, Introduction, pp. 1-127. Lama Anagarika Govinda and Ñanatilaka's work on the subject Narendradeva, Acharya, *Bauddha Dharmadarśana* a Patna, 1955,
35. *Saptaśatikā Prajñāpāramitā* in *Mahāyāna sūtra saṅgraha,* Vol. I. ed. Vaidya, P.L., Darbhanga, 1963, also quoted in MKV. p. 238, 278, 444, 504.
36. Cf. *Samādhirāja Sūtra*, VI. 9 :

bodheti sattvān viṣamātu dṛṣṭito na eṣa mārgo amṛtasya prāptaye.
kumārga varjitva yathe sthapeti taṃ kāraṇaṃ vucyati bodhisattvaḥ..

37. Cf. *Kali kaluṣakṛtāni duritāni yāni gayiye nipatantu tāni.*
vimucyatāṃ hi lokaḥ..

38. *Bhavaduḥkhaśatāni Tartukāmairapi sattva vyasanāni hartukāmaiḥ. ... na vimocyaṃ hi sadaiva bodhicittam.*
Bodhicaryavatāra, . (BCA)

39. On *pāramitā*, see *Bodhicaryavatāra* (BCA), I-IX, See *Pāramitāpaṭala* in *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, vide also Conze, Edward, *The Prajñāpāramitā Literature*.

40. See, BCA, IX. 1.
imaṃ parikaraṃ sarvaṃ prajñārthaṃ hi munirjagau.
buddheragocarastattvaṃ buddhiḥ saṃvṛtirucyate..

41. MK, XIII, 1-7, XV, 1-4, XII.1 sq.

42. MK. XIII, 5-7.

43. Cf. *Anavataptaharadāpasaṅkrāmaṇa sūtra*, quoted in MKV, p. 239.
Yaḥ pratyayairjāyati sahūyajāto notasya utpādu sambhāvito'sti
Yaḥ pratyotpannu sa śūnya uvato yaḥ śūnyatā jānati so'pramattaḥ.

also *Yuktiśaṣṭikā* :
Hetutaḥ sambhavo yasya sthitirna pratyayairvinā .
vigamaḥ pratyayābhāvāt so'stītyavagataḥ katham..
quoted also in BC AP.

44. See, BCAP, P. XI.1 sq.

45. MK, XIII, I, BCA, IX.1,

46. Cf. *Lalitavistara*, ed, Vaidya, P.L., Darbhanga, 1958, XXVI, See Supra, fn. 27.

47. *Samādhirāja sūtra*, 7.5 :
nītārtha sūtrānta viśeṣa jānāti yathopadiṣṭā sugatena śūnyatā .
yasmin punaḥ pudgalarāttvapūruṣo neyārthatā jānati sarvadharmān ..
See also, MKV, p. 441, 276.

48. Cf. MKV. - ref. also - Loc - cit. Glep. Suttanipāta III. 12.155-57. (*Dvayātān Upassanā Sutta*):

Anattani attamānim ca passa lokam sadevakam.
niviṭaṭham nāmarupasmiṃ idaṃ saccaṃ nimaññati..
yena yena hi maññanti, tato taṃ hoti aññathā.
tañhi tassa musā hoti, mosadhimmaṃ hi ittaraṃ ..
amosadhammaṃ nibbānaṃ tadariyā saccato vidū.
te ve saccābhisamayā nicchātā parinibbutā ..
Cf. also. *Triṃśītā* of *Vasubandhu.*
Duḥkha heturahaṅkāra ātmamohāttu vardhate .

49. *Khuddaka Nikāya* (KN), Nalanda ed., I. 386 : also IV. 3. 22, p. 391 (*Duṭṭhaṭṭhaka Sutta*)
Attā nirattāṃ na hissa atthi, adhosi so diṭhṭhimidheva sabbaṃ..
: also *Tuvataka Sutta*, ibid, IV, 14. 154, p. 411;
ajjhattamevupasame na ajjato bhikkhu santi meseyya.
ajjhattaṃ upasantassa, natthi attā kuto nirattā vā ..

50. Cf. *Vasuvandhu*, *Triṃśikā*, quoted in above fn. 48. also, *Akutobhayā* of Nāgārjuna reconstructed by Late Mrs. Indu Datar in *Nāgārjuna's philosophy of Causality*, Bombay University Ph. D. dissertation, 1948, Pt. II, XVIII. 1 : *Ātmātmīyayayorviprayogastattvasya lakṣaṇām*
Madhyamakāvatāra, VI. 120, quoted in MKV,XVIII. 1
Satkāyadṛṣṭi-prabhavānaśeṣān kleśāṃśca doṣāṃśca dhiyā vipaśyan.
Ātmānamasyā viṣayaṃ ca buddhvā yogī karotyātmaniṣedhameva..
Cf. MK, XVIII, 3.4, See also *Tathāgataguhyaka sūtra*, quoted im MKV, p. 361-63.

51. M.K. XVIII. 5,
Karmakleśakṣayānmokṣaḥ karmakleśā vikalpataḥ.
Te prapañcāt prapañcastu śūnyatāyāṃ nirudhyate..
cf. also XXV. 24.

52. Cf. Conze, Edward, *Thirty years of Buddhist Studies*, Oxford, 1963, p. 22-23.

53. MK. XVIII. 7
Nivṛttamabhidhātavyaṃ nivṛtte cittagocare .
Anutpannāniruddhā hi nirvāṇamiva dharmatā..

54. Ibid, loc-cit.

55. *Vigrahavyāvarttanī*, Vs. 29-30 :
Yadikācana pratijñā syānme tata eva me bhaveddoṣaḥ.
Nāsti ca mama pratijñā tasmānnaivāsti me doṣaḥ..
Yadi kiñcidupalabheyaṃ pravartayeyaṃ nivartayeyaṃ vā .
Pratyakṣādibhirarthaistadabhāvānme'nupālabhbhaḥ..

cf. MKV : I. 1, p. 34.
Na Vayaṃ Svatantramanumānaṃ Prayuñjmahe,
Parapratijñāpratiṣedhaparatvādasmadanumānānām.

56. Ratnāvalī, See MKV, p. 275
Sāṅkhyoyaulūkyapudgalaskandhanirgranthavādinam.
pṛccha loka yadi vadatyasti nāsti vyatikramam..

57. *Na sannāsanna sadasanna cāpyanubhayātmakam.*
Catuṣkoṭi vinirmuktaṃ tattvaṃ mādhyamikā viduḥ..
Jñānasārasamuccaya, Vs. 28, see *Catuṣkoṭi* in Jha Commemoration Volume, Poona, 1928, p. 96 sq- (an article by Mm. Pt. Vidhusekhara Bhattacharya).

58. Vs 31-40, 41-71.

59. Tola, F. , Delhi, 1994 : ed., Bhikkhu Sempa Dorje, Varanasi.

60. *Vigrahavyāvarttanī* (VV), Vs, 41 sq : for detailed exposition, vide Mookherji, S. The Absolutist's view-point in Logic, Navnalanda Mahavihara Research Publiction, Vol. I, Nalanda, 1956, p. 1-162, Bhattacharya,Kamaleshwar, *Vigrahavyāvarttanī* (Eng. Tr.)Delhi.

61. VV. Vs 30.

62. See Supra, fn 55.

63. Vide, Murti, ibid, pp. 121 sq. (Ch. V-VIII) : M.K. and *Mahāprajñāpāramitā śāstra* contain detailed dialectical

presentations on these points.

64. MK., XIII, 8, XXV. 22-24.

65. Thurman, ibid, p. 159; MK, XXV. 19-21.
cf. XVI. 10 :
Na nirvāṇasamāropo na saṃsārāpakarṣaṇam.
kastatra saṃsāro nirvāṇesmin bhaviṣyati..

66. *Ratnāvalī*,
Na cābhāvo'pi nirvāṇaṃ kuta evāsya bhāvatā.
Bhāvābhāvaparāmarśakṣayo nirvāṇamucyate..
quoted in MKV, p. 524 Cf. M.K. XXV. 10-16..

67. See, MK. XXV 19-20 ;
Na saṃsārasya nirvāṇāt kiñcidasti viśeṣaṇaṃ .
Na nirvāṇasya saṃsārāt kiñcidasti viśeṣaṇaṃ..
Nirvāṇasya ca yā koṭiḥ koṭiḥ saṃsārasya ca.
Na tayorantaraṃ kiñcit susūkṣmamapi vidyate..

67-a. Thurman, ibid, p. 159

68. *Anirvāṇaṃ hi nirvāṇaṃ lokanāthena deśitam.*
Ākāśena kṛto granthirākāśenaiva mocitaḥ..
MKV, p. 540.

69. Cf. *Paramārtho hi āryāṇāṃ tūṣṇīmbhāvaḥ, kutastatra prapañcasambhavo yadupapattiranupapattirvā syāt.*
MKV, I. 1, p. 57 : Cf. also p. 264 :
Anakṣarasya dharmasya śrutiḥ kā deśanā ca kā.
śruyate deśyate cārthaḥ samāropādanakṣaraḥ..

70. In *Tattvasaṅgraha* (T)

71. In his *Pañjikā* on T.

72. Three *bhāvanākrama*s are said to have been authored by Kamalaśīla, the first of which has been edited from a Tibetan manuscript and its Tibetan version by Tucci in Minor Buddhist Texts (MBT), Delhi, 1986, pp. 313-592; the complete *bhāvanākrama* has also been published

from central Tibetan Institute along with Sanskrit reconstruction, Tibetan version and Hindi Translation, Sarnath, 198.

73. See, MBT, p. 523.

74. See, Tucci, MBT, pp 167-92 cf *bhāvanākrama* , p. 523.

Tathācoktam- Śīlaṃ pratiṣṭhāya samādhilābhaḥ.
Samādhilābhācca hi prājñabhāvanā..
Prajñayā jñānaṃ bhavati viśuddhaṃ..
Viśujñānasya hi śīlaṃ sampat..iti..

75. See, MBT, p. 534-sq. : The ten *bhūmi*s are - *pramuditā, vimalā, prabhākarī, arciṣmatī, sudurjayā, abhimukhī, dūraṅgama, acalā, sādhumatī* and *Dharmameghā* See, *Daśabhūmaka Sūtra* I-IX and, X. 17-32, p. 104-5 and the preceding chapts.; *Bhūmipaṭala* of *Bodhisattvabhūmi*.

76. MK, XXVIII 30 :

Sarvadṛṣṭi prahāṇāya yaḥ saddharmaṃadeśayat.
anukampāmupādāya taṃ namasyāmi Gautamam..
also XXV, 21-23, XXVII. 1, 13 etc.

77. For an elucidation of these foms of *śūnyatā* vide, *Śatasāhrikā Prajñāpāramitā*, ed. Ghoṣa, P.C, Calcutta, 1880 - Murti, ibid, pp. 351 sq

TURNING POINTS IN THE TEACHING OF PĀṆINIAN GRAMMAR

Prof. A. C. Sarangi

0. Introduction

Although both the old and the new schools of Sanskrit Grammar have contributed immensely to the field of Linguistics, it is Pāṇini who in his *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, first set a linguistic model for the description of language in 5th Century B.C. This *Aṣṭādhyāyī* represents a mathematical model of linguistic description and as such it can be taught to the students both as an analytical and synthetic grammar. Taking cues from the studies on modern linguistics, traditional grammar can be viewed from a broader perspective to evolve new tools for the linguistic analysis. Recently keen interest is being taken to study Pāṇini as a model of Universal grammar and it is our bounden duty to seek for the basic commonality among the cognate languages of the Indo-European family. One more turning point in teaching of Pāṇini will be to harp upon students to show that Pāṇini's description of Sanskrit was not meant for the description of morphology alone but semantics and syntax at the same time. Pāṇini was a sentence- grammarian and while analysing the speech linguistically, the whole speech was in his mind before he actually started analysing it.

Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī* is not only unique as a faithful recorder of linguistic informations, however valuable from the point of linguistic criticism of the Sanskrit language may be, "but in its fitness as a training for our understanding the Indian methods of composition and specially as a scientific treatise it offers in this respect great advantages". His unique style and various techniques utilised by him were adopted for many a philosophical and liturgical text. The mnemotechnical ways such as the *adhikāra* - device, the *anuvṛtti* - procedure and the most unique algebraic *anubandha* - system are some of the unique features in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. Kiparsky in his epoch making work, Pāṇini as a variationist (1979) has convincingly established his thesis that the optional terms like *vā, vibhāṣā* and *anyatarasyām* are not synonymous as traditionally believed but a purposeful display of optional variations. Similarly many socio-linguistic variations along with such technical variations only go to prove that Pāṇini was a variationist as well as a stylistician of the first order. Thus Pāṇini can be studied from various angles and such turning points can be found out from a close observation of his *Aṣṭādhyāyī*.

1. *Aṣṭādhyāyī* : A case of Textual Criticism

The extant text of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* is at times doubted as an incomplete work. The presence of a contemporary gloss on it is thought to have been prevalent in Pāṇini's time. Even it is said that the whole of *Aṣṭādhyāyī* as it is available to-day is not written by Pāṇini in its entirety. Traces of layers in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* are doubted. Even after the recent publication of the text with accent marks of S.M. Kartre, doubts still persist whether we should want for a more trust-worthy edition. Not only a few variant readings and the interpolation of a few *sūtra*s are suggested by Birwe and others, but even a large portion of the present text is doubted not being original. Recently S.D. Joshi and J.A.F. Roodbergen have even questioned the very authenticity of the *taddhita* and *samāsa* sections in the

Aṣṭādhyāyī which are apprehended to have stemmed from "an author different from the one who worked out the *kāraka* system and phrased the original text of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* and have been added to the text later on".[1] The inconsistencies of various nature are treated there as the internal evidences. The *kāraka-* basis of the arrangement of rules in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* has been emphasised throughout except for the two large portions in it viz. The *taddhita* and the *samāsa*-sections where such principle of *kāraka*-basis is absent.

The *kāraka*-system along with the *samartha-paribhāṣā* plays a significant role in different aspects of derivational procedure. The agent sense is generally prescribed for the derivation of primary words [2]. Special *kāraka-* designations are prescribed for specific meaning [3]. Thus most of the *sūtra*s in the 3rd chapter refer to the *kāraka*-names as necessary meaning conditions. However, this principle is found missing in *samāsa* and *taddhita* portions. Some *sūtra*s for example may be cited : The *sūtra-kāra* has used *tena krītam* (p.5.1.37) for deriving the word *satyaḥ* bought for one hundred' where he has willfully avoided *karaṇa*. Similarly the *sūtra dvitīyaśritātīta* etc. (p.2.1.24), could have been written as *karmāśritātīta* etc. For compound formations like *vṛkabhayam* and *corabhayam*, the *sūtrakāra* frames his rule like *pañcamī bhayena* (p.2.1.37) instead of *apādānaṃ bhayena*. All these examples create serious doubts in our mind as to the Pāṇinian authorship of such portions in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*.

2. Pāṇini as a Sentence-grammarian

In the very beginning of the *Mahābhāṣya*, Patañjali cites a few unconnected finished words like *gaur aśvaḥ*, *puruṣaḥ* and *hastī* as examples for whose derivation, writing a grammar is specially meant. However, a close study of Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī* may reveal the fact that padas are not derived in Pāṇini's grammar as cases in isolation but on the contrary their mutual relations too are expressed. The sentence as a complete utterance must be present in the mind of the student intending to derive the constituent elements when he faithfully follows Pāṇini's grammar both in its design and its operation. Whether they are *subanta*s or *tiṅanta*s, the words cannot be derived independently. The very design of Pāṇini's grammar, i.e., the very arrangement of rules in his *Aṣṭādhyāyī* speaks in favour of the *vākyasaṃskārapakṣa* unlike its counter part *padasaṃskārapakṣa* where words are assumed to be derived in isolation. As a sentence grammarian, Pāṇini has shown special concern for various sentence-features in his work and has actually used different words of connective expressions like *yoga* (p.1.4.59), *samartha* (p.2.1.1) *yukta* (p.2.3.19), *sambandha* (p.3.4.1) *kāraka* (p.1.4.23), *anabhihita* (p.2.3.1) and *samānādhikaraṇa* (p.6.3.34) etc. Due to the inflictive nature of Sanskrit language the word-order is hardly emphasised in Pāṇinian grammar, although for a few specific cases such an order is duly recognised. From among the three possibilities of word connection viz. (a) *tiṅanta* + *tiṅanta* (b) *tiṅanta* and *subanta* as (c) *subanta* and *subanta*, the last twc relations are well-known categories and these are described in Pāṇini while explaining *kāraka* and *śeṣa* relations. For the first category, however Pāṇini's rules like *tiṅatiṅaḥ* are indicative of the presence of two verbs forming a sentence e.g. *pacati bhavati* or *paśya mṛgo dhāvati* where one verb is taken to be the qualifier of the other. The very design of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* beginning with the enumeration of technical terms, adoption of technical devices and continuing with formation of verb-stems and noun-stems along with the application of morphophonemic as well as phonological rules and ending with - sentence accent and sentence-intonation, reveals the very nature of Pāṇini as a sentence - grammarian.

3. Pāṇini as a stylistician

In order to explore the style of a language or the style of a particular author, one is sure to need the artistic sensibility. It becomes more a difficult task when one tries to investigate the stylistic aspects of a scientific treatise like Pāṇini's grammar In the logical exposition of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, Pāṇini follows a clear-cut dichotomy dividing the text into two main divisions, i.e. *siddha* and *asiddha*. By this principle, the last three sections of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* are considered not to have taken effect in relation to the application of the rules stated earlier[5]. Further rules are so arranged that the former is refuted by the latter. Similarly the *sūtra*s follow the device of dichotomy e.g. *utsarga* vs *apavāda*, *nitya* vs *anitya* and *antaraṅga* vs *bahiraṅga* etc. V.N. Mishra has, therefore, rightly said, "Pāṇini's style is still more specialised than that of the other treatises, as it is not a chain of logical arguments but a full description of an organised mass of concrete data from a living speech (in other words) it is an abstraction in scientific and not in philosophical terms[6]. Pāṇini has devised algebraic systems and assigned functions to them. In order to obtain maximum economy of words and unambiguity of the text, he employed devices and procedures like *saṃjñā*, *paribhāṣā*, *anuvṛtti* and *adhikāra* besides the algebraic *anubandha*-system and *pratyāhāra* formula etc. Further Pāṇini has followed a technique called *nipātana* to take care of ready-made forms whose process of derivation violates regular procedures.

While analysing the peculiar style of our author, we must bear in mind that the present available text of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* has come down to us through an oral tradition. Pāṇini has composed the *sūtra*s so as to be memorised like verses. For achieving this purpose, Pāṇini has adopted various means. Sometimes he adds "*a*","*i*" or "*ti*" to roots when he enumerates them in a particular *sūtra* for the sake of creating rhythm. For example he adds a to roots in the *sūtra, yaja-yāca-ruca-pravacarca* (P. 7.3.66) and used *ṇijanta* roots in the *sūtra, limpa-vinda-dhāri-pāri-vedi-udeji-ceti-sāti-sāhibhyaśca*,(P. 3.1.138) and adds "*i*" to roots in *nandi-grahi-pacādibhyo lyu-ṇiny-acaḥ* (P. 3.1.134) and adds "*ti*" in the *sūtra, upasargāt sunoti-suvati-syati-stauti-stobhati-sthā-senaya-sedha-sica-sajña-svañjām*, (P. 8.3.65). Besides roots, in other cases of accompanying words too, he uses rhythmic expressions like in the *sūtra, divā-vibhā-niśā-prabhā-bhās-kārānta-anantādi-vahu-nāndī-kiṃ-lipi-libi-bali-bhakti-kartṛ-citra-kṣetra-saṃkhyā-jaṅghā-bāhu-ahar-yat-tad-dhanur-aruṣṣu*, (P.3.2.21) etc.

Further, to justifiy Pāṇini's concern for dialectal variations, it must not be forgotten that Sanskrit was the means of communication in the ordinary usage during Pāṇini's times and naturally, therefore, Pāṇini has accepted his own contemporary Sanskrit as the basis of his grammar, which he called *bhāṣā*, the colloquial form of his speech. Thus while dealing with his own language, Pāṇini too has recorded his awareness of various other dialectal variations pertaining to *chandas, mantra, nigama,* or *yajus* etc. He mentions regional variations too referring to northern dialect as *udicya* and the eastern dialect as *prācām*. He also takes into account various usages pertaining to different provinces like Gāndhāra, Bharata, Suvīra, Vāhika, Uśinara, Kuru, Madra and Trigarta. Depending upon the different social roles, the speaker consciously or unconsciously effects variations and these are very closely observed by Pāṇini [7]. Even for indicating various shades of meanings, Pāṇini has taken recourse to various ingenious methods. One such method adopted by Pāṇini is his use of optional rules where according to Paul Kiparsky, the terms like *vā, vibhāṣā* and *anyatarasyām* refer to different shades of meaning viz. preferably, marginally and either or respectively[8].

4. A Semasiological approach in Pāṇini

Derivation in Pāṇini's grammar starts from meaning. These meanings include lexical ones and the meanings used for grammatical purposes like *sādhakatama, dhruvam apāye, vartamāna, bhūta, bhāva, karman* (process) etc. *Aṣṭādhyāyī* has been extolled as the unparalleled model of a complete generative grammar where two levels of interpretation are understood on the basis of semantics. The two levels are the underlying level and the surface level. The deep level and surface level are represented respectively as the semantic level and the phonological level. Pāṇini in his grammar has followed various semantic features of relations like synonymy, general-specific relation or part-whole relation. The Pāṇinian approach to utilise semantics is to group words or stems into form classes. Pāṇini takes recourse to list the individual forms when he fails to group[9]. The *sūtra*-from of his work never allows Pāṇini to explicitly discuss semantics. Although Pāṇini does not declare the necessity of semasiology, he takes words prefixed with the words like *artha* or *vacana*. Pāṇini frames so many *sūtra*s to take care of sentence intonation and accentuation. The meanings of implicative and attitudinal nature are described depending upon the hearer's interpretative skill. What Pāṇini explains in details is about the grammatical categories like *kāraka*-names and their relationship with their respective non-linguistic features. In Pāṇinian system the semantic representation is converted to syntactic structure and thus generative semantics finds its roots in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* [10] .

5. Concluding Remarks

Pāṇinian approach was both synthetical and analytical. He could succeed in reaching the culmination point of the grammatical tradition and his work was rightly adjudged as the monument of human intelligence. His grammar excelled all the previous grammars with regard to their system and thus it became the model for all the later traditional grammars and even today it is looked into for proper methodology it adopts for the study of generative grammar and descriptive linguistics. If interpreted correctly with modern tools of research, it is sure to influence modern regarding universal grammar.

A grammar for such an ancient language is bound to have its limitations, so more so when it has come down to us through an oral tradition. Even Kātyāyana and Patañjali have doubted often with regard its form and function. Principles of higher textual criticism are felt to be necessary in order to solve many a problem so far avoided conveniently. Looking at the *kāraka*-basis of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* as well as number of inconsistencies in some major portions like *taddhita* and *samāsa*-sections, the genuinity regarding single authorship is even doubted. However, the solution too is not expected to be met with in near future.

Pāṇini's grammar has been termed as a *vākyānuśāsana* rather than a *śabdānuśāsana* if *śabda* is interpreted as word in isolation. It has been successfully agrued to prove Pāṇini as a sentence -grammarian as he was all along careful to take care of syntax and semantics rather than morphology alone.

Recent researches on generative grammar have attracted studies on semantics, a forgotten branch of linguistics. Study on structural aspects is being replaced slowly with the study of semantics and syntax. Even some linguists have rightly claimed that the deepest analysis of a sentence is its semantic interpretation. Looking at the fact that Pāṇini's derivational procedures start with semantics and end with morpho-phonemic modifications, his grammar is rightly claimed as a model of generative semantics. Thus there are inroads to the study of Pāṇinian grammar where we can discover various turning points which may compel us to wait and observe and then to rediscover the proper path.

Truly Faddegon is right when he chants :

> I adore Pāṇini because he reveals to us the spirit of India,
> And I, adore India because she reveals to us the spirit, the spirit.

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2. *kartari kṛt*, p. 3.4.67.
3. *karaṇādhikaraṇayoś ca* (p. 3.3.117), *tayoreva kṛtyaktakhalarthāḥ* (p. 3.4.10), *dāsa-goghnau sampradāne*, p. 3.4.73, *bhīmādayo'pādāne* (p.3.4.74), and *vahyam karaṇam* (p.3.1.102) etc.

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7. Cp. P's *sūtras* like *pratyabhivāde'śudre* (p. 8.2.83) and *nādinyākrośe putrasya* (p.8.4.48).
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9. For understanding form-classes cp. the *sūtras* like *tulyārthair atulopamābhyām ajvareḥ* (p. .3.54) etc.
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TURNING POINTS IN THE CONCEPT OF SAMĀSAŚAKTI

Banamali Biswal

INTRODUCTION :

Whether the meaning of compound (CP) is conveyed by *śakti* "primary denotation" or *lakṣaṇā* "implication" is a riddle before the scholars of Sanskrit grammar. An age-long debate continues between the grammarians on one hand and the *Naiyāyika*s as well as the *Mīmāṃsaka*s on the other. The *Naiyāyika*s and some schools of *Mīmāṃsaka*s maintain that it is *lakṣaṇā* which fixes the meaning of CP, whereas the grammarians prefer *śakti* for this purpose. The grammarians, however, are in favour of accepting *śakti* in the CP as a whole, without taking the meaning of constituents into consideration. Therefore, they have appropriately named the term *śakti* used in CP as *samāsaśakti*,. *samudāyaśakti*, *akhaṇḍaśakti*, *samūhaśakti*, *atiriktaśakti*, *viśiṣṭaśakti*, *kḷptaśakti*, *ekaśakti*, *svatantraśakti* and so on. The issue becomes more complicated when the *lakṣaṇāvādin*s differ from each other in course of argument by giving scope for various types of *lakṣaṇā* in this context like *padalakṣaṇā* (*pūrvapada/ uttarapada/ ubhayapada*), *vākyalakṣaṇā*, *samudāyalakṣaṇā*, *samūhalakṣaṇā*, *sāhityalakṣaṇā*, *viśiṣṭakṣaṇā*, *sambandha-lakṣaṇā*, *śakyasambandhalakṣaṇā*, *sāmīpya-lakṣaṇā*, *prāśastya-lakṣaṇā*, *jahatsvārthalakṣaṇā*, *ajahatsvārthalakṣaṇā*, *nirūḍha-lakṣaṇā* and so on.

The present paper is divided into two broad groups : (i) a group which does not accept *śakti* in CP to prefer *lakṣaṇā* and (ii) a group which accepts *śakti* to arrive at the meaning of

CP. Although the *Naiyāyika*s and the *Mīmāṃsaka*s form the former group and the grammarians the other, some *Mīmāṃsaka*s like Kumārila Bhaṭṭa accept the grammarians view, whereas some grammarians like Kaiyaṭa and Haradatta follow the *Naiyāyika*'s way to some extent. Śavarasvāmin clearly postulates for *lakṣaṇā* in this context and so also all other thinkers of *Bhāṭṭa*-school including Somanātha and Khaṇḍadeva etc.

With regard to *lakṣaṇā* in *bahuvrīhi*-compound the *Naiyāyika*s and the *Mīmāṃsaka*s have different opinions. The *Naiyāyika*s accept *padalakṣaṇā*, whereas the *Mīmāṃsaka*s accept *vākyalakṣaṇā*. Gaṅgeśa differs further by accepting *nirūḍhalakṣaṇā* for the similar purpose.

Because of this controversy, this topic has been constantly drawing the attention of the scholars of India and abroad. As a result, a good number of attempts have been made in this direction to unveil the truth. In spite of this fact, the issue remains still shrouded with mystery for the students of all time. Thus, the present topic seems very much interesting and challenging to me, because, all the leading Indian schools of semantics (*Nyāya/ Vyākaraṇa/ Mīmāṃsā*) have something different to speak on this complicated issue. Attempt has been made in this paper to trace the possible turning points in the concept of *samāsaśakti* by showing the historical development along with the arguments of different schools for and against of this particular issue.

In dealing with this topic, I will not go into the details of the opponents' views for obvious reasons, because, the scope of this paper moves around the concept of *samāsaśakti* which they do not accept by preferring *lakṣaṇā*. However, justice cannot be given to this topic, without giving a brief outline of their stands.

As already pointed out, the *Naiyāyika*s lead the opponent group. In *Nyāya* school, only the neo-logicians have dealt with the meaning aspects of CP. In fact, Gaṅgeśa (13 th - 14th century A.D.) and Jagadīśa (17th century A.D.) etc. have substantially contributed to this field. Let us now discuss in a nut-shell how the *Naiyāyika*s and *Mīmāṃsaka*s handle this important issue :

THE NAIYĀYIKAS' STAND

In dealing with *śakti* they differ from grammarians in one hand and the *Mīmāṃsaka*s on the other. Because, they maintain that word alone has the primary denotative power and such power is not natural but based on either the will of God or on the will of human-being, which ascertains that a particular word should convey a particular sense [1].

According to *Naiyāyika*s, *jāti, vyakti* and *ākṛti* together constitute the meaning of the words [2]. Gaṅgeśa says - *ākṛti* should be included in the sense of the word, because, neither *jāti* nor *vyakti* can help in the cognition of the cow made of flour. It is the similarity of the particular physical arrangement which is responsible for such cognition [3].

The *Naiyāyika*s think that a CP is formed of two constituents and together they express the meaning intended by. They differ from the grammarians by accepting *vyapekṣā* as *sāmarthya* in CP, because *vyapekṣā* which constitutes a sentence is the cause of expressing the desired meaning of CP. They do not entertain samudaya*śakti* [4] in this context as the grammarians do because their epistemology does not allow them to postulate different types of *śakti*s, since they recognise *śakti* as only one. Therefore, they seek the help of *lakṣaṇā* to explain the meanings of CPs over and above the meanings of the constituents put together.

Gaṅgeśa holds that the meaning of the case affix indicated by P.2.4.71 in case of *tatpuruṣa* CPS like *rājapuruṣaḥ* etc., can be understood by *lakṣaṇā* from the first member *rājan*. There is no need to accept *samudāyaśakti* for this purpose . Since the CP conveys the desired meaning even before the listener becomes aware of the incompatibility between the referents of the constituents, the *Naiyāyika*s prefer *nirūḍhalakṣaṇā* in this regard [5].

With reference to *karmadhāraya*, Gaṅgeśa has something different to speak. He feels no need of either *śakti* or *lakṣaṇā*, because, the meaning can be understood simply by the syntactic relation [6]. The relation between the qualifier and the qualificand depends upon the mutual expectancy and not on the case-affix of the qualifier. For example, in the expression : *nīlaṃ ghaṭam ānaya* the mutual expectancy is the cause of identical relation between the qualifier *nīla* and the qualificand *ghaṭa* [7]. The case-affix *aṃ* added to *nīla* has no specific grammatical function except to confirm the convention that neither the stem nor the affix should be used independently [8].

However, the case is different in case of *ṣaṣṭhītatpuruṣa* etc., because, if the first member does not denote *sambandha* by *lakṣaṇā* then the CP *rājapuruṣaḥ* will wrongly denote *rājaviśiṣṭa-puruṣaḥ* instead of *rājasambandhipuruṣaḥ*. Because, it is casier to understand the relation of coreference than the relation of possessor and the possessed. Thus, the relation between the man and the king cannot be understood by *śakti*. The incompatibility in the expressed sense of the constituents, gives rise to *lakṣaṇā*. In all other cases except *sāmānādhikaraṇya* the relation between two components is understood by the case-affix. In the absence of such case-affixes in case of CP, the relation can be understood from the *pūrvapada* by *lakṣaṇā* [9].

In the *avyayībhāva* CPs like *upakumbham* etc. the *Naiyāyikas* advocate for *lakṣaṇā* in the *uttarapada* in the sense of genitive case. The reason is, they feel that *śakti* cannot denote the intended meaning of such CPs [10].

Gaṅgeśa says, there is no need of *śakti* in *dvandva*-CP also. Because, the intended - meaning *anekārtha* can be understood by *padalakṣaṇā* only [11]. However, in case of *bahuvrīhi*-cp, they accept *nirūḍhalakṣaṇā*[12]. But not so in case of a sentence which does not contain any *śakti* obviously *lakṣaṇā* cannot be accepted in the absence of *śakti* which is defined as *śakyasambandha* [13].

According to some schools of *Nyāya*, *lakṣitalakṣaṇā* "double implication" is to be accepted in the *bahuvrīhis* like *citraguḥ* etc., where *lakṣaṇā* functions in two stages. The word *citra* first of all implies the qualified sense of the constituents, because of its proximity with *go* and then it implies the possessor of *citrā gau*. However, Gaṅgeśa rejects *lakṣitalakṣaṇā* in the *bahuvrīhi* on the ground that it involves prolixity [14].

THE MĪMĀṂSAKAS STAND :

The problem of word and meaning is not a complicated issue for the *Mīmāṃsaka*s, because, all of their metaphysics and ritual speculations are based on the doctrine of the validity of the *vedas*.

Like *Naiyāyika*s, they also accept *lakṣaṇā* for the signification of the qualified sense of the CP. Among the exponents of *Bhāṭṭa*-school of *Mīmāṃsā*, all the thinkers like Somanātha and Khaṇḍadeva except Kumārila, do not accept any *śakti* for the understanding of the CP.

According to Kumārila, however, the qualified referent of the CP is conveyed by the primary denotation. He makes a general rule that all the derivative words should refer to a substance only by primary denotation [15]. Since *śakti* cannot be confined to a single constituent of the CP, it has to be accepted as residing in both. Thus, from the above discussion it becomes clear that Kumārila prefers *samudāyaśakti* in Cps [16].

However, Śavarasvāmin holds the view that it is only *lakṣaṇā* which conveys the intended sense of the Cps. Later *Mīmāṃsaka*s of *Bhāṭṭa*-school also follow Śavarasvāmin in this regard. They say, there is no need of *samudāyaśakti* or *lakṣaṇā* in *karmadhāraya*-CPs, because, *avayavaśakti* is sufficient to convey the meanings of the CPs like *niṣādasthapatiḥ* etc. [17].

Śavarasvāmin observes that *lakṣaṇā* should not take place in case of *karmadhāraya*, because , the relation of identity is possible between the two referents of the constituents. For example, in the CP word : *niṣādasthapatiḥ*, both the constituents *niṣāda* and *sthapati* denote their respective meanings and because of the *abhedānvaya*, the CP *niṣādasthapatiḥ* denotes: *niṣādābhinnaḥ sthapatiḥ*, or *niṣāda eva sthapatiḥ* [18].

According to Śavarasvāmin, a *karmadhāraya*-CP is stronger than the *śuddhatatpuruṣa* [19] because, in the former the referent is conveyed by *śakti* which is preferable to *lakṣaṇā* [20].

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa does not agree with the above view which favours *śakti* in *karmadhāraya*. Because, if each and every constituent denotes only its primary sense, then *sāmānādhikaraṇya* cannot be established between them. *Sāmānādhikaraṇya* is possible only if both the constituents denote one and the same substance [21]. For example, *nīlotpalam* where *nīla* and *utpala* both signify the same substance, and therefore, the CP is formed [22].

If *niṣāda* denotes its own meaning and if *sthapati* also denotes its own meaning then in the absence of *sāmānādhikaraṇya*, no semantic connection can be established and hence no CP will take place. However, this difficulty can be avoided by accepting the fact that the constituent *niṣāda* denotes sthapathi by *lakṣaṇa* and the word *sthapati* also denotes *sthapati* [23].

According to Kumārila, derivative words are primarily denotative of substance [24]. He prefers *śakti* in CP rather than *lakṣaṇa*. Since *śakti* cannot be confined to a particular constituent of a CP, it has to be attributed to the aggregate. Therefore, he faces no difficulty in accepting, *samudāyaśakti* in case of a CP.

The later *Mīmāṃsaka*s like Somanātha[25] and Khaṇḍadeva[26], differ from Kumārila and accept *lakṣaṇā* in *śuddhatatpuruṣa* and *śakti* in *karmadhāraya*. They do not accept *samudāyaśakti* or *lakṣaṇā* in *karmadhāraya* due to two reasons, namely (i) they do not accept derivative words as denoting substance and (ii) they also do not prefer to go against the *Bhāṣyakāra* who considers the *karmadhāraya* as stronger than *tatpuruṣa* due to the absence of *lakṣaṇā* in the former [27].

With regard to *bahuvrīhi*- cp, the *Mīmāṃsaka*s differ from each other. The *lakṣaṇāvādin* argues that in *bahuvrīhi* - CPs like *piṅgākṣi* etc. both the constituents *piṅga* and *akṣin* express their own meanings and no extra word is found to denote *anyapadārtha*. However the *anyapadārtha* can be understood by *lakṣaṇā* alone[28].

Kumārila observes that *bahuvrīhi* possesses *śakti* to denote *anyapadārtha* by its nature. He says, the CP- referent in such cases cannot be expressed by *lakṣaṇā* because, it cannot be accepted in concomitance with all the instances of *bahuvrīhi* as it happens in the *karmadhāraya*. He feels, *lakṣaṇā* is only possible if the CP and the constituents are in *sāmānādhikaraṇya* just as in case of *karmadhāraya* [29].

Khaṇḍadeva remarks that *lakṣaṇā* helps us in giving the meaning of *bahuvrīhi* [30]. However, in *Mīmāṃsākaustubha* he refers to *nirūḍhalakṣaṇā* through the primary meanings of the constituents after they are syntactically related to each other [31].

In fact, the *Mīmāṃsaka*s postulate *vākyalakṣaṇā* in *bahuvrīhi*-CP, because they feel the sum-total meaning of the syntactically related constituents convey the *anyapadārtha*, just as in the sentences like *gabhīrāyāṃ nadyāṃ ghoṣaḥ* etc.

THE GRAMMARIANS' STAND :

So far as the grammarians' views are concerned, we can place them into two groups : (i) the grammarians who presuppose *śakti* in CP without mentioning the term directly and (ii) the grammarians who accept it by using the terms like *samāsaśakti* or *samudāyaśakti* directly. Pāṇini, Kātyāyana, Patañjali and Bhartṛhari etc. come under the first group who do not explicitly say that *śakti* conveys the meaning of CP. But they intend so in their respective works. On the other hand, Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita and Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa etc. form the other group, who have categorically dealt with the subject so thoroughly and scientifically by adding separate chapters to their respective works.

No school disagrees to the fact that a CP conveys some additional meanings other than that of the constituents, which are understood through the case affixes as well as through some additional words like *ca*, *iva* etc., in a sentence. But they hold difference of opinion as to whether that additional meaning understood by *śakti* or by *lakṣaṇā*. A survey of the grammarianss views in this context, is graphed in the following pages :

According to the ancient grammarians, such meanings are understood by the primary denotation of the constituents [32]. They argue that the case-affix which is indicated by P.2.4.71 is remembered when the CP is heard. Therefore, the meaning is directly understood by the primary denotation of words [33]. However, the neo-grammarians advocate for a *samudāyaśakti* aggregate-expressive power by which the additional meaning is understood. Let us now highlight on the views of the grammarians in this regard starting from Pāṇini onwards :

PĀṆINI :

Pāṇini does not explicitly say that *śakti* or *samudāyaśakti* conveys the intended meanings of the CPs. But many of his rules in *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, do imply that the meanings of the CPs are conveyed by *samudāyaśakti*. I will quote a few examples in this regard.

(i) P. 2.1.6 :

The CP expression *nirmakṣikam* is derived by this rule, meaning *makṣikāṇām abhāvaḥ* "the absence of flies" through *avayavaśakti*. But this meaning is not intended from this expression. The CP word *nirmakṣikam* denotes a place where no people will be around. This meaning, however, cannot be obtained without *samudāyaśakti*.

(ii) P.2.1.21 :

This rule teaches CP only if the meaning of the CP refers to *saṃjñā*. Thus, the CP *unmattagaṅgam* does not refer to a place where the Ganges are furious, but to a country called by such names. This meaning also cannot be achieved by *samudāyaśakti*.

(iii) P.2.1.26 :

The CP-word *khaṭvārūḍhaḥ* is derived by this rule. This expression does not refer to one who is mounted on bed, but it refers to a rogue. This meaning cannot be arrived at without accepting *samudāyaśakti*.

(iv) P.2.1.33 :

This rule teaches CP in the sense of *arthavādavacana*. For example, *vātacchedyaṃ tṛṇam* "the grass which can be cut by the air even". From this expression, the act of praising and finding fault can be understood. The grass is so soft that even the air can cut it (*stuti*). The grass is so weak that it can be cut by the air even (*nindā*). Such emotive meanings cannot be understood without *samudāyaśakti*.

(v) P.2.2.57 :

Uddālakapuṣpabhañjikā is a CP-word which is derived by this rule. This expression refers to a sort of game because of *samudāyaśakti*.

(vi) P.2.1.48 :

The CP-word *geheśūraḥ* meaning coward is derived by this rule. The intended meaning cannot be obtained without *samudāyaśakti*.

(vii) P.2.1.4 :

The CP-word *avataptenakulasthitam* is derived by this rule which refers to a person who is not steady at work and roams here and there, as a mongoose does not stay steady at a hot place. This meaning can be obtained only by *samudāyaśakti*.

(viii) P.2.2.24 :

The concept *anyapadārtha* in CPs like *citragauḥ* "the owner of the variegated cows" etc. cannot be obtained without *samudāyaśakti*.

(ix) P.2.1.42 :

The CP-words like *tīrthadhvāṅkṣaḥ* etc. are derived by this rule, which refers to a person who goes to teacher's house and does not study there for long, but not to a crow at the sacred bathing place. This meaning also cannot be achieved without accepting *samudāyaśakti*.

All these rules mentioned above, go in favour of establishing the fact that Pāṇini intends *samudāyaśakti* for understanding the meaning of a CP.

KĀTYĀYANA :

On P.2.1.1 Kātyāyana teaches a *vārtitika*: *pṛthagarthānām ekārthībhāvaḥ*[34]. "The word *samartha* (means) a single integrated meaning of words which (when uncompounded) have separate meanings (of their own)". This particular *vārttika* alone can be treated as a sufficient ground that Kātyāyana intends *samudāyaśakti* in a CP. The words which have different individual meanings, will refer to a single meaning after being compounded. That means the *avayavaśakti* will have no more effect on the process of understanding a CP, because, a single meaning is understood from the CP as a whole by *samudāyaśakti*.

The next two *vārttika*s [35] describing the special feature of words in an uncompounded word-group as contrasted with a CP also clarify. the intention of Kātyāyana in this regard. The differences between a sentence and a CP as noted in these two *vārttika*s, do help in establishing *samudāyaśakti* in CP. The meaning which are understood by the addition of the elements like case-ending number and particle *ca* etc. in case of a sentence, are understood by *samudāyaśakti* in a CP.

To sum up : Kātyāyana's reference to *ekārthībhāva*, establishes *samudāyaśakti* in CPs.

PATAÑJALI :

Patañjali also does not mention the term *samudāyaśakti* directly. But he uses similar terms like *ekārthībhāva* [36], *jahatsvārthavṛtti* [37] and *samudāyasāmarthya* [38] which refer to nothing but the *samudāyaśakti*. In fact, in the *Bhāṣya* under P.2.1.1 one can find a lot of evidences by which it can be safely concluded that Patañjali prefers *samudāyaśakti* in the determination of the meaning of CPs.

While paraphrasing Kātyāyana's *vārttika* defining *ekairthībhāva*, Patañjali holds that the word *samartha* refers to a single meanings of words which have separate meanings of their own, when uncompounded. To a question that where the words have separate meanings and where they have a single meaning, the *Bhāṣyakāra* replies that in a sentence like *rājñaḥ puruṣaḥ* the words have individual meanings and in a CP like *rājapuruṣaḥ* all the words have a single meaning [39].

Moreover, the statements like *saviśeṣaṇānāṃ vṛttir na* [40] *vṛttasya vā viśeṣaṇayogo na* etc. also go in favour of *samudāyaśakti*. Thus, compounding is not allowed of words qualified by an outside word and at the same time a qualifying word is not allowed once the compounding has taken place. From such statements it is clear that Patañjali accepts a single integrated meaning in CP, which is only possible by accepting *samudāyaśakti*.

There are two different views regarding the expressions of the meaning of CP, namely, *jahatsvārthā* and *ajahatsvārthā*. In *jahatisvārthā*, the constituents of CP denote the meaning of another word and give up their own meanings, whereas in *ajahatsvārthā*, the constituents denote the meanings of some extra words without giving up their own. For *jahatsvārthā*, Patañjali gives the example of a carpenter, who being engaged in royal service, is compelled to discard his own work. Similarly the component *rājan*, involved is conveying the sense of *puruṣa* in the CP: *rājapuruṣaḥ* gives up its denotative sense [41].

An objection is raised against *jahatsvārthā* that if the subordinate member in CP:*rājapuruṣaḥ* gives up its own meaning then any person may be brought in hearing the sentence: *rājapuruṣam ānaya* "bring the king-man". But Patañjali replies that giving up the meaning in *jahatsvārthāvṛtti* does not mean that the constituents give up their meanings altogether. In fact, they give up that much sense only, which is inconsistent to qualify the principle member. Just as the carpenter engaged in royal duties, does not give up his metabolic activities like coughing, breathing, laughing and scratching etc [42].

BHARTṚHARI:

Like Patañjali, Bhartṛhari also believes in the indivisibility of the CP and maintains that the CP and the sentence do not have a relation of producer and the produced [43]. He observes that the interpretation of *sāmarthya* in two ways, namely, *vyapekṣā* and *ekārthībhāva,* is also a fiction and meant for the convenience of teaching the students on the basis of the conventional usage of the learned uncommon parlance [44].

The CP is allowed when the *sāmarthya* is accepted as *ekārthībhāva* only and not as *vyapekṣā* [45]. He feels the *vṛttipakṣa* advanced by some of the grammarians, is nothing but one of the manifold methods of analysing the CP with a view to finally exhibit the indivisibility of CP[46].

Bhartṛhari is of the opinion that Patañjali's statement: *sāpekṣam asamarthaṃ bhavati*, should be slightly modified. Because the words having expectancy with the whole CP like *gurukula*, are related to the whole CP only after relating themselves with the constituents. In the expression: *Devadattasya gurukulam*, the word *Devadatta* is first related to the subordinate member and then to the whole CP, conveying the same sense as expressed by the sentence [47].

BHAṬṬOJI DĪKṢITA :

Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita advocates for the recognition of an additional expressive power called *samudāyaśakti* by which the CP generates an unitary qualified knowledge. He does not accept either *lakṣaṇā* or *nirūḍhalakṣaṇā* in the comprehension of the CP. He feels if *lakṣaṇā* is accepted in a CP then the meaning lotus can be wrongly considered as implied from the affix *ḍa* instead of the whole word, *paṅkaja*. In fact, all the schools believe that the desired meaning lotus is understood from the complex word *paṅkaja* by *rūḍhi* "convention" and the word is treated as a case of *yogarūḍha*. On this ground Bhaṭṭoji remarks that a separate expressive power should be accepted in all the varieties of CP as well as in other complex formations which can convey the intended meaning[48].

He is of the opinion that accepting *vyapekṣā* as *sāmarthya*, will lead to prolixity. He says, in accepting *vyapekṣā*, first of all the use of the words like *ca*, *iva*, *krānta, yukta* etc, in the CPs like *dhavakhadirau*, *ghanaśyāmaḥ, niṣkauśāmbiḥ* and *gorathaḥ* respectively, needs to be taught by some additional statements and subsequently they should be prohibited. Moreover, there will be no proper exposition of the meanings in case of *bahuvrīhi* - CPs like *citraguḥ* etc., because the meaning *anyapadārtha* cannot be arrived by accepting *vyapekṣā* alternative. Hence, to avoid such prolixity, it is better to accept *ekārthaībhāva* [49].

Moreover, in case of *aṣaṣṭhyartha-bahuvrīhi*s like *prāptodakaḥ*, *uḍharathaḥ* and *upahṛtapaśuḥ* etc., there is no *vinigamanā* to decide whether *lakṣaṇa* should take place on the last member or on the first. Therefore, an additional statement is to be made for the application of *lakṣaṇā* either in *pūrvapada* or in *uttarapada*. In addition to that, one has to abandon the previous practice of understanding the meaning of a certain expression by *avayavaśakti*. Therefore, it is better to accept an aggregate expressive power (*samudāyaśakti*) in CPs [50].

KAUṆḌA BHAṬṬA :

As a staunch follower of Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita, Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa also advocates for *ekārthībhāva*. He has dealt with this subject very elaborately by taking all the objections raised by different thinkers like grammarians, *Naiyāyika*s and *Mīmāṃsaka*s into consideration.

He feels, if the constituents of a CP denote only their respective meanings, then either of them could be syntactically related with another word appearing outside the CP. For example, *puruṣa* will also be wrongly compounded with *rājan* in the expression : *rājñaḥ puruṣaḥ aśvas ca*, where *aśva* and *puruṣa* are syntactically related to each other. Similarly the subordinate member can also be related to its own qualifiers to allow incorrect expressions like *ṛḍhasya rāja puruṣaḥ* [51].

On the other hand, *vyapekṣā* is also a necessary factor for the formation of CP. Otherwise, on the basis of *ekārthībhāva* alone, the CP will be possible between *kṛṣṇa* and *śrita* in the expression : *draṣṭuṃ gataḥ kṛṣṇam, śritaḥ gurukulaṃ viṣṇumitraḥ*[52] " (some one has gone to see *kṛṣṇa* (and) *viṣṇumitra* has taken recourse to teacher-house".

He further refers to the view of Haradatta who accepts *ekārthībhāva*, *vyapekṣā* and *ajahatsvārthā vṛtti* together as the necessary conditions for the formation of a CP which are implied by the rule : *samarthaḥ* [53] *padavidhiḥ* (P.2.1.1). But he differs from Kaiyaṭa and Haradatta in this regard and suggests that all the three principles recorded in *Mahābhāṣya* may be subsumed under two alternatives, namely, *jahatsvārthā* and *ajahatsvārthā vṛtti* [54]. Which correspond to *ekārthībhāva* and *vyapekṣā* respectively.

According to him, the two alternatives *ekārthībhāva* and *vyapekṣā* are explained by Patañjali as *jahatsvārthā* and *ajahatsvārthāvṛtti*s [55]. Therefore, they could not be regarded as a separate view as postulated by Kaiyaṭa with reference to *vṛttipakṣa*.

As per his observation, when *jahatsvārthā* is accepted as the proper meaning implied by *sāmarthya* in P.2.1.1, the constituents of the CP have to give up their own meanings. Therefore, for the denotation of the qualified referent of the CP, Bhaṭṭojī advocates for an aggregate expressive power. As the parts like *vṛṣa* and *yāva* in *vṛṣabha* and *yāvaka* respectively, are not meaningful, similarly the constituents of a CP are also devoid of separate meanings [56].

He further argues that the previous view advancing the indivisibility of CP as illustrated by Kaiyaṭa, does not agree with the logic of Patañjali, because, under the *vārttika*: *pṛthag arthānām ekārthībhāvaḥ samarthavacanam*, he says that the words which have separate meanings in a sentence, denote a single meaning in the CP [57].

Moreover, if the CP is presumed as indivisible, it will lead to a wrong conclusion based on the same line of argument that the sentence is also indivisible. Thus, it will contradict the convention of Patañjali that only *vyapekṣā* is possible in a sentence [58].

He feels, the compoundness partially exists in each of the constituents and completely in the aggregate [59]. Thus, neither of the constituents is capable of conveying the desired sense. This is the reason behind postulating an aggregate-expressive-power besides that of the constituents. His argument is based on the presumption that the meanings like *svāmin*, *sambandha/ sambandhi, sāmīpya- sāhitya* and *samūha* are not expressed by either of their constituents in CPs like *citraguḥ*, *rājapuruṣaḥ, upakumbham, dhavakhadirau* and *pāṇipādam* respectively. Such understanding cannot be explained by any other way than the *samudāyaśakti* [60].

According to him, the meanings of *bahuvrīhi* cps like *citraguḥ* etc. are denoted by *samudāyaśakti* [61]. He observes that *lakṣaṇā* fails to convey the intended meanings of *aṣaṣṭhyarthabahuvrīhi*s like *prāptodakaḥ* etc. [62] For example in the expression : *prāptodakaḥ grāmaḥ,* the water is the agent and the village is the object for the action of reaching. Here, since the affix *kta* is added in the sense of an agent, the derivative word *prāpta* denotes the object and the agent both. Thus, the meaning of the CP is fixed as *udakakartṛkaprāptikarma*. Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa argues that this meaning cannot be conveyed by *lakṣaṇā* after the constituents *prāpta* and *udaka* are syntactically related to the meaning water which is the agent of the action of reaching [63].

He also advocated for the recognition of *samudāyaśakti* on the basis of practical experience and psychological principal behind the comprehension of the meaning of a CP. He argues that the meaning of CP is understood even by the children who do not know either the CP or the grammatical analysis of the CP; either the *śakti* or the *lakṣaṇā* of the constituents. The understanding of the meaning of CP by *samudāyaśakti*, cannot be treated as the mis-apprehension of *śakti*, because , neither the denotativeness of the aggregate is obstructed nor any ambiguity is found in the cognition [64].

He neither agrees with the ancient grammarians saying the meaning of the CP is understood by *avayavaśakti*, nor with the *Naiyāyika*s and the *Mīmāṃsaka*s who accept *lakṣaṇā* for the same. He says, *samudāyaśakti* is to be accepted in each and evey CP [65].

NĀGEŚA :

In refutation of the opponents' views and in support of the grammarians, stand, Nāgeśa puts forth the following arguments : If *śakti* is not accepted in CPs then *samudāya* becomes meaningless and thus cannot be called a *prātipadika*. It is also not proper to argue that since constituents are meaningfull the *samudāya* should obviously be meaningfull, because Patañjali says that the collection of meaningfull units can also become meaningless [66]. For example, in the complex-words like *dasadāḍimāni, ṣaḍapūpa* etc. the constituents are meaningful but not the collection. Similarly the meaningful constituents like *rājan* and *puruṣa* become meaningless in the CP as a whole. Therefore it is better to accept *samudāya* as meaningful, so that it can be called *prātipadika* by p.1.2.45 and the use of *samāsa* in the next rule (P.1.2.46) can be treated as niyama.

The *vyapekṣāvādins* argue that *samudāya* can become meaningful by *lakṣaṇā*. To this Nāgeśa replies that since you define *lakṣaṇā* as *śakyasambandha* [67], the *lakṣaṇā* will not be possible in the absence of *śakti*. As a result the *samudāya* i.e. CP cannot become *prātipadika* and thus the suffixes like *su* etc. cannot be added to it. In the absence of these suffixes the CP cannot get *padasajñā* and hence it cannot be used in language[68]. Therefore , it is better to accept *śakti* to avoid these difficulties [69].

Both the alternatives : *ekārthībhāva* and *vyapekṣā* cannot be accepted together in a CP as suggested by the *Naiyāyikas* to facilitate both the meanings : *sāmabheda* and *rathataraṇakartā* from the single expression *rathantara*. Because, Nāgeśa feels, once *rūḍha* is accepted the power of etymology is ceased [70].

A doubt is further raised that in accepting *viśiṣṭaśakti* in complex formations like *paṅkaja* etc. the intended meaning can be understood without knowing the meaning of the constituents. Thus, the word *paṅkaja* can not be treated as a case of *yogārūḍha*, because, it will be a pure case of *jahatsvārthā*. To this the *siddhāntavādin* replies that *jahatsvārthā* is only possible when conventional meaning goes against the etymological meaning [71].

Contextually Nāgeśa records the four fold divisions of the words, accepted by the *Naiyāyika*s, namely, *rūḍha, yogarūḍha, yaugika* and *yaugikarūḍha*. He feels *samudāyaśakti* is needed for three of these divisions except *yaugika* which can be explained by *avayavaśakti* [72].

On the line of Bhaṭṭoji's *kārikā* : *samāsa khalu bhinnaiva śaktiḥ paṅkaja śabdavat,* Nāgeśa says, *viśiṣṭaśakti* is to be accepted in CP just as in case of *paṅkaja*. He feels *ekārthībhāva* should be accepted in CP to avoid prolixity. Because, in the absence of that many additional statements are to be made to arrive at the intended meaning [73].

If *śakti* is not accepted by considering the etymological meaning alone, *paṅkaja* will wrongly denote *śaivāla* "moss" etc. on the other hand, in accepting *vyapekṣā*, the addition of *vṛttidharma*s like *viśeṣaṇa*, *liṅga* etc. are to be prohibited through some additional statements like *padārthaḥ padārthenānveti* and *saviśeṣāṇānāṃ vṛttir na* etc. However, for the grammarians, such problems do not arise, because in accepting *ekārthībhāva*, the *viśeṣaṇa* etc. cannot be added to the constituents which are meaningless [74].

Moreover, in *dvandva*-CPs like *ghaṭapaṭau* etc. the *vyapekṣāvādin*s have to drop *cakāra* expressing *sāhitya*, whereas the *ekārthībhāvavādin*s can do away with it in expressing such meaning through *śakti*.

CONCLUSION :

The discussion made in this paper, lead us to the following observations :

(1) The term *samāsaśakti* refers to an additional expressive power accepted by the grammarians for comprehending the qualified referent of the CPs. This has been given a conceptual status at least from Bhaṭṭoji's period onwards.

(2) Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa advocates for the distinct recognition of *samāsaśakti* on the edifice of Bhaṭṭoji's *Vaiyākaraṇa Siddhāntakārikā*. However, his stand with reference to this issue is mainly based on the scattered ideas of Pāṇini, Kātyāyana, Patañjali and Bhartṛhari etc.

(3) Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa criticises the views of Kaiyaṭa and Haradatta in this context who follow the *Naiyāyika*s way to some extent. He also criticises the traditional classification and the definitions of CP in the process of explaining Bhaṭṭoji's *kārikā* - No. 28.

(4) Amongst the grammarians, the *nityaśabdavādin*s resort to the concept of *padasphoṭa* to explain this issue, whereas the *kāryaśabdavādin*s accept *samudāya-śakti* for this purpose.

(5) The *Naiyāyika*s maintain that the CP meaning is always understood by *lakṣaṇā* except in *karmadhāraya*. Gaṅgeśa holds a difference of opinion by accepting *nirūḍhalakṣaṇa* in case of *bahuvrīhi*.

(6) Amongst the *Mīmāṃsakā*s, Śabarasvāmin, Khaṇḍadeva and Somanātha etc. follow the *Naiyāyika*s way and accept *lakṣaṇā*. However, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa holds that all the CPs denote *dravya* through *śakti*. Like grammarians he accepts

samudāyaśakti in CP.

(7) So far as the *bahuvrīhi*-CP is concerned, the *Mīmāṃsaka*s differ from the *Naiyāyika*s. The *Naiyāyika*s accept *padalakṣaṇā* "word-implication" and the *Mīmāṃsaka*s favour *vākyalakṣaṇā* "sentence - implication" for this purpose.

(8) *Samudāyaśakti* or *samāsaśakti* is acceptable to all due to its logical simplification on the other hand, accepting *lakṣaṇā* involves a number of alternatives like *padalakṣaṇā*, *vākyalakṣaṇā*, *nirūḍhalakṣaṇā*, *samudāyalakṣaṇā*, *sāhityalakṣaṇā* and so on. In *padalakṣaṇā* also there is every possibility to get confused, whether to accept it in *pūrvapada*, in *uttarapada* or in *ubhayapada*.

To sum up : *lakṣaṇā* being a *jaghanyāvṛtti* is of secondary importance. There is no sufficient ground for accepting *lakṣaṇā* when *śakti* is capable of expressing the intended sense. Moreover, *samudāyaśakti* solves a number of problems pertaining to the interpretation of CPs by avoiding so many additional statements which were essential in the process of accepting *lakṣaṇā*. Thus accepting *samudāyaśakti* in CPs is certainly a better solution to all problems raised in this context.

NOTES AND REFERENCES :

(1) *yaḥ śabdaḥ yatreśvareṇa saṃketitaḥ sa tatra śaktiḥ sādhurity-ucyate*, *Tattvacintāmaṇi* (TC) p. 648.

(2) *vyaktyākṛtijātayas tu padārthaḥ*, *Nyāyasūtra* - 2.2.65.

(3) *jātiviśeṣavad avayavasaṃyogarūpākṛtir api padaśaktyā gopadāt jātyākṛtiviśiṣṭasyaivānubhavāt piṣṭakamayo gāva ityādau gavākṛtisadṛśākṛtau lakṣaṇā piṣṭakasaṃyogaviśeṣasyāśakyatvāt*, TC, pp.

589-90.

(4) *samudāyaśaktau mānābhāvāt*, Ibid, P. 746.

(5) *Tatpuruṣe'pi rājapuruṣa ityādau pūrvapadasya ṣaṣṭhyarthasambandhe nirūḍhalakṣaṇayaiva rājasamvandhipuruṣabuddhyupapatter na samāse śaktiḥ*, Ibid, P. 753.

(6) *karmadhāraye tu na śaktir na vā lakṣaṇā tābhyām vināpi vivakṣitārthānvayabodhopapatteḥ*, Ibid, P. 777.

(7) *nīlaṃ ghaṭaṃ ānayetyādau nāmārthayor viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyayor anvayabodhe ākāṅkṣādikam eva hetuḥ, na tu viśeṣaṇavibhaktir api nīlasya ghaṭakarmakatvābhāvāt śabdāt tathānanubhāvācca*, Ibid, P. 771.

(8) *na kevalā prakṛtiḥ prayoktavyā na kevalaḥ pratyayaḥ*, MBh, Vol. I, P. 442.

(9) *nanu anupapattiṃ vinā kathaṃ ṣaṣṭhyarthe lakṣaṇeti ced yadi ṣaṣṭhyartha na lakṣyate tadā rājapuruṣādau lāghavādinā prāk sāmānādhikaraṇyāvagamād rājatvaviśiṣṭa puruṣasyaiva vibhaktiko'nvayaḥ syāt ---atha rājaviśiṣṭe'asmadādyānayanānāyāyogya iti cet tarhi anayaivānupapattyā vā ṣaṣṭhyarthe lakṣaṇā vibhaktyarthāpekṣo hi sarvatra nāmārthānvayaḥ. ataḥ śrutavibhaktyarthāsambhave vibhaktyartha lakṣaṇai-vocita*, Ibid, PP. 755-757.

(10) *upakumbham ityavyayibhāve ---pūrvapadārtha-pradhāne eva kumbhasya samīpe tātparyād itastatrottarapade ṣaṣṭhyarthalakṣaṇā na tu samāse śaktiḥ* Ibid, pp. 785-86.

(11) *nāpi dvandve śaktir eva padalakṣaṇayaivānekārtho-pasthitisambhavāt*,Ibid, P. 795.

(12) (a) *astu tarhi bahuvrīhisithapadadvaye nirūḍha lakṣaṇā*, Ibid., P. 746.

(b) *bahuvrīhiḥ svagarbhārtha sambandhitvena bodhakaḥ/*

nirūḍhayā lakṣaṇayā svaṃśajñāpakaśabdavān / /
śabdaśaktiprakāśikā - 43

(13) *vākye itarārthakatayā svārthasambandhabhāvena lakṣaṇā niṣedhād atrāpi padalakṣaṇayaivopapatteśca*, TC, P. 733

(14) *yat tu citrapadena gopadasannidhānāt svārthasambodhini gaur lakṣyate, citragavā ca svāmi lakṣita iti lakṣitalakṣaṇayā jaghanyatvāt*, Ibid PP. 735-36.

(15) *sarvatra yaugikaiḥ śabdaiḥ dravyam evābhidhīyate /*
na hi sambandhavācyatvam sambhavaty atigauravāt / /
Tantravārttika (TV) 3.1.6.12

(16) Cf. *Athavā samudāyād utpādād ubhayatrāpi draṣṭavya*, *Ṭupṭikā* - 6.1.13.51

(17) *niṣādapadam evātaḥ ṣaṣṭhyartha lakṣayed idam /*
karmadhārayapakṣe tu na kācid api lakṣaṇā//
niṣāda eva sthapatir ataḥ smṛtyā pratīyate /
Śāstradīpikā - 6.1.13.51

(18) *sthapatir niṣādaḥ syāt*, *niṣāda eva sthapatir bhavitum arhati kasmāt? śabdasāmarthyāt*, *niṣādam hi niṣādaśabdaḥ śaknoti,*
Śābarabhāṣya - 6.1.13.51

(19) *niṣādaśabdalakṣaṇāyā tasyāś ca daurlabhyam ity uktam samānādhikaraṇāsamāsas tu balīyān tatra hi svārthe śabdau vṛttau bhavataḥ,* Ibid.

(20) *śrūtilakṣaṇaviṣaye ca śrutir nyāyyā na lakṣaṇā.*

(21) *piṅgākṣyaikahāyaniśabdau dvāv api sāmānādhikaraṇyād ekadravyavacanam*, TV 3.1.6-12.

(22) *utpalaśabdasyāpi tad evādhikaraṇam nīlaśabdasyāpi ata aikādhikaraṇyāt sāmarthyam sāmarthyācca samāsaḥ, Ṭupṭikā*- 6.1.13-51.

(23) *yadi niṣādaśabdena niṣāda evocyate, sthapati śabdena sthapatir eva tato bhinnādhikaraṇatvāt sāmarthyā*

bhāvaḥ, tasmāt niṣādaśabdena sathapatim yāvad gantavyam iti eṣā lakṣaṇā, Ibid.

(24) *sarvatra yaugikaiḥ śabdaiḥ dravyam evābhidhīyate /*
nahi sambandhavācyatvam sambhavaty atigauravāt //
TV 3.1.6.72.

(25) *niṣādapadam evātaḥ ṣaṣṭhyartha lakṣayed idam /*
karmadhārayapakṣe tu na kācid api lakṣaṇā //
Mayūkhamālikā 6.1.13.51

(26) *ataś ca ṣaṣṭhītatpuruṣe lakṣaṇāpatteḥ niṣādaścāsau sthapatiś ceti karmadhāraya evāyam*, *Bhaṭṭadīpikā* 6.1.12-51

(27) *yat tu karmadhārayepyuttarapada lakṣaṇayaiva nirvāha iti tan na, tathā sati lakṣaṇāśūnyatvena tadvataḥ ṣaṣṭhitatpuruṣāt karmadhārayasya balavattvam iti, niṣādasthapatyadhikaraṇeṣūktam dattajalāñjaliḥ syāt, vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa*(VB), *samāsaśaktinirṇaya* (SSN), T74.

(28) *bahuvrīhau tu pūrvottarayoḥ padayoḥ vidyamānasvārthatvāt anyasya cāpyadhikasya śabdāvayavasyābhāvāt piṅgatvākṣitvābhyām eva ca dravya pratyayasiddher na śakyam abhidheyatvam kalpayitum*, TV. 3.13.12.

(29) *na tvetad vyāpitvena śakyam āśrayitum karmadhāraye hyetad vyāpitvena syāt sarvathā lakṣaṇanimittopapatteḥ*, Ibid.

(30) *ekahā.nipadānāṃ tu bahuvrītvād avayavārtha viśiṣṭānyapadārtharūpe dravye eva śaktir iti prācīnaḥ anyapadārthe padadvayasya lakṣaṇeti tu bahavaḥ*, *Bhāṭṭadīpikā* 3.1.6.12.

(31) *yatra tu bahuvrīhyādau vācakāntarasattvam tattu padavyayasyaiva svārthaviśiṣṭānyapadārthe anya padārthamātre vā nirūḍhalakṣaṇā*, *Mīmāṃsākaustubha* - 3.1.12.

(32) *prācīnavaiyākaraṇoktarītyā kḷptaśaktyopapattiḥ,* VB *samāsaśaktinirṇaya*, T 54.

(33) *rājñaḥ puruṣa ityādau vigrahe samāsābhidhānāt luptā smṛtā ṣaṣṭhyaiva sambandhasmārikā ato na lakṣaṇā na vā śaktir ity eke,* TC, P. 759.

(34) *Vārt* 1 on P. 2.1.1. of *MBh* (Vol.I) P. 361.

(35) (i) *sub alopo avyavadhānam yatheṣṭam anyatareṇābhisambandhaḥ svāraḥ, Vārt* on P. 2.1.1., *MBh* (Vol.I) P. 362.

(ii) *saṅkhyāviśeṣo vyaktyābhidhānam upasarjanaviśeṣaṇam cayogaḥ*, Ibid.

(36) *MBh*, Vol. I, P. 361.

(37) *Ibid*, P. 364.

(38) *Ibid*, P. 367.

(39) *pṛthagarthānām ekārthībhāvaḥ samartham ity ucyate, kva punaḥ pṛthag arthāni kva ekārthāni? vākye pṛthag arthāni, rājñaḥ puruṣa iti, samāse punar ekārthāni, rājapuruṣa iti, Ibid*, pp. 361-62.

(40) *Ibid*, P. 361.

(41) *Ibid* P. 364.

(42) *Ibid*

(43) *Vākyapadīya* III. 14.49

(44) *Ibid* III 14.36,43.

(45) *ekārthībhāva evātaḥ samāsākhya vidhīyate/*
Ibid III 14.44

(46) *Ibid* III 14.94,97.

(47) *Ibid* III. 14.48 ; vide III. 14-47 also

(48) *samāse khalu bhinnaiva śaktiḥ paṅkajaśabdavat/*
Vaiyākaraṇasiddhāntakārikā . 31

(49) *cakārādiniṣedhotha bahuvyutpattibhañjanam /*
syān mahad gauravaṃ tasmāt ekārthībhāva āśritaḥ//
Ibid 32.

(50) *aṣaṣṭhyarthabahuvrīhau vyutpattyantarakalpanā /*
kḷptatyāgaścāsti tava tat kim śakatiḥ na kalpaye//
Ibid 33.

(51) The *Samāsaśaktinirṇaya* of Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa, T11-T13 pp. 110-11.

(52) *Ibid*, T12, P.111

(53) *Ibid*

(54) *Ibid*, T10, P.109

(55) *Ibid*, T 17, P. 115

(56) *Ibid*, T 19, P. 116

(57) *Ibid*, T 13, P. 112

(58) *Ibid*, T14, P. 113

(59) *Ibid*, T16, P. 114

(60) *Ibid*

(61) *Ibid*, T86, P. 176

(62) *Ibid*, T87, P. 176

(63) *Ibid*

(64) *Ibid*, T89, P. 179

(65) *Ibid*

(66) *samudāyonarthakaḥ*, *MBh* on *vārttika* of P. 1.2.48

(67) *Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī*, verse No. 82.

(68) *sup tiṅantaṃ padam* P. 1.4.14; *apadaṃ na prayuñjīta*, *MBh*

(69) *Paramalaghumañjuṣā*, *Samāsaśakti* chapter, P. 301.

(70) *Ibid* P. 308.

(71) *Ibid* P. 309.

(72) *Ibid*

(73) *Ibid*

(74) *Ibid*, PP. 308-309

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(9) *Tattvacintāmaṇi* of Gaṅgeśopādhyāya (Śabdakhaṇḍa) with comms. of Mathurānātha and Jayadeva Mishra, Vol. II, Part IV, Bibliotheca India, Calcutta - 1901.

(10) *Vākyapadīya* of Bhartṛhari (3rd *kāṇḍa*, Pt.2) with comm. *Prakīrṇaprakāśa* of Helārāja, ed. Ravi varma, L.A. Univ. of Travancore, 1942).

RŪPĀVATĀRA -A TURNIMG POINT IN PĀṆINIAN TRADITION

Ramakant Pandey

1-Introduction

The order of *sūtra*s adopted by Pāṇini is not very helpful to common students. Suppose, one desires to look into the *sūtra*s that form a word like *rāmaḥ,* he has to search from the very first chapter to the last chapter of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* (*Aṣṭa*) because the *sūtra, arthavad adhātur apratyayaḥ prātipadikam* occurs in the second *pāda* of the first chapter (1.2.450 in Pāṇini then *svaujasamauṭ........* in the first *pāda* of the fourth chapter (4.1.2), *sasajuṣoruḥ* in second *pāda* of eighth chapter (8.2.66), and *khar avasānayor visarjanīyaḥ* in the third *pāda* of the eighth chapter (8.3.15) of the *Aṣṭa.* Thus it can be said that the *sūtra* system of *Aṣṭa* is not meant for a beginner of Pāṇinian grammar.

The Pāṇinian tradition which was built successively by Kātyāyana, Patañjali, and their followers Vāmana, Jayāditya etc. by making a great contribution came to dominated by non-Pāṇinian traditions like *Kātantra, Cāndar* etc., because of its own sacred and difficult nature. Students of Pāṇinian grammar who were facing difficulties in the study of *Aṣṭa* became unsatisfies with this tradition.

The arrangement of *sūtra*s and the process of the forming the *rūpa*s in non-Pāṇinian traditions of Sanskrit grammar was so feasible only because of their simplicity. Since there was a particular system for *sūtra*s related to forms and they made it easier thereby. Hence, the students of Pāṇini were appreciating non-Pāṇinian tradition. In course of time, however, the arrangement of *sūtra*s and explaining them under specific chapters were made by stalwarts of the tradition. The *Rūpāvatāra* (Rp) is the result of such an attempt.

The rearrangement of the *Aṣṭa* in a new way is added to the tradition as *prakriyā* or new school of Sanskrit grammar in which *Prakriyākaumudī* (Pk) and *Vaiyākaraṇasiddhānta-Kaumudī* (Vsk) are well known. The work which paved the path to gradual development of this school in this direction is Rp which was composed by Dharmakīrti (Dk) a buddhist monk. It is the first text of its kind available to us and thus, it is considered as the point from where the *prakriyā* tradition initiated in the Pāṇinian study.

It should be noted that Dk borrowed the idea to systematise the *sūtra*s in the form of *prakriyā* from *kātantra* school of Sanskrit grammar. We find that the arrangement of topics etc. in *Kātantatravyākaraṇa* are similar to our author as the first part of *Kātantra* consists of *saṃjñāpāda* rules of froming *sandhi*, and *nipātapāda*. The second part introduces as *nāmaprakaraṇa* or *catuṣṭaya* and it deals with noun formations, compounds, *taddhita* suffixes and feminine suffixes. The third part has been named *ākhyāta* section dealing with conjugations. The fourth and last part deals with *kṛt* suffixes[1]. Dk also discussed the *kṛtparicchedа* at the end of his work.

The *Kātantra* follows the Pāṇini and tries to put it in a simpler form. Though it does not deal with the *pratyāhāra* system like Pāṇini, most of its *sūtra*s are similar to Pāṇinian *sūtra*s in their wording. For instance:

1- *in han pūṣāryamṇāṃ śau ca* -- (Ka. 2.2.21)
2- *uśanaḥ purūdaṃśonehasāṃ sāvanantaḥ*-(Ka. 2.2.22)

3- *panthi manthyubhukṣīṇāṃ sau--* (Ka. 2.2.35)[2]

It can be concluded by the above discussion that the idea of Dk recasting the Pāṇinian *sūtras* in a new way depends on the *Kātantra* itself.

It also is a notable point that the text of Pk identifies non-Pāṇinian forms also as its author seems to have borrowed some *prayogas* from *Mugdhabodha* grammar etc. but, Dk does not follow the same way. He is well aware of the prescriptive and sacred nature of Pāṇinian system. His work Rp is based on *Kāśikā* as it presents *sūtras* and *prayogas* etc. in the manner of *kāśikā*.[3] There are a number of *kārikās* and *ślokas* in RP which are borrowed from *Kāśikā* by its author. For example:

aniṭ svarāntc bhavatīti dṛśyatām, imāṃstu seṭaḥ pravadanti tadvidaḥ. adantamṛdantamṛtāñca vṛḍvṛñau khiḍiṅivarṇeṣvatha śīṅśriñāvapi.. śaktistu kānteṣvaniḍeka iṣyate, ghasiśca sānteṣu nasiḥ · prasāriṇī. rabhiṣca bhānteṣvatha maithune yabhiḥ, tatastṛtīyo labhireva netare.. asyānaṃ dṛṣadaṃ manye kāṣṭhamulūkhalam. andhāyāstaṃ sutaṃ manye mātā na paśyati.. [4]

There are many similarities between *Kāśikā* and RP by which we can prove that the author of RP has amply utilised the *kāśikā* in connection with composing his text.

2. *Sūtras* and their order in RP

The aim of composing the text of RP as its author has stated in the beginning is *bālaprabodhanārtha,*[5] i.e., to make beginners understand. With this idea in mind *sūtras* relating to a particular subject are grouped together under a specific topic from the various chapters of *Aṣṭa*. For example, *sūtras* related to *sandhi* are grouped in *sandhiprakaraṇa* and these are further grouped in sub-chapters as *tuksandhi, svarasandhi* etc. The order of *sūtra*s adopted by Pāṇini is set aside by the author of RP. He has tried to give a *vṛtti* on most of the *sūtra*s without taking recourse to *anuvṛtti* principle as Pāṇinian order of *sūtra*s is mainly based on the principle of *anuvṛtti,* which one cannot understand without its help.

In some chapters (for example, *taddhita* etc., which begins from 4.1.76 i.e. *taddhitāḥ* to 5.4.67 in Pāṇini) the order of the *sūtra*s as in the *Aṣṭa* is kept intact. But as per the need Dk repeats the same *sūtra* over again.

We find that DK has commented upon only 2,664 (Two thousand Six Hundred and Sixtyfour) *sūtra*s from Pāṇini in his work.[6] *sūtra*s which are laid down by Pāṇini exclusively for the vedic language are not taken up by our author. *Sūtra*s which are not too much related to classical language or without which the practice of language is not very much hampered, have also been omitted. For instance, *sūtra*s as given below could not find place in the RP-

1. *prahāse ca manyopapade manyateruttam ekavacca* (1.4.106)
2. *kālavibhāge cānahorātrāṇām* (3.3.137)
3. *parasmin vibhāṣā* (3.3. 18)
4. *aka jīvikārthe* (6.2. 73)
5. *akṣṇo'darśanāt* (5.4. 76)
6. *nādinyākothe putrasya* (8.4. 48)
7. *purā ca parīpsāyām* (8.1. 42)
8. *putrāccha ca* (5.1. 40)

We can guess from the above account that DK has omitted a number of *sūtra*s from the various chapters of the

Aṣṭa. Similarly, some *sūtras* are explained repeatedly as per the need of that particular form. A few example may be given as:

Sūtras	Page No.
1. *acoñṇiti*	46,59 Vol.I (repeated twice)
2. *avyayādāpsupaḥ*	26, 129, 166 Vol. I
3. *iko jhal*	117, 144, 187, 193 Vol.II
4. *bhūte*	51, 19, 142, 235, 273 Vol. II
5. *liṅ sicāvātmane padeṣu*	115, 117, 118, 144, 154, 155 Vol. II (repeted as many as six times)

Among the later *prakriyā* texts *Rūpamālā* and PK both explain some *sūtras* number of times which can be considered as the influence of RP in them. But this system is not adopted in Vsk. We find that the author of Vsk does not interprete some *sūtras* whose meaning is obvious in their form itself. For example, *nīcair anudāttaḥ* (1.2.20), *jhalām jaś jhaśi* (8.4.43) and so on. But DK has interpreted all the *sūtras* accepted in the RP. He has given a *vṛtti* on *utsādibhyo'añ* (4.1.86), *śivadibhyo'ṇ* (4.1.115), and *godhāyā ḍhak* (4.1.129) also which are not much in the need of explanation.

3. The arrangement of the topics-

The simplification of Pāṇinian *sūtras* was the aim of DK. He composed his work to keep these *sūtras* intact and rearranged them in a simpler way. he kept together all the *sūtras* dealing with the same grammatical operation in a place.

RP is divided into two main parts viz., *pūrvārdha* and *uttarārdha*. The first part of this is divided into eight chapters called *avatāras* or manifestations viz. *saṃjñā avatāra* or manifestation of technical terms, *saṃhitā avatāra* or manifestation of close proximity between founds, *vibhakti avatāra* or manifestation of nominal inflection, *avyaya avatāra* or manifestation of affixes, *kāraka avatāra* or manifestation of *kāraka*s, *samāsa avatāra* or manifestation of compounds. In RP *paribhāṣā*s are not described separately. But it is interesting to note that the first *avatāra* of RP deals with terms strictly limited to *saṃhitā*. The other technical terms are introduced elsewhere if and when they become necessary.

The second part of RP is presented under the general title of *dhātupratyayapañjikā* and divided into three main *pariccheda*s viz. *sārvadhātuka, ārdhadhātuka* and *kṛt*. the whole of the second part consists of twenty-two *prakaraṇa*s. The first division i.e. *sārvadhātuka pariccheda* is accumulated in five sub-chapters viz. *laṭ, laṅ, loṭ, liṅ* and *yak* whereas the *ārdhadhātuka pariccheda* in fifteen subchapters viz. *āśīrliṅ, liṭ* and *luṭ* etc. The third and last *pariccheda* i.e. *kṛt pariccheda* is divided into two sub-chapters viz., *kṛt* and *kṛtya*. The division of second part is based on classification of affixes introduced after verbal roots. The *uṇādi* etc., are omitted here. Similarly, there is no separate chapter for *pādavyavasthā,* the changes being given under the respective roots themselves.

To start a new *prakaraṇa* or *avatāra,* the author of RP puts a question and then explains a particular rule. As in *kāraka avatāra- kāḥ punarvibhaktayaḥ? su au jas iti prathamā-- ityevamādayaḥ.kasminnarthe prathamā? prātipadkārtha-liṅgaparimāmaṇavacanamātre prathamā* (2.3.46). *kiṃ prātipadikam? arthavadadhāturapratyayaḥ prātipadikam* (1.2.45) *anarthakasyāpi nipātasya prātipadikasaṃjñeṣyate*[7].

Else where *ke punaḥ strīpratyayāḥ? ṭāp, ḍāp, cāp, ṅīp, ṅīṣ, ūṅ, ti ityete strīpratyayāḥ.*[8]

The paraphrases of the RP as we have seen above, are much simpler than the later *prakriyā* texts. One, who has a little background of Sanskrit grammar, can understand the process of derivation himself. DK has defined every technical term in a very simpler way.

For instance-

kā ca saṃhitā? paraḥ sannikarṣaḥ saṃhitā (1.4.109) *paraśabdo'trātiśaye vartate. sannikarṣaḥ pratyāsattiḥ. paro yassannikarṣo ardhamātrākālavyavadhānaḥ sa saṃhitāsaṃjño bhavati.*[9]

The closest proximity of letters (their being the intervention of half a *mātrā* or prosodial length between them) is called contact or *saṃhitā*.

It follows from the above treatment that the notion of *prakaraṇa* or topics in the RP is conceived in view of particular derivational types. The Pāṇinian order of *sūtras* is disturbed here and a *vṛtti* on a *sūtra* is given to understand the meaning of that particular rule.

4. Details of derivation-

The RP is nothing but an arrangement of the rules in an order which is helpful to follow easily the derivations of particular forms which are given in detail here. For example:-

deva+iha iti sthite adeṅ guṇaḥ (1.2.2) *adeṅau guṇasaṃjñau bhavataḥ. ekaḥ pūrvaparayoḥ* (6.1.87) *avarṇādaci parataḥ guṇo bhavati ekaḥ pūrvaparayoranyatamaḥ. deveha.*[10]

DK is very clear in the process derivation. He gives a particular word to show the process of derivation. He gives a particular word to show the process of derivation and does not hesitate to repeat the *sūtra*s again and again.

While describing the declension DK clearly presents the process of derivation of words related to various genders. After having dealt with introductory part of the topic, in the declension of masculine ending in *a*, he takes the word *vṛkṣa* to show the process of getting the same in nominative singular-

arthavatvāt prātipadikasañjñāyāṃ svādyutpattiḥ. tathaiva prathamaikavacanam su. ukāralopāt vṛkṣa+sa iti jāte sasajuṣo ruḥ (8.2.66) *iti padāntasya sasya ruḥ. atha vṛkṣa +ra iti jāte virāmo'vasānam* (1.4.110) *virāmo varṇānāmabhāvaḥ so'vasānasaṃjño bhavati. kharavasānayorvisarjanīyaḥ* (8.3.15) *iti visarjanīyaḥ. tasmāt vṛkṣaḥ.. yathā vṛkṣastiṣṭhati.* [11]

At the end of the forming of the *rūpa*s, somewhere, he gives a particular *śloka* related to that form. As-
vṛkṣastiṣṭhati kānane kusumitā vṛkṣaṃ latā saṃśritā.
vṛkṣeṇābhihato gajo nipatito vṛkṣāya deyaṃ jalam..
vṛkṣe nīḍamidaṃ kṛtaṃ śakuninā he vṛkṣa kiṃ kampase.. [12]

This style of interpreting the farm no doubt is much helpful to beginners.

The second part of the RP which is introduced as *dhātupratyayapañjīkā* deals with conjugations. Here, as we have seen, chapters are divided on the basis of suffixes and DK has given the process of forming of conjugations in a very simple way-

edha vṛddhau. akāra ātmanepadārthaḥ. dhātusaṃjñāyāṃ pūrvavallaṭ. anubandhalopaḥ. anudāttaṅita ātmanepadam (1.3.12) *anudānteto ye dhātavo ṅitcaśca tebhyaḥ parasya lakārasya sthāne ātmanepadaṃ bhavati. aco'ntyādi ṭi* (1.1.64) *acāṃ sanniviṣṭānāṃ madhye yo'ntyo'c tadādiśabdasvarūpaṃ ṭisañjñaṃ bhavati. ṭita ātmanepadānāṃ ṭere* (3.4.79) *ṭito lakārasya sthāne yānyātmanepadāni vihitāni teṣāṃ ṭerekārādeśo bhavati. edhate.* [13]

In later *prakriyā* texts, there is no scope for this type of simplification. They do not give a full idea to form any declension or conjugation in a place as RP.

5. Contribution of RP to *prakriyā* tradition.

Although RP is first and successful attempt at *prakriyā* tradition of Pāṇinian grammar, it did not influentially utilised by later followers of this school. Nārāyaṇabhaṭṭa, the author of *Prakriyā sarvasva,* in opening verse of his work, criticises DK. He says- *vṛttau cāru na rūpasiddhikathanam rūpāvatāre punaḥ*. But it is just his ignorance.

We find that RP gives quite a few Pāṇinian *sūtra*s and *vārttika*s with a number of examples. He also has tried to give some ideas to keep a particular topic in a better position. For instance, his direction towards *sandhi*s-

> *tuk svaraḥ prakṛtiścaiva vyañjanaṃ ca tataḥ param.*
> *tato visarjanīyaśca sāvādiḥ ṣaḍsandhirūcyate..* [14]

But the later followers have not considered *tuk* as independent *sandhi.* It is described under the *vyañjana sandhi* in later texts. When we compare the view of DK and that of his followers who kept the *tuk* in the boundary of *vyañjana sandhi,* we find that DK's judgement is better than his followers.

There are four *sūtras* related to augment *tuk* (i.e. *t*) introduced under the *adhikāra* of rule *saṃhitāyām* (6.1.72) in *Aṣṭa.* They are :- *che ca* (6.1.73), *āṅmāṅośca* (6.1.74), *dīrghāt* (6.1.75) and *padāntād vā* (6.1.76). An another *sūtra* i.e., *śi tuk* (8.3.31) related to *tuk* is also introduced in the *Aṣṭa.* Here we must remember that the *sūtra, śi tuk* is out of the *adhikāra* of rule *saṃhitāyām* (6.1.72) and this optionally adds augment *tuk* to a word ending in *n* when a word beginning with *śa* follows. This *sūtra* is considered in the chapter of *vyañjana sandhi* by DK as it adds *tuk* after a consonant.

Sūtras che ca etc., do not require any consonant or vowel to add *tuk* and therefore DK kept them in independent topic *tuk.*

Some contributions of DK to *pṛakriyā* tradition are as under :-

a. The word *sandhi* introduced for first time in RP.

b. His *avyayas* like *taka, hākā, hāhau, haihā, mamasā, masamasā, īhā* etc., are new to Sanskrit grammar.

c. *'tvaṃ brāhmaṇī' ahaṃ brāhmaṇī ity ādau tāb abhāvāya'aliṅge yuṣmad asmad'* by this *patañjali* treats the words *yuṣmad* and *asmad* as non-gender. DK also defines these words in a separate chapter named as *halanteṣu aliṅga prakaraṇa.* [15]

d. He has made *dhātu pratyaya pañjikā* more understandable for beginners as he explains the particular effects of all *anubandhas* added to roots.

e. He gives some examples also in poetic form which are not accepted before him in the tradition. As in *vīpsā* -

īkṣamīkṣaṃ tadā bālā rodaṃ cabhūmanu.

āyamāyaṃ nivṛntāyā jīvedekākinī katham.. [16]

6. Conclusion

After having discussed DK's RP above, we may conclude from of that the attempt of DK towards making a new tradition to the study Pāṇinian grammar was a point from where the scholars of this tradition came to a quite new direction and started the interpretation of the *sūtra*s by rearranging their order adopted by Pāṇini.

We find that in grammatical tradition which consists of *sūtra, vṛtti, vārttika*s and *bhāṣya* etc. The order of *sūtra*s adopted by Pāṇini was never changed before DK. It is DK who contributed new trend namely that of *prakriyā* or derivation to this study for the first time and thus, he is an innovator of derivation method in the Pāṇinian school.

As it is the first attempt towards this tradition, it does not include all the *sūtra*s, *phiṭsūtra*s, *gaṇapāṭha* and *dhātu* etc., but the idea of derivation method in Paninan study is DK's own experiment the first of its kind. The system of RP was followed by various authors of this tradition and *rūpamālā, prakriyāratnākara,* PK, VSK etc. came to us as its effect.

The revolutionary work of this tradition VSK was composed by *Bhaṭṭoji* where all the *sūtra*, *phiṭsūtra*, *gaṇapāṭha* etc., are included and which became very popular is preceded by RP of DK. But RP did not attain much popularity, perhaps due to over-simplification[17] or perhaps because he is not as comprehensive as Bhaṭṭoji in his VSK is.

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DIMENSIONS OF DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

Korada Subrahmanyam

Linguists in Western Hemisphere are still struggling to reach an agreement on a viable theory of Discourse - a group of sub-sentences, which render a unitary meaning. On the other hand, the ancient Indian intelligentsia had thousands of years ago propounded and expounded the theory of Discourse or *mahāvākya*. Mostly, the *mahatva* lies in *śabda* rather than *Artha*. The speaker employs a *vākya* (sentence) if he intends to express an *Artha* that is short and a *mahāvākya* if the *Artha* is large. *Avāntaravākya*s (sub-sentences) are the constituents of a *mahāvākya* and they correspond to *pada*s (words) in a *vākya*. Relations both at syntactic and semantic levels are common in a *vākya* and *mahāvākya*.

Jaimini, the author of *Pūrvamīmāṃsāsūtra*s, offered a definition that is applicable to both *vākya* and *mahāvākya*-

arthaikatvādekam vākyam sākāṅkṣamcedvibhāge syāt

(If a single purport /purpose is served and if the parts, when separated, are found to be wanting, that is a *vākya*). In this *sūtra*, *vākyam* refers to both a *vākya* and a *mahāvākya*. *Pada*s are parts in a sentence, whereas *avāntaravākya*s are in a *mahāvākya*. The term "*artha*" in the *sūtra* means a thing or purpose or purport. Therefore, in the case of a *mahāvākya* all the sub-sentences must end in a single purport or serve a single purpose. When separated, the *avāntaravākya*s must have mutual expectancy or *ākāṅkṣā*. *Ākāṅkṣā* entails *yogyatā* (compatibility) and *āsatti* (proximity). Consequently, all the three prerequisites. i.e. *ākāṅkṣā*. *Yogyatā* and *āsatti* are needed in the case of *mahāvākya* also. The conspicuous distinction between a *vākya* and a *mahāvākya* is that the *avāntaravākya*s would have *ākāṅkṣā* extended to a far away place. *videśasthamapi sadekaṃ vākyam bhavati* - says Patañjali. *Tena śākhāntaroktānāmapi pradhānavākyena samabhivyāharaḥ*- rules Kumārilabhaṭṭa. *Arthaikatva* and *ekavākyatā* are synonymous. *Ekavākyatā* is of two types - *padaikavākyatā* and *vākyaikavākyatā*. The former is there in a *vākya* and the latter in a *mahāvākya*. On the other hand, in certain cases, *padaikavākyatā* is found in *mahāvākya* also, *paṭo bhavati* - is a sentence and when the same gets connection with a *viśeṣaṇa* - '*raktaḥ*' through *padaikavākyatā*, then it would become a *mahāvākya*. This was explained by Śavarasvāmī. *Nodyantamādityamīkṣeta*- is another example. The background of such a contention goes like this- there are sentences of commendation and condemnation, called *Arthavāda*s in Vedic Literature. The purpose of such sentences is to create an urge in the minds of the readers to perform the sacrifice and as such they do not ordain any injunction or *vidhi*. Consequently, Such sentences would become null and void. According to *Mīmāṃsaka*s, each and every *vākya* in *Vedas* is meaninglful and useful in advocating performance of some sacrifice or the other (*āmnāyasya kriyārthatvāt* ......). In order to see that the *Arthavāda*s are not rendered meaningless/ useless. Jaimini ruled that the *Arthavādavākya*s are to be construed alongwith the *vidhivākya*s, as they are eulogistic in nature. Consequently, the *Arthavādavākya*s are replaced by a word like *stutyaḥ* and the same gets *padaikavākyatā* with the *vidhivākya*. Rather the purport of both types of *Arthavāda*s is *stuti* only. This is clarified by Śavarasvāmī- *na hi nindā nindyaṃ ninditum prayujyate, api tu stutyaṃ stotum* (censure is not used to condemn the wicked but to indirectly praise the worthy. The descriptions made in *kāvya*s are akin to

*Arthavāda*s. The *varṇana*s as is obvious are needed for *kāntāsammitatayā upadeśayuje* and they support the *upadeśa*, i.e.,*rāmavadvartitavyaṃ na tu rāvaṇādivat, dharmarājādivadvartitavyaṃ na tu duryodhanādivat* etc. Kumārila endorses this view in *Tantravārtika* - *evaṃ bhāratādi vākyāni vyākhyeyāni*.

The following passage is found in *Yajurveda* -*vāyavyaṃ śvetamālabheta bhūktikāmaḥ, vāyurvai kṣepiṣṭhā devatā* etc. Here the first sentence is a *vidhivākya* and the rest is *Arthavāda*. Consequently, the following *mahāvākya* is formed- *stutyaṃ vāyavyaṃ śvetaṃ bhūktikāmaḥ ālabheta*.

In order to decide *ekavākyatā* in a passage, at semantic level, *Mīmāṃsaka*s offered certain devices like *aṅgāṅgibhāva*, *śeṣaśeṣibhāva*, *upakāryopakārakabhāva* and *guṇaguṇibhāva*. At syntactic level all these *bhāva*s reflect in the form of *viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāva*. Here is . an example *darśapūrṇamāsābhyāṃ svargakāmo yajeta* is a *phalavākya*, which tells about the *phala* of *Darśa* and *Pūrṇamāsa*. It has got the *itikartavyatākāṅkṣā* i.e. expects other sentences to tell as to how to perform *Darśa* and *Pūrṇamāsa*. *Iḍā yajati, samidho yajati, tanunapātaṃ yajati* etc. are sentences which indicate the process of performing the said yagas. But they have *phalākāṅkṣā* -expect other sentence to tell as to what the *phala* is. In other words, the *phalavākya* is called the *aṅgivākya* and the latter *aṅgavākya*s. Since there is *ākāṅkṣā* on both sides (*prakaraṇam*) a *mahāvākya* is thus formed - *iḍāsamittānupadyāṅgasahitābhyāṃ daśapūrṇamāsābhyāṃ svargakāmo yajeta*.

svārthabodhe samāptānāṃ aṅgāṅgitvavyapekṣayā.
vākyānāmekavākyatvaṃ punaḥ saṃhatya jāyate..

declares Kumārila in *Tantravārtika*. The *Avāntaravākya*s would have a full meaning but also possess expectancy based on *aṅgāṅgibhāva* etc. and thus get united (to render a unitary meaning).

The *Avāntaravākya*s in a *Mahāvākya* are not to be taken authoritatively says Śavarasvāmī -

na ca mahāvākye satyavāntaravākyaṃ pramāmaṃ bhavati padāntarasya bādhanāt. yathā nodyantamādityamīkṣate iti niṣedho gamyate mahāvākyāt. avāntaravākyādīkṣaṇavidhānam.

Kumārila brings similarity with *mahāsaṅkhyā* and *avāntarasaṅkhyā* - *Vedāntin*s enumerated six deciding factors of purport -

upakramopasaṃhārauvabhyāso'pūrvatā phalam.
arthavādopapattiśca liṅgatātparyanirṇaye..

beginning and end, repetition, novelty, result, commendation / condemnation and the reasoning are the six factors. If a passage or *upaniṣad* consists of all the six factors then it is fit to be called a *mahāvākya*. Rather the sentence which renders the gist or purport is given the *saṃjñā-mahāvākya*, which is secondary. On the other hand the *saṃjñā* here is given to a sentence since it is loaded with meaning. *Tattvamasi*, *ayamātmā paraṃ brahma* etc. are examples.

*Pūrvamīmāṃsaka*s have accepted *upakrama* and *upasaṃhāra* as the deciding factors in certain cases (*ekopakramasaṃharādekaṃ cedaṃ prairyate*- Kumārila). The rest of the analysis of *Vedāntin*s runs in the same way of *Mīmāṃsaka*s. *Upakramopasaṃhārābhyāṃ hi vākyaikatvamavagamyate*- says Śaṅkara. *Tattu samanvayāt* - is a *sūtra* that explains *ekavākyatā* in upanisadic sentences, which have got *brahman* as the purport. *rāmavadvartitavyamaṃ na tu rāvaṇādivat* etc. can be styled *mahāvākya*s in line with *Vedānta*.

Nyāya and *Vaiśeṣika* systems adopted the theory of *mahāvākya* while analysing the *pañcāvayavavākya* for *parārthānumāna- parvato vahnimān, dhūmāt, yo yo dhūmavān sa sa vahnimān yathā mahānasaḥ. tathā cāyam, tasmāttathā*. All the five *avāntaravākya*s have got mutual expectancy with each other. The main difference in this regard between *Naiyāyika*s and *Vaiśeṣika*s is in nomenclature - *pratijñāhetūdāharaṇopanayanigamanānyavayavāḥ-* says Akṣapāda. Praśastapāda proposed the following way - *pratijñāpadeśanidarśanānusandhānapratyāmnāyāḥ*. The group of five *vākya*s is called *Nyāya*.

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So for as the *Vyākaraṇaśāstra* is concerned, it can be asserted that without applying the concept of *mahāvākya*, it is not possible to effect a single application. There are six types of *sūtra*s in *Vyākaraṇa* - *saṃjñā, paribhāṣā, vidhi, niyama, adhikāra* and *atideśa, vidhisūtra* is principal and the rest are subordinates and the relation of *śeṣaśeṣibhāva* between *vidhisūtra* and others is established. Bhartṛhari clearly states in *vākyakāṇḍa* of *Vākyapadīyam-*

viśeṣavidhinārthitvād vākyaśeṣo'numīyate .
niyamaḥ pratiṣedhaśca vidhiśeṣastathā sati ..

Sūtra means an elliptical sentence of *vākyaikadeśa*. In fact, *upadeśa* in *śāstra*s and *darśana*s is done thru *ekavākyatā* only and the same is much more conspicuous in *Vyākaraṇa*. Here is Kumārila --

sarvāṇyeva hi śāstrāṇi svapradeśāntaraiḥ saha .

> *ekavākyatayā yuktamupadeśaṃ pratanvate..*

Vibhāṣā sākāṅkṣe - is a *sūtra* where Pāṇini took up the analysis of a *mahāvākya* - *abhijānāsi Devadatta, yat kāśmīreṣu vatsyāmaḥ tatrādhyeṣyāmahe.* Here the first sentence has got the *ākāṅkṣā* of the latter - *tatrādhyeṣyāmahe*. Therefore, it is clear that *vaiyākaraṇas* had adapted the definition of Jaimini. i.e. *arthaikatvādekaṃ vākyaṃ sākāṅkṣaṃ cedvibhāge syāt,* as it is in the case of a *vākya*, Bhartṛhari summarises the concept ---

> *vākyānāṃ samudāyaśca ya ekārthoprasiddhaye.*
> *sākāṅkṣāvayavastatra ... ...*

The *vākyārthas* in a *mahāvākya* are akin to *padārthas* in a *vākyārtha* says Bhartṛhari ---

> *sāpekṣā ye tu vākyārthāḥ padārthairiva te samāḥ.*

So far as the length of a *mahāvākya* is concerned, there is no limit. Both Bhartṛhari and Kumārila clarified the position --

> *na ca vākyarūpāvadhiparigrahe niyamo'sti, kadātit devadatta gāmabhyājeti kadācit devadatta gāmabhyāja śuklāmiti; vākyaikatvāccārthādhikatve'vadhāryamāṇe'vaśyamarthanirapekṣaṃ vākyaikatvamavagantavyaṃ na ca tasyāvadhitvena kiñcit paśyāmo varṇaśataṃ varṇasahasraṃ vā.*

An interesting point in the analysis of a *mahāvākya* is that it is a defect/*doṣa*, called *vākyabheda*, to split a *mahāvākya* when there is *ekavākyatā*. Kumārila rules --

> *sambhavatyekavākyatve vākyabhedastu neṣyate.*

Viśvanātha defines a *mahāvākya* thus in *Sāhityadarpaṇa*--

> *vākyoccayo mahāvākyaṃ, yogyatākāṅkṣāsattiyukta eva yathārāmāyaṇamahābhārataraghuvaṃśādi.*

In *kāvyas* a single *rasa* is taken as principal and the same is nourished throughout the *kāvya* and thus *ekavākyatā* is maintained. Ānandavardhana clearly states this --

prabandhe cāṅgī rasa eka evopanibaddhyamāno'rthaviśeṣalābhaṃ chāyātiśaye ca puṣṇāti--kasminniveti cēt, yathā rāmāyaṇe yathā vā mahābhārate.

Bhojarāja in eighth chapter of *Śṛṅgāraprakāśa* proposed that *mahāvākya* is *śabdabrahma*. Under *kāvyaliṅga alaṅkāra*, Paṇḍitarāja discusses *mahāvākyadhvani*.

The following *vākovākyam* cited by Bhojarāja is a good example of a *mahāvākya* --

bāle! nātha! vimuñca mānini ruṣaṃ roṣānmayā kiṃ kṛtaṃ
khedo'smāsu, na me'parādhyati bhavān sarveparādhā mayi.
tatkiṃ rodiṣi gadgadena vacasā kasyāgrato rudyate
nanvetanmama kā tavāsmi dayitā nāsmītyato rudyate..

Finally, *vākyam*, *mahāvākyam*, *śabdaḥ*, *prabandhaḥ*, *vākyāntaram*, *Nyāyaḥ*, *granthaḥ* etc. are the terms used in the sense of a *mahāvākya*. A detailed account of the subject is available in my work viz. *Mahāvākyavicāraḥ*.

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MAHĀVĀKYA AND LIBERATION

Radhavallabh Tripathi

Replying to *Indra*'s arguments comprising a plea for renouncement, *Arjuna* says in Bhāravi's *Kirātārjunīyam* - (XI.43)-

Avijñātaprabandhasya vaco vācaspaterapi
vrajatyaphalatāmeva nayadruha ivehitam..

(Even the utterance of a Vācaspati becomes fruitless if he does not know the *prabandha,* like the intentions of a man who stands against good policy).

Here Mallinātha has translated *prabandha* as *pūrvāparasaṃgatiḥ,* i.e., consistency or context. Bhāravi seems to suggest that a man speaking out of context looses consistency and his utterances cannot culminate into a *mahāvākya,* and they do not become means for the salvation.

Viśvanātha is the first author who discusses the concept of *mahāvākya* in the field of Sanskrit Poetics. To him, there are two types of *vākya*s (sentencial construct)- *vākya* (sentence) and *mahāvākya* (discourse). *vākya* is an assemblage of words which have *ākāṃkṣā, yogyatā* and *sannidhi* and *mahāvākya* is a combination of *vākya*s forming `*ekavākyatā*' (consistency). Verses of *Amaruka* such as *Śūnyaṃ vāsagṛham* --etc., are examples of *vākya* and epics like *Rāmāyaṇa, Mahābhārata, Raghuvaṃśa* etc , are examples of *mahāvākya.* [1]

Both *vākya* and *mahāvākya* thus are formed through an assemblage. The *vākya* is formed through an assemblage of words and the *mahāvākya* is formed through an assemblage of sentences. The logic behind the assemblage of words in a *vākya*; i.e, that these words should possess the qualities of *ākāṃkṣā*, *yogyatā* and *sannidhi* should apply to the assemblage of *vākya*s or sentences in a *mahāvākya* too. Jaimini therefore rightly attributes the qualities of *ākāṃkṣā* etc., to the sentences of a *mahāvākya* and he also defines the mutual relationships of these sentences viz., *guṇaguṇibhāva, śeṣaśeṣibhāva* etc.

A *śāstra* or scientific work can be termed as a *mahāvākya*. So also a piece of poem. The difference between the two lies in the former's persuit for knowledge and in latter's persuit for *Rasa*. Both of them have a harmony of form and content. By defining transformational rules which function as a bridge between the surface structure and deep structure, Chomsky also emphasises over this harmony.

Contextual synthesis is *sine qua non* for the formulation of a *mahāvākya*. However a micro-context does not lead to the formulation of a *mahāvākya*. A *mahāvākya* is embued with a macro-context. *Raghuvaṃśa* is a *mahāvākya* because of macro-context, *Ṛtusaṃhāra* does not tend to become a *mahāvākya*, because it is limited to a micro-context only.

The macro-context of a *mahāvākya* leads to an understanding of *vidhi* and *niṣedha* and this understanding leads to the attainment of *puruṣārtha*.

Aruṇagirinātha has presented a fine analysis of the whole structure of *Raghuvaṃśa* as a single unified discourse. He raises the question- If a *prabandha* or literary work becomes a *mahāvākya* because it leads to the understanding of *vidhi* and *niṣedha* and subsequently leads to a *puruṣārtha,* how can *Raghuvaṃśa* be termed as a *mahāvākya* when it consists of diverse characters or different lives of kings? Aruṇagiri proposes that there is a unified design in the diversity of contents in Kālidāsa's epic leading to the understanding of *vidhi* and *niṣedha* and thus the attainment of *puruṣārtha.* [2]

Abhinavagupta was earlier confronted with a similar question regarding the structure of *samavakāra,* one of the major forms of drama. A *samavakāra* is supposed to have three types of deceptions (*Kapaṭa*s) , three types of disturbances (*vidrava*s) and three types of *śṛṅgāra*s. It has twelve heroes with different themes in its three acts. Then how can a *samavakāra* project a single unified structure and form a discourse? Abhinavagupta also finds a synthesis in the thematic and structural diversity of *samavakāra* which in the same way leads to *puruṣārtha.*[3]

The diversity of a *mahāvākya* can be explained through the model of a tree. Despite diverse branches, numerous leaves or flowers, a tree has a single unified structure. The tree germinates from a single seed and its sprouting, stemming and flowering finally leads to the culmination in the same seed. Incidentally, Bharatamuni has also used the tree-imagery to explain *Rasa*-synthesis in the performance of drama.[4]

Ānandavardhana says that a poet can achieve heights of *Rasa*-synthesis in a single verse equal to an epic poem. If we analyse or de-construct such a verse it will reveal a diversity of emotions, states or characters and will finally lead to the understanding of *vidhi* or *niṣedha* to culminate in a *puruṣārtha*. For example the following verse by Amaruka-

Likhānnāste bhūmiṃ bahikhanataḥ prāṇadayito
nirāhārāḥ sakhyaḥ satataruditocchūnanayanāḥ
parityaktaṃ sarvaṃ hasitapaṭhitaṃ pañjaraśukai
stavāvasthā ceyaṃ visṛja kaṭhine mānamadhunā..

The five sentences in this verse reveal five different activities and a multi-layered time-scale. The utter dejection being experienced at present revives the memory of the days that are begone, the ecstasy of love which belongs to the past.

Incidentally Viśvanātha has cited a verse by the same poet as the example of a *vākya*.

Śūnyaṃ vāsagṛhaṃ vilokya śanakairutthāya kiñcicchanaiḥ
nidrābyājamupāgatasya suciraṃ nirvarṇya patyurmukham
viśrabdhaṃ paricumbya jātapulakāmālokya gaṇḍasthalīṃ
lajjānamramukhī priyeṇa hasatā bālā ciraṃ cumbitā ..

This verse fails to become a *mahāvākya*. It is a mere *vākya,* as it presents the picture of a moment. The scene is laid down in the bed-room. The husband is pretending sleep and the lady kisses him out of love, so that he rises up laughing and gives her prolonged kisses to her shame. There is no such diversity and multi-layered structure of time and space in this verse as in the earlier one. A poet can weave a *mahāvākya* in a single verse, or he may just compose a *vākya*. As is the case with Amaruka here. It is also possible that a poet weaves a lengthy poem and it may not turn out to be a *mahāvākya*. A poet like Amaruka having a tendency for *vākya*-poems may also compose *mahāvākya* poem, and a poet like Kālidāsa gifted with the genius for composing *mahāvākya*-poems, may compose *vākya*-poems too. The understanding arising out of a poem can be the deciding factor for adjusting the same as a *vākya* or a *mahāvākya*. Aruṇagirinātha[5] has defined this understanding as '*pratipatti*', a term used by Kālidāsa in the very first stanza of *Raghuvaṃśa*. The poet is liberated by composing a *mahāvākya* as he gains '*pratipatti*' by composing it. A connoisseure is also liberated by going through his poem as he too attains the '*pratipatti*' after relishing it. Poetry thus opens the doors for liberation.

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2. *Śivayorupādānācca sarvarasāśrayatvaṃ sarvapuruṣārthahetutvaṃ ca. Yatastāvevādau rasābhinayanaṃ kurvāṇau nāṭyavedaṃ pravartitavantau. Puruṣārthahetutvaṃ ca tayoḥ prasiddham. Atra dilīpādicarite bhūyasā dharmasya vyutpattiḥ, vīraśca rasaḥ. Raghvādicarite'rthasya tasyaivāntyāśramālambane mokṣasya, śāntaśca rasaḥ. Agnivarṇacaritādau kāmasya, śṛṅgāraśca. Ajapralāpādau karuṇarasaḥ. Tāṭakāvṛttāntādau bībhatsaḥ. Śūrpaṇakhāvṛttāntādau hāsyaḥ. Taddarśanādau sītādeḥ bhayānakaḥ. jāmadagnyavarṇane raudraḥ. māyāsiṃhetivṛttādau adbhutaḥ. Nanu vidhiniṣedhāvagatiheturmahāvākyaṃ prabandha iti hi prabandhalakṣaṇam. Atra ca nānāphalāntānāṃ nānārājacaritānāṃ upanibandhe kathamekavākyatā. arthaikatvāddhyekaṃ vākyam. Ucyate, atrāpyeka eva vaṃśalakṣaṇo'rtha upanibaddhaḥ. Vidhiniṣedhāvagatiścaikaṃ phalam. Yathā parikathāyām. Avāntaravākyānāṃ tu prabandhāyamānānām sandhisandhyaṅgādisarvaṃ nirūpyameva.* (**Aruṇagirinātha Com. on *Raghuvaṃśa, Tripunithura*** Ed. p. 4-5.

3. *Arthatrayaṃ ca kapaṭavidravaśṛṅgārāḥ pratyekaṃ trividhāstatra pratyaṅkam vidravādayastrayastathāhi kapaṭa upāyāṃśe vidravo vyāpattisambhāvanāṃśe śṛṅgāra phalāṃśe, evaṃ dvitīye'ṅke tṛtīye ca. dvādaśanāyakabahula iti pratyaṅkamiti kecit. anye tu pratyaṅkam nāyakapratināyakau tatsahāyau ceti caturāhuḥ samudāyāpekṣayā hi dvādaśeti. Saprahasana iti vacanāt prathame'ṅke kāmaśṛṅgāraḥ prayojya ityāha tatraiva hāsyasyāgamanāt. stri yopeta iti kāma śṛṅgārātmakaṃ dvādaśaghaṭikāmadhyasampādyaiḥ kapaṭavidravaprahasanalakṣaṇairupāyaiḥ prāpte prathamāṅke nibadhnīyāditi tātparyam. Dvitīye tvaṅke ghaṭikācatuṣṭayagāmibhiḥ kapaṭādibhirupāyaiḥ, tṛtīye tvaṅke sarvaṃ vastu samāpyate dvighaṭikāntarasampādyairupāyaiḥ yadyapi pratyaṅkam vastuparisamāptirasti tathāpi tṛtīye vastusamāptigrahaṇenedamāha bīje tāvadaṅkatrayārtha upakṣeptavyaḥ, tadanantaramaṅkadvaye'vāntara-vākyārtha-samāptiranyonyaviśiṣṭaiva vidheyā. Tṛtīye tvaṅkevāntaravākyārthaḥ. tṛtīyastābhyāṃ pratisambaddhaḥ. Evaṃ mahāvākyārthanirvāhahetusambaddhataiva sarvasya jāyate. evaṃ hi sānusandhānā vitatadṛśo'pi trivargasiddhyupāyavyutpattyanugṛhītā bhavati, niranusandhānāpi tāvattāvat parisamāptyā tāvatyupāye nijahṛdayasaṃvādabalāditi. Ata eva sambaddho'vakīrṇaśca yatrārthaḥ samavakārastadāha aṅko'ṅka iti, turvyatireke aṅkatrayasambandho bhavati, na tvaṅgo'ṅgaḥ parasparamityarthaḥ. Kāvyabandhamiti. sarvaṃ vastu kāvyabandhopaśliṣṭamityarthaḥ anthā hi samavakāra ekaṃ kāryamiti keyaṃ bhaṇitiḥ.* --***Abhinavabhāratī.*** Vol.II (*Nāṭyaśāstra*, Delhi, 1988) p.322-23.

4. *Yathā bījādbhavedvṛkṣo vṛkṣātpuṣpaṃ phalaṃ yathā .*
tathā mūlaṃ rasāḥ sarve tebhyo bhāvā vyavasthitāḥ..
Nāṭyaśāstra. VII.38.

5. *Pratipattiśabdena ca gauravam, prāptiḥ, pravṛttiḥ prāgalbhyam, pratibhā jñānamiti ṣaḍapyarthāstantreṇopāttāḥ. tatra gauravaṃ mādhuryādiguṇasampatyā sahṛdayabahumānam. Prāptiḥ nirvahaṇaprāptiḥ. Pravṛttiḥ svayameva-saṃghaṭanārūḍhiḥ .*

Prāgalbhyaṃ doṣarāhityena niśśaṅkatā. pratibhā pratyutpannā matiḥ tattaducitaśabdārthaviśeṣalābhaphalā. jñānaṃ yathātattvasaṃvedanam . Eṣvartheṣvasya prayogā draṣṭavyāḥ. Tathā ca Keśavasvāmī "pratipattistu gauraveprāptau pravṛttau prāgalbhye pratibhājñānayorapī"ti. Ete ca dharmā yathāsambhavaṃ mukhyatayā gauṇatayā ca vaktṛviṣayatvena vāgarthaviṣayatvena ca veditavyāḥ. **(Aruṇagirinātha's Com. *Raghuvaṃśa,* Tripunithura ed. p.3-4.)**

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ISBN : 81-85268-93-2

प्रतिभा प्रकाशन
PRATIBHA PRAKASHAN
(Oriental Publishers & Book-Sellers)
29/5, Shakti Nagar, Delhi-110007